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UNIVERSITY OF SUSSEX 
PETER JAMES I’ANSON LUSH, PhD PSYCHOLOGY 
THE SENSE OF AGENCY IN HYPNOSIS AND MEDITATION 
SUMMARY 
 
The sense of agency is the experience of being the initiator of our intentional actions and 
their outcomes. According to higher order thought theory, a representation becomes 
conscious when there is a higher order state about it. Thus conscious experience, 
including that of intentions, is metacognitive. The experience of involuntariness 
characteristic of hypnotic responding may be attributable to the formation and 
maintenance of inaccurate metacognitive higher order states of intending. Conversely, the 
practice of Buddhist mindfulness meditation may develop accurate metacognition, 
including higher order states of intending. Highly hypnotisable people and mindfulness 
meditators may therefore occupy two ends of a spectrum of metacognitive ability with 
regard to unconscious intentions. The presented research investigated predicted trait 
differences in cognitive tasks which directly or indirectly reflect metacognition of 
intentions: the timing of an experience of an intention to move and the compressed time 
interval between a voluntary action and its outcome, known as intentional binding. As an 
implicit measure of sense of agency, intentional binding was also employed to investigate 
the veridicality of reports of the experience of involuntariness in hypnotic responding. 
Additionally, while hypnosis presents a unique opportunity to investigate reliable changes 
in agentic experience, existing hypnosis screening instruments are time consuming and 
present a barrier to wider adoption of hypnosis as an instrument for studying 
consciousness. Here a revised, time-efficient hypnosis screening procedure (the SWASH) 
is presented.  
Consistent with predictions, highly hypnotisable groups reported later awareness of motor 
intentions than less hypnotisable groups and meditators earlier awareness than non-
meditators. In an intentional binding task, high hypnotisables showed less binding of an 
action-outcome toward an action (outcome binding) than low hypnotisables and 
meditators more outcome binding than non-meditators. Outcome binding was reduced in 
post-hypnotic involuntary action compared to voluntary action. It is proposed that 
intentional binding is driven by a cue combination mechanism and that these differences 
reflect varying precision of motor intention related information in reported timing 
judgements. The SWASH was found to be a reliable hypnosis screening instrument. 
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Chapter I 
General Introduction 
 
The sense of agency is the experience we have of being the initiator of our 
actions and controller of their outcomes (Haggard & Chambon 2012). The experience of 
agency is central to human experience and, because it supports attributions of 
responsibility, is foundational to the formal and informal structures upon which 
societies depend (Haggard, 2017; Moore, 2016). Distortions of sense of agency can 
occur in a wide range of conditions, but are most widely recognised as a central feature 
of certain neurological disorders (e.g., corticobasal syndrome) and psychiatric disorders 
(e.g., schizophrenia; Moore & Fletcher, 2012; Rowe & Wolpe, 2015).  
The experience of involuntariness is the central feature in all hypnotic 
responding (Weitzenhoffer, 1980). Therefore, hypnosis is characterised by changes in 
the sense of agency (Polito, Barnier & Woody, 2013). Despite this, there has been very 
little empirical research relating hypnosis directly to contemporary scientific 
investigations of the sense of agency (Terhune, Cleeremans, Raz & Lynn, 2017). The 
work in this thesis draws predictions from the cold control theory of hypnosis, which 
posits that to respond hypnotically is to perform a voluntary action but to (intentionally) 
experience the action as involuntary (Barnier, Dienes & Mitchell, 2008; Dienes, 2012; 
Dienes & Perner, 2008). Specifically, cold control theory predicts that the ability to 
respond to hypnotic suggestion reflects relatively low conscious access to information 
relating to intentions. Conversely, the practice of mindfulness meditation centrally 
involves awareness of intentions (Grossenbacher & Quaglia, 2017) and so experienced 
mindfulness meditators might be expected to develop improved conscious access to 
intentions (consistent with this suggestion, experienced meditators have been found to 
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be less hypnotisable than non-meditators; Dienes et al, 2015; Semmens-Wheeler & 
Dienes, 2012a). 
The research presented in this thesis applies measures established in 
psychological research into the sense of agency to hypnosis and meditation to test the 
theory that hypnosis and meditation are related in opposing ways to awareness of 
intentions. The results presented here inform theories of hypnosis, of the sense of 
agency, of the nature and effects of mindfulness meditation, and of theories of the 
mechanisms that drive the intentional binding effect (an established measure in sense of 
agency research). Additionally, the development of a hypnosis screening procedure 
informs theoretical approaches to the induction of hypnosis and provides a more 
efficient tool for identifying hypnotisability.  
The sense of agency and the experience of volition  
The sense of agency presents an elusive target for empirical research as it is 
complex, consisting of various elements (e.g., an experience of intention over causes, a 
sense of initiation and a sense of control; Pacherie, 2007) and has an ambiguous 
phenomenology (Gallagher, 2012). The experience of agency has been described as 
phenomenologically “thin” (i.e., not as “crisp and vivid” as other experiences; 
Metzinger, 2006, p.20), as it is generally pre-reflective, forming a background to 
experience rather than being the focus of attention (Gallagher, 2012; Haggard & Eitam, 
2015). However, some intentional actions produce relatively “thick” phenomenology 
(Bayne & Pacherie, 2007) and if expectations are violated and the sense of agency over 
an outcome is lost (as when a routine action fails to produce the anticipated outcome), 
the experience can be striking (Haggard, 2007). 
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Theorists have proposed a division of sense of agency into two components, 
distinguishing between a background, implicit or pre-reflective sense of agency and 
explicit, reflective judgements of agency, e.g., whether or not one was the agent in a 
particular case (Bayne & Pacherie, 2007; David, Newen & Vogeley, 2008; Gallagher, 
2012; Synofzik, Vosgerau & Newen, 2008). However, opinions differ as to whether a 
pre-reflective sense of agency supports reflective judgements of agency (e.g., Bayne & 
Pacherie, 2007; Gallagher, 2012; Synofzik, Vosgerau & Voss, 2013) or if the two 
components are fully independent (e.g., Chambon, Filevich & Haggard, 2014).  
The sense of agency has to distinguish between actions and outcomes that are 
intended and those that are not (even a sneeze might have significant consequences 
when holding a hot drink on a crowded bus). Distinctions between voluntary and 
involuntary action can be made on the basis of relative influence of endogenous and 
exogenous processes. For example, reflex actions driven by neuronal activity in the 
spinal cord might be considered to lie at the opposite end of a spectrum from actions 
generated by high level cognitive processes which are relatively distal from external 
influence (Schuur & Haggard, 2011). An alternative approach (at least for animals 
capable of the communication of introspection) is to draw a distinction between 
voluntary and involuntary action based on reported experience (Frith, 2013). 
Contemporary research into sense of agency primarily arises from two 
theoretical approaches, which differ in the emphasis they place on different cues in the 
generation of sense of agency. The theory of apparent mental causation (Wegner & 
Wheatley, 1999) proposes the relatively strong influence of external contextual cues. 
Here, sense of agency depends on three aspects surrounding an action-outcome event: it 
must be associated with a prior thought, it must be consistent with that thought and there 
must be minimal causal ambiguity regarding the outcome (for a thorough treatment and 
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criticisms see Wegner, 2004).  There is plentiful evidence consistent with this theory 
(Wegner, 2002). For example, participants report agency over a mouse cursor they do 
not control if the cursor stops on an image which is consistent with a presented word 
(Wegner & Wheatley, 1999). A second example comes from a study of “vicarious 
agency”, in which the experimenter’s arms were so placed as to give the visual 
impression that they belonged to the participant (Wegner, Sparrow & Winerman, 2004). 
Here, participants reported a stronger sense of agency over the experimenter’s arm 
movements when they heard prior instructions about the movements. However, there 
may be some cases in which a sense of agency can occur without consistent prior 
thought (e.g., in ‘flow states’; see Carruthers, 2010). Furthermore, the theory of 
apparent mental causation may downplay the role of internal motor system information, 
which is likely to provide a relatively reliable cue for agency judgements (Synofzik, 
Vosgerau & Voss, 2013).  
By contrast, in motor comparator models of agency efferent predictions of the 
sensory information arising from action-outcomes are compared to afferent information, 
with a sense of agency arising if there is a close match between predicted and afferent 
information (Frith, Blakemore & Wolpert, 2000). The comparator model of sense of 
agency has, for example, been employed to explain why we are generally unable to 
tickle ourselves, and there is neurobiological and behavioural evidence consistent with 
this proposal (Blakemore, Frith, and Wolpert, 1998; 2000). There is also evidence for 
changes in activity in the parietal cortex and cerebellum accompanying a hypnotically 
suggested experience of involuntariness consistent with a comparator model of sense of 
agency (Blakemore, Oakley & Frith, 2003). However, a comparator model is unable to 
accommodate a wide range of experimental results, and therefore does not sufficiently 
explain the generation of the sense of agency (see Carruthers, 2012; Frith, 2012). For 
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example, in Wegner et al’s (2004) vicarious agency study, participants’ judgements of 
agency were based on observation of the movements of others and, as their own arms 
were not moving, these judgements could not have been based on efferent motor 
information.  
The failure of existing models to accommodate the full range of experimental 
results relating to sense of agency has led to the proposal of theoretical models which 
argue that the sense of agency arises from a combination of internal, external, predictive 
and retrospective cues (Moore, Wegner & Haggard, 2009; Synofzik, Vosgerau & 
Lindner, 2009). These approaches draw on models of cross-modal cue combination 
which have been employed to explain the perception of purely external stimuli. 
Information from multiple modalities must be combined to disambiguate information 
streams and create stable perception of the environment (for reviews see Ernst & 
Bülthoff, 2004; Seilheimer, Rosenberg & Angelaki, 2014). One strategy for cue 
combination is integration by maximum-likelihood estimation (MLE), in which the 
reliability of a sensory estimate is increased by combining signals from different 
modalities based on the relative precision (or inverse variance) of each cue (e.g., Alais 
& Burr, 2004; Ernst & Banks, 2002). Moore & Fletcher (2012) argue that the 
integration of cues in the generation of sense of agency is a case of maximum-likelihood 
estimation and that therefore the relative reliability of a cue determines its weighting in 
generating the sense of agency (e.g., in situations where motor intention-related 
information is relatively unreliable, external agency cues should dominate)1. For  
     1In cross-modal perception of e.g., spatially or temporally located stimuli, there will always be a time 
or a place of an external object to be estimated. Applying a similar model to sense of agency requires that 
it is a constant feature of the environment (like time or space). Synofzik (2015) argues that this arises 
from the repeated experience of contingencies in relation to a minimal self.  
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example, in Wegner, Sparrow & Winerman’s (2004) vicarious agency experiment, the 
absence of motor intention related information would result in the relatively high 
weighting of external visual cues in forming an experience of agency.  
Measuring sense of agency 
The sense of agency can be investigated by explicit subjective reports; for 
example, asking participants to respond to questions about whether or not they were 
responsible for a particular outcome (e.g., Ritterband-Rosenbaum et al, 2011) or rate 
how much agency they felt over a particular action (e.g., Sato & Yasuda, 2005; Wegner 
et al, 2004). Explicit reports of judgements of agency may be susceptible to demand 
characteristics and, given the theoretical distinction between reflective and pre-
reflective sense of agency, might influence the target of investigation (Wolpe & Rowe, 
2014). 
Implicit measures have also been developed to measure sense of agency. Such 
measures are sensitive to agency, but require no explicit agency-related reflection and 
are therefore relatively protected against demand characteristics. However, it is unclear 
as to whether or not implicit measures and explicit measures are measuring the same 
target. For example, a partial dissociation has been demonstrated between explicit 
judgements of agency and intentional binding (Ebert & Wegner, 2010; Moore, 
Middleton, Haggard & Fletcher, 2012) but there is also evidence that implicit measures 
may be dissociable both from each other and from explicit judgements of agency 
(Dewey & Knoblich, 2014).While many authors argue that explicit and implicit 
measures may reflect the theoretical division between explicit judgements of agency 
and implicit, pre-reflective sense of agency (e.g., Ebert & Wegner, 2010; Moore, 
Middleton, Haggard & Fletcher, 2012; Obhi & Hall, 2011), addressing this question 
through empirical research presents a considerable challenge (Moore & Obhi, 2012). 
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Sensory attenuation is the reduced perceived intensity of a sensory stimulus 
arising from intentional action outcomes compared to externally triggered events (for a 
review see Hughes, Desantis & Waszak, 2012). This effect is thought to reflect the 
successful prediction of afferent information relating to action outcomes as described by 
a motor comparator model of sense of agency. Experimental evidence for sensory 
attenuation comes from varied methods including explicit report of self-tickling 
(Blakemore, Frith & Wolpert, 2000), signal detection theory approaches (Cardoso-
Leite, Mamassian, Schütz-Bosbach, & Waszak, 2010), force matching tasks (Shergill et 
al, 2005) and brain imaging showing a relative reduction in the sensory processing of 
self-triggered auditory (e.g., Martikainen, Kaneko, & Hari, 2005) or visual (e.g., Hughes 
& Waszak, 2011) stimuli compared to externally triggered stimuli. 
The intentional binding effect is a compressed time interval between intentional 
action and outcome when an outcome (typically an auditory tone) arises from an 
intentional action rather than a passive movement (Haggard, Clark & Kalogeras, 2002; 
for reviews see Hughes, Desantis & Waszak, 2012; Moore & Obhi, 2012; Wolpe & 
Rowe, 2014). The effect has been investigated using direct estimation of interval 
between action and outcome (e.g., Engbert, Wohlschläger & Haggard, 2008), by 
dichotomous judgement of synchrony (e.g., Cravo, Claessens & Baldo, 2011) or by 
reports of the judged time of action and outcome events (Haggard, Clark & Kalogeras, 
2002). In the latter method, participants report judgements of the position of a rapidly 
moving clock hand at the time of an occurrence of an action or of an outcome event. 
These timing judgements are taken in two conditions: a contingent condition in which 
the action causes the outcome, and a baseline condition in which each event occurs in 
isolation. Measured in this way, intentional binding consists of opposing shifts between 
the perceived time of events in baseline and in contingent conditions: a shift of the 
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outcome event toward the time of action (outcome binding) and a shift of the action 
towards the outcome (action binding).  
Intentional binding studies have provided evidence consistent with cue 
integration models of agency. For example, Moore & Haggard (2008) report that action 
binding can occur in the absence of an action-outcome when it is predictable 
(suggesting a role for sensorimotor prediction) and in the presence of an outcome when 
it is not predictable (suggesting a role for external cues). Furthermore, priming of action 
effects has a greater effect in passive than in voluntary action, an effect which may be 
attributable to increased weighting of primes in the absence of efferent sensorimotor 
information (Moore, Wegner & Haggard, 2009).  
Awareness of intentions 
The experience of volition in intentional action can be studied by the use of 
explicit report of the perceived time of an intention to move, known as W judgements 
(by contrast with reports of the perceived time of action, or M judgements; Libet et al, 
1983). Pacherie (2007) distinguishes between three forms of intention: future intentions 
(for which the goal is distal), present intentions (involving specific plans regarding the 
achievement of a goal in the present circumstances) and motor intentions (sensorimotor 
representations driving ongoing motor action in the pursuit of a goal). While Pacherie 
considers W judgements to be a measure of present intentions, the timing of intentions 
is likely to draw on efferent information relating to motor intentions and therefore might 
be best considered as corresponding to Pacherie’s concepts of both present and motor 
intentions (Gallagher, 2012). Here, the term motor intention will be used in a broad 
sense to describe the cognitive processes which may support W judgements. For 
example, activity in the presupplementary motor areas (preSMA) prior to movement 
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(which when averaged produces the readiness potential (RP); Shibisaki & Hallett, 2006) 
is considered to at least partly support awareness of motor intentions (e.g., Lau, Rogers, 
Haggard & Passingham, 2004; Libet, Gleason, Wright & Pearl, 1983).  
In a famous series of studies, participants watched an oscilloscope ‘clock’ and 
reported the perceived position of the clock ‘hand’ when they experienced an urge to 
move (Libet et al, 1983). Because the average time of onset of the readiness potential 
occurred before the average time of reported W judgement, Libet concluded that 
therefore, we become aware of our intentions after they have been initiated. Libet’s 
proposal generated considerable controversy, with criticisms aimed at both the 
empirical and philosophical assumptions supporting his conclusions (Freeman, Libet & 
Sutherland; see commentaries in Libet, 1987, 1999). Recently it has been argued that 
rather than a slow buildup of activity toward action, the RP is an artefact arising from 
the time locking of electroencephalography (EEG) signals to movement onset which 
reflects a stochastic decision process (Schurger, 2012; Schurger, Mylopoulos & 
Rosenthal, 2016). Drawing on this account, Schmidt, Jo, Wittmann & Hinterberger 
(2016) argue, therefore that differences in the Libet task (e.g., such as related to motor 
impulsivity; Caspar & Cleeremans 2015) might reflect differing propensity to act on 
information reflected in negative deflections of slow cortical potentials. Libet’s method 
has been employed to investigate hypnotic involuntariness; Haggard, Cartledge, Dafydd 
& Oakley (2004) tested the effect of a post-hypnotic suggestion of involuntariness on M 
judgements. 
Metacognition and Higher Order Thoughts 
Metacognition can be broadly defined as cognition about cognition (Flavel, 
1979). Nelson & Narens (1990, 1994) distinguish between an object level of cognitive 
processing and a meta-level which monitors and controls it. The meta-level is 
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sometimes considered synonymous with conscious awareness (e.g., Koriat, Ma’yan & 
Nussinson, 2006), while other authors argue that metacognitive processes can be 
unconscious (e.g., Timmermans, Schilbach, Pasquali & Cleeremans, 2012). According 
to Rosenthal’s higher order thought (HOT) theory of consciousness (Rosenthal, 2005; 
for a review of HOT theories see Carruthers, 2007), consciousness is a metacognitive 
process in which an unconscious first order cognitive state become conscious only when 
one has a HOT representing that one is in that state (Rosenthal, 2005). Such HOTs are 
not equivalent to introspective-awareness, as a second-order HOT will only become 
conscious if there is another (third-order) HOT about it. Rosenthal’s HOT theory 
assumes no particular functional role for consciousness as first order states, including 
intentions, have their causal and functional properties by virtue of which they are the 
states they are, quite independent of HOTs (Rosenthal, 2008). 
Therefore, according to HOT theory, it is possible that intentions can occur in 
the absence of awareness of intentions and that a tendency to have awareness of 
intentions can vary both according to context and between individuals. There is some 
evidence that HOTs are supported by activity in the prefrontal cortex (PFC), and in 
particular the dlPFC (for reviews see Lau & Rosenthal, 2011; Passingham & Wise, 
2012; for a conflicting view see Bor, Schwartzman, Barrett & Seth, 2017; Kozuch, 
2013).  
Hypnosis   
Hypnosis involves compelling changes in subjective experience which arise 
from the delivery of imaginative suggestions within a hypnotic context (i.e., the person 
delivering the suggestions is designated as a ‘hypnotist’; Kihlstrom, 2008). Hypnotic 
suggestions can be categorised according to whether they require a motor or a 
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perceptual-cognitive response, and also whether they suggest a particular experience 
will occur or a challenge that a behaviour or percept will be inhibited (Woody & 
Barnier, 2008; Woody, Barnier & McConkey, 2005). An example of a direct motor 
suggestion is that the subject will raise their arm and an example of a motor challenge 
suggestion is that they would be unable to raise it. Similarly, a successful response to a 
perceptual cognitive suggestion might require a positive hallucination (e.g., hearing 
music) or a negative hallucination (e.g., being unable to see a ball which is has been 
placed on the floor). Hypnotic responding is partly characterised by the verisimilitude of 
suggested experiences (Kihlstrom, 2008). However, the central feature common to all 
hypnotic responding is the experience of involuntariness over a mental or physical act 
(e.g., Lynn, Kirsch, & Hallquist, 2008; Weitzenhoffer, 1980).  
In scientific research, the ability to respond to hypnotic suggestion 
(hypnotisability) is measured by the use of standardised scales, which consist of an 
induction (delivered from a script) and a set of imaginative suggestions (for reviews see 
Terhune & Cardeña, 2016; Woody & Barnier, 2008). Hypnotisability scores can be 
generated by recording dichotomous responses for each suggestion, based on 
behavioural indicators of a successful response (e.g., Bowers, 1993). While such 
‘objective’ scoring is commonly employed, subjective scales which allow participants 
to provide a quantitative measure of changes in experience may help distinguish 
between genuine hypnotic responding and conformity (Bowers, Laurence & Hart, 
1988). Hypnotisability can be considered a stable trait (Morgan, Johnson & Hilgard, 
1974; Piccione, Hilgard & Zimbardo, 1989) but, when tested out of the hypnotic 
context, reliable correlates of hypnotisability are few and explain little of the variation 
in hypnotic responding (Dienes et al, 2009). Response expectancies have been found to 
correlate with hypnotisability (Braffman & Kirsch 1999), but still leave much of the 
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variability in hypnotic responding unexplained (Benham, Woody, Wilson & Nash, 
2006). The strongest predictor of ability to respond to an imaginative suggestion 
following a hypnotic induction is the ability to respond to an imaginative suggestion 
without an induction (Braffman and Kirsch, 1999). Individual differences in 
hypnotisability may therefore at least partly reflect differences in a specific ability to 
experience involuntariness in response to imaginative suggestions. 
Woody and Sadler (2008; see also Kirsch & Lynn, 1998; Lynn & Green, 2011) 
draw a broad distinction between sociocognitive theories and dissociation theories of 
hypnotic responding. Sociocognitive theories (e.g., Spanos, 1986; Lynn, Rhue & 
Weekes, 1990; for a review see Lynn, Kirsch & Hallquist, 2008) argue that hypnotic 
responding can be explained in the same terms as other social behaviours, while 
dissociation theories (e.g., Hilgard 1992; Kihlstrom, 1985; for a review see Woody & 
Sadler, 2008) argue for an innate mechanism which specifically supports hypnotic 
responding. In sociocognitive theories, hypnotic responding is goal-directed and 
changes in experience occur as a direct result of contextual expectations about the 
hypnotic situation (e.g., that it will involve the experience of involuntariness (see Green, 
Page, Rasekhy, Johnson, & Bernhardt, 2006). 
  In dissociation theories, hypnotic responding arises from a dissociation 
between either cognitive control processes and behaviour (dissociated control) or 
between cognitive control processes and experience (Woody & Sadler, 2008). The 
important distinction here is that in dissociated control, hypnotic involuntariness reflects 
a genuine lack of top-down control, while in dissociated experience (as in 
sociocognitive approaches) hypnosis is goal-directed and driven by top-down processes. 
Hilgard’s neo-dissociation theory (1977, 1992), proposes that the experience of 
involuntariness in hypnotic responding is due to an ‘amnesic barrier’ between the 
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monitoring and control processes of an ‘executive ego’; Hilgard, 1986, p.234), and is 
therefore an example of dissociated experience. Conversely, dissociated control theory 
(Woody & Bowers, 1994) argues that executive processes supported by the frontal lobes 
are weakened in hypnotic responding, so that actions are triggered without executive 
control by a contention scheduling system which (according to Norman and Shallice, 
1986) normally drives habitual behaviour. Dissociated control approaches conflict with 
a large body of evidence supporting the role of top-down cognitive processing in 
hypnotic responding (for a review see Terhune, Cleeremans, Raz & Lynn, 2017). 
While proponents of sociocognitive approaches claim that hypnosis involves no 
special mechanisms over and above those used to describe other social behaviours, there 
is consensus that reports of hypnotically-induced phenomena reflect genuine changes in 
experience (Lynn, Hirst & Hallquist, 2008). Sociocognitive theories (e.g., Spanos, 
1986) propose that changes in experience in hypnosis arise directly from, for example, 
expectation and motivation and appropriate strategies (e.g. directing attention, engaging 
in goal-directed fantasies). A twist on this idea can be found in response set theory 
(Kirsch & Lynn, 1997; Lynn, Rhue & Weekes, 1990) which draws on the theory that 
the experience of agency is a retrospective illusion (Wegner, 2002) to argue that all 
behaviour is unintentional. On this approach, the lack of awareness of the cognitive 
strategies employed to fulfil strategic goals in hypnotic responding is therefore no 
different to a lack of awareness of cognitive strategies in solving a mathematical puzzle 
(Lynn et al, 1991).  
The cold control theory of hypnosis (Dienes & Perner, 2007; Dienes, 2012; see 
also Barnier, Dienes & Mitchell, 2008) provides a parsimonious unifying path through 
varied theoretical approaches to hypnosis. This interpretation draws on a central 
implication of HOT theories; intentions, as first order states, are unconscious (Rosenthal 
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2008; for a review of empirical evidence for unconscious goal-directed behaviour see 
Custers & Aarts, 2010). According to cold control theory, hypnotic responding is 
attributable to alterations in HOTs directed at first order intentions. For example, a 
successful response to hypnotic suggestion that one’s arm will rise involuntarily 
involves an intact first order motor intention, but an inaccurate HOT directed at it. 
Therefore, hypnotic responding requires the ability to form and maintain inaccurate 
HOTs of intending. 
 Cold control theory is not restricted to explaining response to motor 
suggestions, as cognitive-perceptual suggestions are also claimed to arise as a result of 
changes in HOTs of intending.  For example, experiencing a hypnotically suggested 
hallucination requires that the subject intentionally imagines the suggested percept, but 
generates and maintains an inaccurate HOT of that intending. A central implication of 
cold control theory, therefore, is that hypnosis should produce no special abilities; any 
behaviour an individual can perform in a hypnotic context they should also be able to 
perform out of the hypnotic context and without the experience of involuntariness. Cold 
control theory is therefore consistent with the proposal that hypnotisability may be 
composed of a core ability and domain specific abilities (Woody, Barnier & McConkey, 
2005). This may partly explain why pass-rates are so much lower for cognitive-
perceptual suggestions than for motor suggestions; it is perhaps more common to be 
able to intentionally raise one’s arm than to intentionally imagine a percept which in the 
absence of an experience of intending could pass as a hallucination (it may also be more 
difficult to avoid a HOT of intending to hallucinate than to perform a motor action; 
Dienes & Perner, 2007).  
Cold control theory is consistent with dissociation theories in that a particular 
mechanism is proposed to underlie hypnotic responding (but note that cold control 
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theory is not only applicable to the hypnotic context and the ability to form and 
maintain inaccurate HOTs of intending may support a wide variety of phenomena in 
which goal directed behaviour is experienced as unintended, e.g., spirit possession or 
channeling, automatic writing or glossolalia; Dienes & Perner, 2007). The theory is also 
in agreement with sociocognitive theories that argue for a central role for expectation 
and context and that hypnotic responding is goal-directed and intentional (e.g., Kirsch & 
Lynn, 1997; Spanos 1986) and not with dissociated control theories.  
There have been few published studies which directly test the predictions of cold 
control theory. However, Dienes & Hutton (2013) report increased hypnotisability 
arising from disruption of dlPFC (a brain area which may support HOTs; Lau & 
Rosenthal, 2011) by repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS). Additionally, 
Semmens-Wheeler, Dienes and Duka (2013) report increased hypnotisability following 
administration of alcohol, which the authors argue reflects a reduction in metacognitive 
ability arising from alcohol-induced disruption of prefrontal cortex (see also evidence 
that alcohol reduces metacognitive awareness of mind-wandering; Sayette, Reichle, and 
Schooler, 2009).  
 So hypnotic responding involves contextually triggered changes in the sense of 
agency, which may rely on an ability to form and maintain inaccurate HOTs of 
intending.  This may reflect an ability to rely more on external cues to agency (e.g., 
suggestions from a hypnotist) than internal cues (e.g., motor intentions) in a hypnotic 
context. 
Mindfulness meditation  
Mindfulness (a 19th century translation of the Pali word sati; Bodhi, 2011) is an 
important concept in Buddhist meditation practice which has come to be an influential 
23 
in the West through its adoption in psychotherapeutic techniques, perhaps most 
famously in Jon Kabat-Zinn’s Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction (MBSR) program 
(Kabat-Zinn, 2011). Clinical, psychological and neuroscientific mindfulness research 
has expanded rapidly since the late 1990s and is now applied to diverse areas including 
primary, secondary and higher education, business and leadership (Williams & Kabat-
Zinn, 2011), and clinical interventions derived from Buddhist meditation practice  have 
been demonstrated to be effective in improving psychological health (Hofmann, 
Sawyer, Witt & Oh, 2010; Keng, Smoski & Robins, 2011) .  
In Buddhist sources, there is no single definition of mindfulness, as the concept 
has developed through a wide variety of scholastic traditions (Dreyfus, 2011; Gethin, 
2011) and the varied definitions within traditions are often obscure (e.g., ‘not wobbling’ 
or ‘not drifting’; Dreyfus, 2011) or established in metaphor (e.g., as a guard watching 
the doors of a house, Gethin, 2011). Kabat-Zinn (2003) defines mindfulness as “the 
awareness that emerges through paying attention on purpose, in the present moment, 
and non-judgmentally to the unfolding of experience moment by moment” (p.145). This 
emphasis on present moment awareness and a non-judgmental attitude toward thoughts 
is a common feature of Western definitions of mindfulness (e.g., Bishop et al, 2004; 
Kristeller, 2007). However, such an approach may mischaracterise the Buddhist concept 
of mindfulness, which fundamentally involves remembrance, and also making 
judgements about particular mental states in progressing toward a particular ethical goal 
(Bodhi, 2011; Dreyfus, 2011; Gethin, 2011; Kuan, 2012). Therefore, an attitude of non-
attachment or acceptance in mindfulness is perhaps better communicated by the term 
equanimity, which Desbordes et al (2015) define (in relation to mindfulness) as “an 
even-minded mental state or dispositional tendency toward all experiences or 
objects, regardless of their affective valence (pleasant, unpleasant or neutral) or 
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source” (p.357). This concept should be considered distinct from indifference, which, 
while apparently similar, can be considered as oppositional to equanimity (Bodhi, 
2000); thus an attitude of curiosity is sometimes used to characterize mindfulness 
(compare the Pali metaphor of mindfulness as a surgeon’s probe to gather 
information, Analayo, 2003, p. 53). One can feel equanimity towards pleasant or 
unpleasant mental states, while judging one such mental state (consistent with the task 
at hand) should be sustained in awareness and another let go. 
 Mindfulness practice is derived from the central teaching of the Buddha on 
mindfulness, the Satipatthana Sutta. This work consists of a series of discourses 
(purportedly in the words of the Buddha) which present a number of meditation 
practices to develop mindfulness within four domains (Analayo, 2003). While the first 
of these domains relates mindfulness to awareness of the body, the remainder all 
involve awareness of mental states (Dienes et al, 2015). Therefore, the metacognitive 
monitoring and control of cognitive processes is centrally involved in mindfulness 
practice (e.g., in monitoring and redirecting attention; Bishop et al, 2014; Brefczynski-
Lewis et al, 2007).  
Dahl, Lutz & Davidson (2015; see also Lutz, Slagter, Dunne & Davidson, 2008) 
identify two styles of meditation within an attentional family of mindfulness meditation 
practices common to multiple Buddhist traditions including Zen, Vipissana and Tibetan 
Buddhism. Examples of focused attention practices include samatha meditation within 
the Theravadan tradition, which has the aim of developing concentration (samadhi; 
Kuan, 2012). Focused attention meditation involves maintaining attentional focus on a 
single object, for example, one’s own breath. Such focused attention is distinct from that 
common every day (for example when absorbed in an activity) as it requires the 
metacognitive monitoring of mental states (or “meta-awareness’” Dahl, Lutz & 
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Davidson, 2015, p.516), to prevent attention drifting from the object. Note that, contrary 
to secular definitions of mindfulness as non-judgmental, this process requires assessing 
whether a particular mental state is consistent with intentions (Dreyfus, 2011; Gethin, 
2011). 
 By contrast, in open-monitoring meditation there is no pre-selected object of 
attention. Rather, the “attentional scope is expanded to incorporate the flow of 
perceptions, thoughts, emotional content and/or subjective awareness” (Dahl, Lutz & 
Davidson, 2015, p.516). Open monitoring practices are therefore metacognitive. Open 
monitoring techniques are, for example, related to the Theravadan tradition of insight or 
vipissana meditation, with the aim of developing a direct understanding of the nature of 
things (Kuan, 2012). When meditation includes insight, attention is not held on one 
mental content but expands to consider properties of mental states, such as their 
transience or felt ownership, relevant to the Buddhist analysis of flourishing. Novice 
meditators are often introduced to focused attention techniques before open monitoring, 
as metacognitive skills developed by focused attention meditation may aid open 
monitoring (Lutz, Slagter, Dunne & Davidson, 2008).   
Theoretical approaches that propose a key role for metacognition in mindfulness 
meditation may also be supported by the Buddhist literature. For example, a 
contemporary Buddhist scholar, Kuan (2012) finds support for interpretations of 
samatha and vipissana meditation as processes of metacognitive monitoring and control 
in the Theravadan Pali canon:  
“Some psychologists suggest that mindfulness corresponds to 
metacognition. My study shows that this correspondence can be corroborated by 
Buddhist literature since sati ‘mindfulness’ consists in 
steering saññā ‘cognition’ in such a way that one's cognition is rendered 
wholesome in a Buddhist sense. While mindfulness and concentration both 
involve attention (manasikāra), mindfulness in particular plays a pivotal role in 
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regulating attention. In the case of vipassanā (insight) meditation, attention is 
regulated by mindfulness in such a way that it is not focused on a single object, 
but is directed to monitor the ever-changing experiences from moment to 
moment in a way conformable to Buddhist doctrine, so that the practitioner 
attains ‘metacognitive insight’ whereby he recognizes the nature of all things as 
impermanent, unsatisfactory and not-Self. In the case of samatha (serenity) 
meditation, in order to attain the state of ‘concentration’, one has to concentrate 
one's attention on a single object. Mindfulness picks an object as the focus of 
‘selective attention’, that is ekagga ‘one-pointedness’ in Buddhist terminology, 
and monitors whether attention is focused on the chosen object to ensure that the 
state of concentration is maintained.”  (p.55) 
 
So, there is agreement between secular and Buddhist theorists that mindfulness 
is a form of metacognition. While metacognition of intentions is part of the fourth 
application of mindfulness described in the Satipathana Sutta (Analayo, 2003), it is not 
generally presented of being of particular significance to mindfulness meditation. 
However, arguably metacognition of intentions is central to both focused attention and 
open monitoring practice. In focused attention meditation, one must sustain an intention 
to maintain concentration on a particular object, during which other intentions may 
arise, and these must be monitored and controlled in order to sustain attention. Repetti 
(2010) argues, therefore, that metacognition of intentions is at the core of mindfulness 
meditation practice, and that it develops awareness of intentions: 
 “Meditation cultivates an increasing awareness of pre-conscious, 
impersonal cognitive/volitional forces that fuel distractions, engage and direct 
attention, and trigger actions, and it simultaneously cultivates volitional 
detachment and liberation-oriented volitions and metavolitions. As the 
practitioner becomes more aware of behavioral triggers, she becomes more able 
to refrain from acting on them. Thus, Meditation is a form of metamental 
training that increases volitional self-regulation (autonomy).” (p.177) 
 
Grossenbacher & Quaglia (2017) present a parsimonious model of mindfulness 
meditation which places a central emphasis on metacognition of intentions. The 
Contemplative Cognition Framework identifies three constructs as being central to 
mindfulness and meditation: intended attention, attention to intention and awareness of 
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transient information (or present moment awareness). Here, attention is defined as a 
process that modulates the efficiency of other ongoing processes and intention is 
defined as a process of motivation that specifies a goal and makes further processing to 
achieve that goal more likely. Awareness entails conscious experience and makes 
cognitive representations available to other processes (e.g., Baars, 1997; Cleeremans & 
Jiménez; 2002). These three distinct attention related processes together constitute the 
cognitive processes that characterise mindfulness meditation. Grossenbacher & Quaglia 
distinguish between intentions to attend and attention to intentions, and argue that it is 
the interplay of these in relation to attention to transient information (in the present 
moment) which constitutes mindfulness meditation. Mindfulness meditation therefore 
involves intentions to attend in the present moment; focused attention involves an 
intention to pay present moment attention to a particular object (and the intention to 
notice when attention drifts from this object; Latham, 2016), while in open monitoring 
the intention is to pay attention to any mental states which happen to arise. Successfully 
maintaining an intention to attend in the present moment requires the metacognitive 
monitoring and modulation of intentions, of both the intention to attend and of any 
conflicting intentions that may arise.  
Latham (2016) relates OM and FA meditation to higher order thought theories, 
drawing on a simple distinction between 1st order states (which are not about other 
mental states) and higher order states (which are about other mental states). On this 
interpretation, the intention to pay focused attention to an object (as in FA practices) is 
an intention to maintain a 1st order metal state, which is likely to also involve an 
intention to notice whenever attention shifts from the object. Fulfilling such an intention 
requires a HOT about the contents of the 1st order state. Open monitoring practices, on 
the other hand can involve the monitoring of both 1st and 2nd order mental states by 
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higher order states (depending on which mental states arise). However, OM may still 
involve HOTs of 1st order intentions, as such mental states may be amongst those 
arising during monitoring. Long-term meditation practice may develop enhanced 
phenomenology of HOTs (just as experienced artists or musicians are capable of more 
detailed perceptions relating to their area of expertise), which in turn may improve 
metacognitive monitoring (Latham, 2016). 
So, Buddhist meditation fundamentally involves practicing metacognition of 1st 
order intentions, and therefore may develop finer-grained HOTs of intending. The 
centrality of awareness of intentions to Buddhist practice has been related to the 
experimental tradition pertaining to awareness of intentions in psychological science. 
For example, Dreyfus (2011) argues that mindfulness practitioners “should be able to 
distinguish more carefully their own intentions and the degree to which those precede 
their actions or fail to do so” (p. 53) and Repetti (2010, p.207) that “meditators scores 
on the temporal disparity between neural volitions and mental volitions will be 
significantly less than those of non-meditators”. Consistent with these suggestions, there 
is evidence that Buddhist meditators may have improved access to negative deflections 
of slow cortical potentials which, when averaged, produces the readiness potential (Jo, 
Wittmann, Hinterberger & Schmidt, 2014; see also Jo, Wittmann, Borghardt, 
Hinterberger & Schmidt, 2014). Furthermore, there is evidence that meditators are less 
hypnotisable than non-meditators, perhaps because they have finer-grained concepts of 
1st order intentions (Semmens-Wheeler, 2013; Dienes et al 2015). 
While there is evidence that meditation may improve a range of cognitive 
functions, e.g., attention and memory (for reviews see Chiesa, Calati & Seretti, 2013; 
Tang, Hölzel & Posner, 2015), there is little empirical research relating to the proposal 
that experienced meditators may have improved metacognition in other domains. 
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However, there is some consistent evidence from longitudinal studies of mindfulness 
training; metacognitive judgements of accuracy in a memory task are improved 
following a 2-week mindfulness meditation intervention (Baird, Mrazek, Phillips & 
Schooler, 2014), and the frequency of self-caught mind wandering is increased 
following mindfulness meditation training (Mrazak et al, 2012; Levinson et al, 2014; 
Zanesco et al 2016).  
Aims of the thesis 
The main aim of this thesis was to explore predictions arising from the cold 
control theory of hypnosis – that different levels of trait hypnotisability and experience 
of mindfulness meditation would be reflected in cognitive measures which may be 
sensitive to metacognitive access to first order intentions. A secondary aim was to 
investigate whether or not explicit reports of the experience of involuntariness in 
hypnotic responding are reflected in an implicit measure of sense of agency. Finally, in 
order to increase the viability of hypnosis research to the wider research community, we 
aimed to produce a more efficient instrument for identifying individual differences in 
trait hypnotisability.  
Chapter II employed an established paradigm to explore temporal judgements 
relating to the experience of volition. Across three studies, Libet clocks were used to 
compare the time of participants’ intentional motor actions to the time at which they 
experienced an intention to move. In the first study, data was collected from participants 
pre-screened for trait hypnotisability and experienced Buddhist mindfulness meditators. 
It was predicted that if hypnotisability is related to higher order access to first-order 
intentions, high hypnotisables would report later W judgements than low hypnotisables 
and meditators earlier W judgements than non-meditators. In the second and third 
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studies, hypnosis and meditation-naive participants completed a Libet clock task, were 
screened for hypnotisability and completed a mindfulness questionnaire to investigate 
relationships between these measures and trait mindfulness. It was predicted that there 
would be an inverse relationship between hypnotisability and both W judgement time 
and self-reported mindfulness. 
Chapter III investigated predicted differences in experienced Buddhist 
meditators and age-matched controls in an established implicit measure of sense of 
agency - intentional binding. Intentional binding may be driven by a cue combination 
mechanism in which the judged time of action or outcome events is an average of the 
temporal sensory information arising from each cue, weighted by precision of 
information. It was hypothesised that greater metacognitive access to motor intention-
related information in meditators would be reflected in opposing patterns in the two 
components of binding: the shift of reported outcome time toward the action (outcome 
binding) and the shift of the reported time of action toward the outcome (action 
binding). Specifically, greater access to motor-intentions in meditators was predicted to 
increase precision of information relating to action-timing, increasing the weighting of 
the action cue over both action and outcome time judgements and resulting in decreased 
action binding and increased outcome binding. Greater precision of action judgements 
was also predicted to be reflected in the variance of reported action time judgements. 
Chapter IV employed an intentional binding task in voluntary action, passive 
action and post-hypnotic involuntariness to investigate reports of involuntariness in 
hypnotic responding. In passive action, no motor intention information is available. It 
was hypothesised that the reported experience of involuntariness in hypnotic responding 
arises from the avoidance of motor intention-related information in the generation of 
higher order thoughts of intending. Compared to intentional action, there should be less 
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motor intention information available to support conscious timing judgements in both 
passive action and post-hypnotic involuntariness, and therefore less precision of action 
timing judgements. Thus, in the voluntary action condition there should be less variable 
action timing judgements, less action binding and more outcome binding than in the 
passive action and post-hypnotic involuntariness conditions. 
In Chapter V, an intentional binding task was performed by high and low 
hypnotisable participants. The aim of the study was to investigate predictions relating to 
the cold control theory of hypnosis and theoretical models of cue combination as a 
mechanism driving intentional binding. Greater metacognitive access to first order 
motor intention-related information was predicted to support relatively high precision of 
action timing judgements in low hypnotisables. In comparison to high hypnotisables, 
low hypnotisables were thus predicted to show less action binding, greater outcome 
binding and less variable timing of action judgements. 
Chapter VI presents normative data for a new hypnosis screening procedure (the 
Sussex-Waterloo Scale of Hypnotisability (SWASH) based on the Waterloo-Stanford 
Group C (WSGC) Scale of hypnotic susceptibility (Bowers, 1993). The primary aim 
was to produce an effective and time-efficient hypnotisability assessment tool which 
could increase the accessibility of hypnosis research to scientists interested in 
employing hypnosis instrumentally to reliably induce changes in conscious experience, 
e.g., changes in the experience of agency. A second aim was to reflect contemporary 
theoretical understanding in the induction script. Practical aims were addressed by 
including a subjective scale in addition to the dichotomous behavioural scoring of the 
WSCG to better capture changes in experience (and not merely behavioural response), 
making adaptations to increase the number of participants who could be screened in 
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single session and decreasing the length of the induction script to reduce the time 
required for a screening session. 
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Chapter II 
 
Metacognition of intentions in mindfulness and hypnosis 
 
 
Abstract 
In a famous series of experiments, Libet investigated the subjective timing of awareness 
of an intention to move, a task that can be considered a metacognitive judgement. The 
ability to strategically produce inaccurate metacognitions about intentions has been 
postulated to be central to the changes in judgements of agency common to all hypnotic 
responding. Therefore, differences in hypnotisability may be reflected in Libet’s measure. 
Specifically, the ability to sustain inaccurate judgements of agency displayed by highly 
hypnotisable people may result from their having coarser higher order representations of 
intentions. They therefore should report a delayed time of intention relative to less 
hypnotisable individuals.  Conversely, mindfulness practice aims at accurate 
metacognition, including of intentions, and may lead to the development of finer grained 
higher order representations of intending. Thus, the long-term practice of mindfulness 
may produce an earlier judgement of the time of an intention. We tested these groups 
using Libet’s task, and found that, consistent with predictions, highly hypnotisable people 
reported a later time of intention than less hypnotisable people and meditators an earlier 
time than non-meditators. In a further two studies we replicated the finding that 
hypnotisable people report later awareness of a motor intention and additionally found a 
negative relationship between trait mindfulness and this measure. Based on these 
findings, we argue that hypnotic response and meditation involve opposite processes. 
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General introduction 
Voluntary actions can be distinguished from involuntary or reflex actions in that 
they can, on reflection, be accompanied by awareness of intending to act, as 
investigated in the famous experiments of Libet and colleagues (Libet, Gleason, Wright 
& Pearl, 1983). In these studies, participants reported the time at which they 
experienced an 'urge' to move (W) whilst watching an oscilloscope ‘clock’. As such, 
Libet's W timing can be interpreted as a measure of temporal metacognition and as a 
chronometric measure of the sense of agency (Wolpe and Rowe, 2014). We use it to 
investigate the nature of both hypnotic responding and mindfulness, which both have, 
we argue, essential metacognitive components.  We will argue for the relationship 
between W and both hypnotic responding and mindfulness via higher order thought 
theory.  
Higher order theories of consciousness relate metacognition to conscious 
experience by arguing that a mental state becomes conscious by virtue of a second order 
process that is about it (Lau and Rosenthal, 2011). For example, a visual percept (e.g., 
“a red ball”, the first order state because it is about the world) becomes conscious by 
one becoming aware of it with a higher order state (e.g. one with the content, “I see a 
red ball”, higher order because it is about a mental state). Therefore, Libet’s W 
judgements can be interpreted as depending on higher order states targeting first order 
intentions. Changes in higher order processing (i.e. involving states about mental states) 
may be expected to result in changes to the content of consciousness.  Conversely, if 
normal events elicit unusual experiences, it may be hypothesised that higher order states 
are being employed in unusual ways. 
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Differences in the ability to experience hypnotic effects are considerable, and 
they can be measured using standardised scales based on the number of hypnotic 
suggestions to which an individual responds (Laurence, Beaulieu-Prevost, du Chene, 
2008; Woody & Barnier, 2008). As will be explained, it is possible to describe the 
unusual experiences of hypnosis as resulting from changes in higher order states. The 
classical hypnotic suggestion effect is characterised by the experience of 
involuntariness, with control instead attributed to the hypnotist or to some feature of the 
hypnotic suggestion (Weitzenhoffer, 1980). Alterations of the sense of agency are 
therefore central to hypnotic responding (Polito, Woody & Barnier, 2013), and this may 
provide a clue as to where to look to find reliable predictors of hypnotisability.  
A broad distinction can be made between theories of hypnosis that propose that 
hypnotic responding is intentional and those that do not. For example, according to 
dissociated control theory (Woody & Bowers, 1994), hypnosis causes a dissociation 
between action generation and executive control systems. In this case metacognitive 
judgements of agency during hypnotic responding are accurate, as subjects genuinely 
have no executive control over the action, and judge that they do not. A second 
theoretical approach argues that hypnotic responding is intentional (or under executive 
control), and is due to changes in self-monitoring (e.g, Kihlstrom, 1992; Spanos, 1986). 
The common denominator of the latter group of theories has been dubbed “cold control” 
(Dienes, 2012).  The word “cold” is used, because the theory supposes that intentional 
actions are carried out in the absence of an appropriate higher order thought (HOT).   
Cold control theory draws on Rosenthals’s HOT theory (Rosenthal, 2005) and 
proposes that the changes in the conscious experience of intending that define a 
hypnotic experience are the result of inaccurate HOTs about not having a first order 
intention. Therefore, hypnotic responding is made possible by an ability to relinquish 
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metacognition related to voluntary behaviour in response to a hypnotic situation 
(Dienes, 2012). So, by this account, an ideomotor suggestion to raise an arm results in a 
normal first order intention to raise the arm (cf. Schlegel, Alexander, Sinnott-
Armstrong, Roskies, Tse, & Wheatley, 2015). However, the intention fails to become 
conscious because there is no accurate HOT that might ordinarily be directed at the first 
order intention if a voluntary movement were being attended to (“I am intending to 
move my arm”).  There is in fact a directly contrary HOT, appropriate to the hypnotic 
situation, but inappropriate to the facts (“I am not intending to move my arm”, which 
constitutes a HOT broadly construed as a state about the nature, including non-
existence, of first order states; contrast Rosenthal, 2005). So, hypnotic responding 
requires an inaccurate HOT related to an intention, not merely the absence of an 
accurate HOT. If highly hypnotisable people are better able to form inaccurate HOTs of 
intending, this ability may be supported by their having a generally weaker coupling of 
HOTs to first order intentions (Semmens-Wheeler & Dienes, 2012).  Such a weaker 
coupling may be reflected by later awareness of an intention to move.  
Mindfulness can be defined as the cultivation of equanimous awareness of 
present experience as present experience, while sustaining that experience or letting it 
go according to task purposes (e.g. Williams & Kabat-Zinn, 2013).  For example, if the 
aim is to attend to the breath, when experiences unrelated to the breath arise they are 
judged as task unrelated, and allowed to pass; but experiences of the sensation of the 
breath on the lip are judged as appropriate and sustained. These judgments are made 
without feelings of disappointment or triumph. Mindfulness meditation is thus 
intrinsically an exercise in the (metacognitive) control and monitoring of mental 
processes (Bishop, Lau, Shapiro, Carlson, et al., 2004; Gethin, 2015; Jankowski & 
Holas, 2014; Teasdale, 1999). But apart from a recent report that mindfulness 
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meditation enhances metacognitive abilities (Baird, Mrazek, Phillips & Schooler, 2014), 
and evidence that mindfulness is associated with a more fine-grained awareness of 
emotions (e.g. Hill & Updegraff, 2010), there has been surprisingly little work relating 
meditation practice to metacognitive measures.  Awareness of intentions constitutes part 
of the four foundations of mindfulness (Analayo, 2003). The four foundations are:  First, 
awareness of the body in terms of its parts, postures and movements; second, awareness 
of feelings, specifically as pleasant, unpleasant or indifferent; third, awareness of mental 
states broadly in terms of whether they are conducive to flourishing or not ('deluded', 
'concentrated', etc); and, fourth, awareness of mental states classified in a number of 
detailed ways to bring out their nature and relation to flourishing (Analayo, 2003).  The 
final category includes intentions.  (The progression is from the more concrete given 
content of a mental state to more abstract mental state properties claimed as relevant to 
flourishing by Buddhist theory.)  Buddhist scholars have also argued that the practice of 
mindfulness should lead to an enhanced awareness of action intentions (Dreyfus, 2013). 
Therefore, mindfulness meditators might be expected to have an earlier awareness of an 
intention to move (cf Jo, Hinterberger, Wittmann & Schmidt, 2015, who report that 
meditators have greater access to the negative deflections of the slow cortical potentials 
averaged to produce the early readiness potential which is associated with conscious 
intentions to act).  
In summary, we have argued that highly hypnotisable people on the one hand, 
and meditators on the other, lie at two ends of a spectrum of metacognition or accurate 
HOTs related to intention (see Lifshitz, Cusumano & Raz, 2014, and Raz & Lifshitz, 
2016, for a discussion of different theoretical perspectives on the relation between 
meditation and hypnosis). In support of this assertion, it has been found that meditators 
score lower on hypnotisability scales than non-meditators and that highly hypnotisable 
38 
people score lower on trait mindfulness scales than low hypnotisables (Semmens-
Wheeler & Dienes, 2012). 
We used a variation of Libet's experimental method to time the conscious 
awareness of an intentional action in high, medium and low hypnotisable subjects, and 
in mindfulness meditators. Since cold control theory proposes that hypnotic responding 
relies on an ability to generate inaccurate HOTs of intending, it was predicted that the 
highly hypnotisable group would report an awareness of their intention as occurring 
later than other groups. On the basis that mindfulness meditation may lead to a tighter 
metacognitive coupling between first order intentions and their related HOTs, we 
predicted that mindfulness meditators would report an earlier W time than non-
meditators. 
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Study 1 
Study 1 method 
Participants 
Twelve long-term meditators with at least three years of meditation practice 
were recruited from Buddhist organisations in Brighton. One meditator was excluded as 
they reported an inability to read clocks. So, data from eleven meditators were analysed 
(5 males, 6 females; mean age = 37.8, SD = 16.4) with a mean of 12.7 years of 
meditation experience (SD=10.6) and a mean of 14.7 hours per month meditation 
(SD=11.3). Meditators were asked to provide details of their practice in simple terms 
and all reported using a form of mindfulness meditation. 
Fifty-four undergraduate participants of varying hypnotisability were recruited 
from the University of Sussex hypnosis screening database. Eight reported prior 
experience of meditation and were excluded, so data from seven highly hypnotisable (1 
male, 6 females; mean age =19.6, SD =2.1), nineteen low hypnotisable (19 females; 
mean age = 20.3, SD =6.9) and twenty medium hypnotisable subjects (3 males, 17 
females; mean age = 23.0, SD =6.0) are reported. Using a standard test of 
hypnotisability (Waterloo-Stanford Group Scale of Hypnotic Suggestibility, Form C 
(WSGC; Bowers, 1993) participants categorised as highly hypnotisable scored nine or 
above from a possible twelve (M = 9.29, SD = 0.50).  Medium hypnotisable participants 
scored between four and eight (M = 6.00, SD =1.41) and low hypnotisable subjects 
scored three or below (M = 1.95, SD = 1.22).  
Participants were recruited for the duration of one term, until there were no more 
responses. Bayesian analyses were used to assess sensitivity. As stopping was not 
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conditional on a function of the p-value, orthodox statistics assuming fixed N could be 
used (Cox & Mayo, 2010, section 10.1). Crucially, we used Bayesian analyses to 
indicate the strength of evidence for H1 versus H0; the measure of evidence is valid no 
matter what the stopping rule. 
Ethical approval was received from the University of Sussex ethics committee and 
informed consent was obtained from each participant before commencing with the study. 
Participants received cash payment of £5 or course credits. 
Apparatus and materials 
The apparatus, controlled by a PIC microcontroller, comprised two connected 
units: a clock (figure 1) and a switch assembly.  The clock had a conventional face, but 
the hour labels (1, 2, 3 … 12) were replaced with minute labels (5, 10, 15 … 60).  The 
clock’s single hand was driven by a stepper motor, requiring 2,400 steps to complete 
one revolution.  The motor was pulsed every millisecond, thus one revolution took 2.40 
s and the “minute” marks on the face represented increments of 40 ms.  When 
participants reported values on the clock face, these were converted to the equivalent 
number of milliseconds from the twelve o’clock (60) mark.  The clock was connected to 
a switch, the contacts being closed by a light metal sleeve, worn on the participant’s 
finger.  The sleeve was lined with soft foam, the arrangement being designed so that no 
tactile information was available to indicate whether the switch was closed or not; this 
could be deduced only via proprioceptive feedback.  In the rest position the finger, with 
its conducting sleeve, rested across the two contacts of the switch, completing the 
circuit.  Raising the finger broke the circuit, and the time registered by the clock at that 
moment was recorded by the microcontroller with 1 ms resolution.  The result was 
shown on a seven-segment display, oriented out of sight of the participant.  The finger 
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could be lifted voluntarily, but there was also a mechanism by which the experimenter 
could cause the finger to rise.  This facility was not used in the experiments reported 
here. 
All participants were asked to complete the dissociative experiences scale II 
(DES-II, Carlson & Putnam, 1993) One meditator did not complete the DES-II.  
 
Figure 1: The clock apparatus. 
 
Procedure 
The experiment was adapted from Libet et al (1983). Subjects carried out five 
practice trials and forty test trials (two blocks of twenty trials with a five-minute rest 
period). Participants were asked to rest their finger upon the switch assembly to complete 
the circuit, then to wait for one full revolution of the clock hand before lifting their finger 
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at a time of their choosing. They were asked not to plan ahead or to aim for a particular 
time. After raising their finger, they were asked to replace their finger and then to report 
the time indicated by the clock at which they had first experienced their immediate 
intention to move (a W judgement). They were instructed to make full use of the clock 
face in reporting (rather than rounding the time on the clock to the nearest five-unit 
marker). The time at which the circuit was broken was recorded, together with the stated 
clock time. 
Analysis 
Finger-lift times (in milliseconds) were subtracted from the subjective report of 
the timing of immediate intention (converted to milliseconds) to give a numerical value 
for the difference between the timing of the reported intention and the moment at which 
the circuit was broken (W). Time differences on individual trials with values greater than 
3 SD from the mean were excluded for each participant (21 trials in total, 0.9% of all 
trials). Mean scores for time difference were taken for each group and, following 
convention, a negative number was used to denote that the awareness of intention 
occurred before the circuit was broken and a positive number that it occurred afterwards.  
The interquartile range of judgement errors was compared between groups to 
assess whether there were differences in attention to the task. Mean DES-II scores were 
calculated for group comparison and correlation analysis. 
Bayes factors (B) were used to assess strength of evidence (cf Wagenmakers, 
Verhagen, Ly, Matzke, Steingroever, Rouder, & Morey, in press). A B of above 3 
indicates substantial evidence for the alternative hypothesis and below 1/3 substantial 
evidence for the null. Bs between 3 and 1/3 indicate data insensitivity (see Jeffreys, 1939; 
Dienes, 2014). In order to indicate how strongly evidence supports a hypothesis, one has 
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to specify what the hypothesis predicts; i.e., for H1, one needs to specify roughly the sort 
of effect predicted, as for example based on a relevant past study. Williams et al (2011) 
found a difference of 230 ms in W timing between functional motor disorder patients and 
a control group. It has been proposed that such functional disorders rely on the same 
mechanisms as hypnotic response (Bell, Oakley, Halligan, & Deeley, 2011), so the effect 
is relevant.  Assuming 230 ms is a rough maximum effect we could expect given it was 
found comparing a clinical population to controls, Bayes factors for W timing group 
differences were calculated using a half-normal distribution with SD = 115ms. Although 
here we interpret the results with respect to Bayes Factors, p values are also provided for 
each analysis. 
Bayes factors for correlations of hypnotisability with other measures were 
calculated using a half-normal distribution with SD = .30 based on the moderate 
correlations reported between hypnotisability scores and other cognitive or 
questionnaire-based measures (e.g., Laurence et al, 2008). As directional predictions 
were not made for correlations between hypnotisability and gender or age the Bayes 
factors for these correlations were calculated using a full-normal. Here, BH(0, x) refers to a 
Bayes factor where H1 is specified as a half-normal distribution with a mean of 0 and 
SD of x (for directional predictions), and BN(0, x) indicates H1 was specified as a normal 
distribution with mean 0 and SD x (for non-directional predictions). Bayes factors and t-
tests were corrected for unequal variance by the procedure of Box and Tiao (1972, p 
107) for adjusting standard errors and degrees of freedom. 
 The 3-df effect of group was decomposed into three contrasts. Specifically, the 
effect of hypnotisability was evaluated in terms of a linear trend (highs versus lows) and 
a quadratic trend (mediums versus the average of highs and lows). Finally, meditators 
were contrasted with mediums because the relative numbers of participants in each 
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hypnotisable group do not reflect their proportions in the population (approximately 
10% of the population are high and 10% low hypnotisable by conventional thresholds). 
The B’s for these three contrasts were multiplied together to obtain an “omnibus B” 
evaluating the predictions of cold control versus H0. Support for cold control was taken 
as being shown by evidence: for a linear trend of hypnotisability versus H0; for H0 
versus a quadratic trend; and for a difference between meditators and mediums versus 
H0. The resulting omnibus B assumes that the B for each contrast tests predictions 
independently of the other contrasts in the precise sense that the effect size tested in 
each contrast would not be relevant to updating the predicted effect size for the other 
contrasts (Jeffreys, 1939, pp 269-270). We include omnibus B only for completeness so 
that wherever we give a p-value we also give a B, but in fact no conclusions will depend 
on omnibus B’s in any case.  
Bayes factors for DES-II analysis were calculated with a full normal based on 
half the difference between highs and lows (24 points) reported in Terhune, Cardeña & 
Lindgren, (2011).  
H1 for interquartile range analysis was specified using a uniform from 0 to the 
medium hypnotisable groups’ inter-quartile range, specified as BU[0,m] where m is the 
maximum of the uniform distribution. The interquartile range can be normalized with a 
log transform, which also provides a “data translated” likelihood especially suitable for 
Bayesian analyses when a uniform is used to specify predictions (Box & Tiao, 1972). 
A Bayes factor for age difference between meditators and mediums was 
calculated using a half normal with SD based on the minimum number of years of 
meditation experience (3) used as a criterion for selection. 
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Study 1 results 
We will first consider the key predictions regarding the timing of awareness of 
intentions. Then we consider two more secondary issues: Any role of dissociative 
experiences as measured by DES-II; and finally any differences in sustaining attention 
on the task, as measured by the consistency of the W response. 
Figure 2 shows mean time differences and confidence intervals for the four 
groups. A Welch one-way ANOVA on the time differences (W timings) between the 
four groups indicated that the groups differed, F(3, 24.63)= 16.54, p < . 0.001, omnibus 
BH(0, 115)= 2570.41. There was a linear trend of hypnotisability on W judgements, 
t(22.76)= 3.84, p = .003, d = 1.22, BN(0, 115)= 92.01. There was no quadratic trend, t(44)= 
.042, p = .966, d = 0.013, BN(0, 115) = .23. Finally meditators reported earlier W 
judgements than mediums, t(28.78)= 3.04, p = .007, d = 0.95, BN(0, 115 ) = 22.27. 
Pearson's coefficient was used to test for correlations. A correlation between WSGC 
(hypnotisability) score and W was found, r(47)= .30, p = .043, BH(0, .30)= 5.43. 
There was evidence that the mean age of meditators (M = 37.8, SD = 16.4) 
differed from medium hypnotisables (M = 23.0, SD = 6.9, t(12.0) = 2.87, p = .014, BH(0, 
3) = 2.98. The evidence was not sensitive as to whether or not there was a within-group 
correlation between age and W judgements, (Fisher z-transformed) r(57) = -.069 (SE = 
.13) BN(0, .30) = .45. But crucially, a one-way ANCOVA showed that, after accounting for 
age, mean W differed between meditators (M = -149.1 ms, SE = 29.3) and medium 
hypnotisable non-meditators (M = -68.5, SE = 20.6), F(1,28)= 4.36, p = .046, BH(0, 115) = 
4.40. 
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 Figure 2: Mean time differences between the retrospectively self-reported time at 
which a volitional immediate intention to perform a motor action was experienced and 
the moment at which the movement occurred. Error bars show 95% CIs (the CIs can be 
treated as credibility intervals with uniform priors). 
 
 
Turning now to dissociative experiences, the evidence was insensitive as to 
whether or not there was a correlation between W and DES-II score, r(56)= .015, p = 
.911, BH(0, .30) = .44.  DES-II and WSGC scores correlated, r(49)= .473, p = .001, BH(0, 
.30) = 79.45.  A contrast between highs (M = 31.22, SD = 15.59) and lows (M = 14.3, SD 
= 7.7) revealed a linear trend of hypnotisability on DES-II scores, t(7.09) = 2.75, p = 
.028, d = .57, BH(0, 12) = 3.95, and there was no evidence one way or the other for a 
quadratic trend, t(44) = .497, p  = .621, BN(0, 12) = .47.  Meditators (M = 11.5, SD = 9.8) 
differed from mediums (M = 20.8, SD = 3.1), t(23.4)= 2.18, p = .040, d = 0.88, BH(0, 12)= 
4.70. 
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Finally, we consider group differences in sustaining attention to the task, as 
measured by consistency of response; specifically, a participant’s inter-quartile range in 
their W responses. There was no linear trend of hypnotisability on inter-quartile range 
(highs M = 143.2 ms, SD = 52.2; vs lows, M = 131.9 ms, SD = 46.7) revealed by a t-test 
conducted on log-transformed values, t(24)= .627, p = .537, d = 0.29, BU[0, 2.17) = .07. 
Meditators (M = 123.0 ms, SD = 40.22) and mediums (M = 168.2 ms, SD = 104.6) did 
not differ in inter-quartile range. t(29)= 1.48, p = .149, d = 0.56, BU[0, 2.17) = 0.23. 
 
Study 1 discussion 
The key findings of Study 1 are that highs show an especially late awareness of 
intentions, consistent with cold control theory. Conversely, meditators show an 
especially early awareness of intentions, consistent with meditation experience inducing 
metacognitive changes. We found that these differences did not arise from attentional 
differences between groups, and therefore they may be purely meta-cognitive. 
Dissociation has been found to interact with hypnotisability in executive related 
tasks (e.g., Terhune, Cardeña & Lindgren, 2011). Thus our conclusions about the 
relation between high hypnotisability and W judgments may apply only to the sub-
group of highs identified by Terhune et al as high dissociating highs. While the high 
DES-II scores of highs in study 1 prevented investigation of this possibility, further 
research could usefully select low dissociating highs and lows and determine if the 
pattern still holds. The association we found between DES and hypnotisability 
contradicts the null finding by Dienes et al (2009); however, the latter study tested 
hypnotisability and the DES in entirely unrelated contexts, conditions known to reduce 
correlations of variables with hypnotisability (Kirsch & Council, 1992). When 
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hypnotisability and DES are tested in the same context, people may interpret the 
questions of the DES as asking about hypnotic experiences. A possible weakness of the 
study is that we do not know the hypnotisability of participants in the meditation group. 
Studies 2 and 3 will assess mindfulness in participant groups in which hypnotisability is 
known.  
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Study 2 introduction 
Study 2 was a conceptual replication of Study 1 measuring mindfulness with a standard 
questionnaire in undergraduates rather than by contrasting meditators with non-
meditators and investigated whether the early W judgements reported by mindfulness 
meditators also occur in meditation naïve participants high in trait mindfulness.  As 
hypnotisability was measured on all participants, this study examined the relationship 
between mindfulness and the timing of an intention to move in groups of known 
hypnotisability. The study also investigated the relationship between hypnotisability and 
trait mindfulness. Buddhist traditions suggest that long-term meditation leads to the 
development of mindfulness skills in everyday life, and experienced meditators have 
been shown to score higher on the FFMQ than non-meditators (Baer et al, 2008). 
Therefore, we might not expect meditation-naive participants high in trait mindfulness 
to display mindfulness related metacognitive abilities to quite the same degree as 
experienced meditators. 
Study 2 method 
Participants 
Thirty-six meditation-naïve undergraduate students were recruited from the 
University of Sussex. Following initial examination of the data, two participants were 
excluded from further analysis as their scores for mean W judgement identified them as 
outliers by SPSS boxplot. Data from 34 participants were therefore analysed.  
Ethical approval was received from the University of Sussex ethical committee 
and informed consent was obtained from each participant before commencing with the 
study. Participants were compensated with course credits. 
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Materials and methods 
Participants were screened for hypnotisability using an edited version of the 
WSGC. This involved a shortened induction and the delivery of one of two selections of 
five suggestions taken from the WSGC scale. Each set of suggestions contained one 
motor direct suggestion, two perceptual direct suggestions, one motor challenge 
suggestion and one perceptual-cognitive challenge suggestion. Participants were 
randomly assigned to either set of suggestions. Unlike in the WSGC:C, in which 
participants are screened as a group and therefore report their own objective ratings, 
because the screening sessions were individual, it was possible for objective ratings to 
be taken by the experimenter. The WSGC:C does not include subjective ratings and 
here a further subjective rating was recorded from the participant’s verbal answers to a 
set of standard questions (see online Supplemental Material for the hypnosis scripts and 
scoring procedure). W timing was measured using the same apparatus and procedures as 
in Study 1. 
Participants also completed a short form of the Five Facet Mindfulness 
Questionnaire, a 24-item questionnaire which measures five different facets of 
mindfulness; observing, describing, acting with awareness, non-judging and non-
reactivity (FFMQ-SF; Bohlmeijer, ten Klooster, Fledderus, Veehof & Baer, 2011). 
Participants were recruited for the duration of one term, until there were no more 
responses. Bayesian analyses were used to assess sensitivity. 
Analysis 
Mean judgement errors on the Libet clock task were calculated for each 
participant as in Study 1.  Mean ratings of objective and subjective scores for 
hypnotisability and scores on the FFMQ-SF were calculated. A combined hypnotisability 
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measure was calculated from the objective and subjective hypnotisability ratings. Both 
the objective and subjective ratings were measured on a scale of 0 to 5; the combined 
measure was the simple average of the subjective and objective measures. Results for the 
individual hypnotisability ratings are presented in the online supplementary materials. 
Bayes factors were calculated as in Study 1. A B was calculated for the 
correlation between objective and subjective hypnosis scores using a full-normal with 
SD = .82 (converted to Fisher’s Z) based on the average correlation between objective 
and subjective hypnotisability ratings across three screening procedures reported by 
Barnes, Lynn and Pekala (2009).  
Study 2 results 
Subjective (M = 2.0, SD = 0.8) and objective (M = 2.0, SD = 1.4) hypnosis 
ratings correlated, r(34)= .69, p< .001, BH(0, .82) = 16439.52,  The combined measure of 
subjective and objective hypnotisability (M  = 2.1, SD = 1.0) correlated with W 
judgement, (M = -75.0 ms, SD = 84.5 ms), r(34) = .321, p = .065, BH(0, .30)  = 3.76, and 
negatively correlated with FFMQ-SF score, r(34) = -.403, p = .018, BH(0, .30)  = 9.39.  
Study 2 discussion 
These results support the relationship between hypnotisability and judgement of 
intention reported in study 1 and are consistent with evidence that hypnotisability is 
inversely related to trait mindfulness. However, as there was no sensitive evidence for a 
correlation between trait mindfulness and W judgements (see supplemental material), 
no conclusion can be drawn as to whether trait mindfulness is related to metacognition 
of motor intentions. 
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Study 3 introduction 
Study 3 replicated study 2 but differed in two aspects. First, a computer clock 
was used. Second, unlike in the first two studies, M judgements (the timing of action) 
were taken alongside W judgements. Libet considered the M judgement an important 
part of participant training, and found that when M trials were performed before W 
trials, W times were significantly more negative (Libet, 1983). However, the use of M 
judgements to influence identification of the moment of intention has been criticised 
(Gomes, 1998), and Pockett and Miller (2007) argue that subjects in subjective timing 
experiments should be kept as naive as possible. The -75ms timing of W reported here 
in the absence of an M judgement is later than the -200 ms mean W time and close to 
the -85 ms mean M reported by Libet al al (1983). This might be interpreted as evidence 
that subjects in these studies misunderstood the request for a W judgement and gave M 
judgements instead. Study 3 investigated whether the relation between hypnotisability 
and W would hold when M as well as W judgments are taken. 
 
Study 3 method 
Participants 
Twenty-nine meditation-naïve undergraduate students were recruited from the 
University of Sussex. One participant was excluded prior to analysis due to equipment 
malfunction. Ethical approval was received from the University of Sussex ethical 
committee and informed consent was obtained from each participant before 
commencing with the study.  
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Materials and methods 
Participants were screened for hypnotisability using the same procedure as in 
Study 2.  
Visual stimuli were displayed at 100 Hz on a 21" CRT monitor. At the 
beginning of each trial, a clock face was presented. This was marked at thirty degree 
intervals and subtended a visual angle of five degrees.  A static dot, subtending at 0.2 
degrees appeared at a pseudo randomized position for each trial and began rotating 
around the clock face 250 ms after the clock appeared, performing a full rotation every 
2560 ms. Participants were seated at a viewing distance of approximately 60 cm. A 
computer mouse was used to record actions (button presses). 
In separate blocks, participants were asked to press the mouse button at a time of 
their choosing and to report either the time of the action (M) or the time of their 
immediate intention or urge to move (W). In both trial types, participants were 
instructed to allow the dot to complete at least one full revolution before pressing the 
mouse button. If this instruction was not followed, a warning message was displayed 
and the trial restarted. Similarly, a warning message was displayed and the trial restarted 
if the button had not been pressed within six full rotations of the clock. 
Participants were asked not to pre-plan their actions. After the button had been 
pressed, the clock continued moving for a pseudo-randomised period of time between 
1200 ms and 2370 ms to prevent any influence from the sudden disappearance of the 
dot. There then followed a pseudorandomised time interval (500 ms to 1280 ms) during 
which the clock was not visible on the screen. Timing judgements were then recorded 
by moving a dot around the clock face and pressing the mouse button. 
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Each block consisted of 40 repetitions of one trial type and blocks were 
separated by 30 s rest periods. The two blocks were presented in counterbalanced order. 
All Stimuli were programmed by Jim Parkinson (University of Sussex) and generated 
with Matlab (MATLAB 2012b, The MathWorks, Inc., Natick, Massachusetts, United 
States)  running Psychtoolbox v3 (Kleiner et al, 2007). 
Participants also completed a short form of the five facet mindfulness scale 
questionnaire (Bohlmeijer, ten Klooster, Fledderus, Veehof & Baer, 2011), as in Study 
2. Two participants failed to complete the questionnaire. These participants were 
included in all analyses except correlations with the FFMQ-SF. 
Participants were recruited for the duration of one term, until there were no more 
responses. Bayesian analyses were used to assess sensitivity. 
 
Analysis 
Mean judgement errors on the Libet clock task were calculated for each 
participant as in Study 1, but for M (timing of movement) as well as W judgements.  
Mean ratings of objective and subjective scores for hypnotisability and scores on 
the FFMQ-SF were also taken. A combined hypnotisability score was calculated as in 
Study 2. Results for the individual hypnotisability ratings are presented in the online 
supplementary materials. The distance between M and W was also calculated for each 
participant (M/W distance).  
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Study 3 results 
M judgements (M = -17.1 ms, SD = 40.1) correlated with W judgements (M = -
143.7 ms, SD = 159.0), Spearman's ρ (28) = .526, p = .004, BH(0, .50) = 44.61. Objective 
(M = 1.6, SD = 1.2) and subjective (M = 1.7, SD = 1.0) hypnosis ratings were correlated, 
Spearman's ρ (28) = .690, p < .001, BH(0, .30)  = 1307.98.  The combined hypnotisability 
rating (M = 1.6, SD = 1.0), and the derived measure of the distance between M and W 
were correlated, Spearman's ρ (28) = -.376, p = .049, BH(0, .30)  = 4.90. The combined 
hypnotisability measure correlated with W, Spearman's ρ(28) = .350, p = .068, BH(0, .30)  
= 3.85. There was no evidence as to whether or not M judgements correlated with the 
combined hypnotisability measure, Spearman's ρ(28) = .161, p = .414, BH(0, .30)  = 1.06. 
 The evidence was not sensitive as to whether or not FFMQ-SF scores correlated with 
W, Spearman's ρ (26) = -.136, p = .507, BH(0, .50) = .67,  or with the combined 
hypnotisability score, Spearman's ρ (26)= -.147, p = .472,  BH(0, 30) = .98.  
 
Table 1 shows the results of a fixed-effects meta-analysis conducted on the 
results of studies 2 and 3 to test the overall evidence for correlations. This revealed 
support for correlations between hypnotisability and W judgement and hypnotisability 
and mindfulness. The Bayes factor on FFMQ-SF score vs W was insensitive, so no 
conclusion follows.  
 
  
56 
  Measure   
 Overall 
hypnotisability 
Subjective 
hypnotisability 
Objective 
hypnotisability 
Mindfulness 
(FFMQ-SF) 
 
W 
judgement 
.347 (.129) 
p = .009 
[.094, .600] 
BH(0, .30)  = 16.63* 
.369 (.129) 
p = .005 
[.117, .622] 
BH(0, .30)  = 
24.85* 
.270 (.129) 
p = .041 
[.018, .523] 
BH(0, .30)  = 
4.88* 
-.19 (.131) 
p = .152 
[-.067, .447] 
BH(0, .30)  = 
1.76 
 
Mindfulness 
(FFMQ-SF) 
-.306 (.131) 
p = .023 
[-.049, -.564] 
BH(0, .30)  = 7.79* 
-.373 (.131) 
  p = .006 
[-.115, -.630] 
BH(0, .30)  = 
23.98* 
-.203 (.131) 
p = .126 
[-.055, -.460] 
BH(0, .30)  = 2.03 
 
Note. * = sensitive B (evidence for the hypothesis). Standard deviations appear in 
parentheses after means. 95% credibility intervals and Bayes factors are reported below 
means.  
 
Table 1. Meta-analytically combined Fisher z-transformed Pearson and Spearman’s 
correlations between measures of hypnotisability, mindfulness and timing of intention 
(W) in studies 2 and 3. 
Study 3 discussion 
Consistent with predictions, there was evidence that the distance between M and W 
judgements was inversely related to hypnotisability. This counts against the suggestion 
that highly hypnotisable people may have confused W with M judgements. The 
evidence for a relationship between trait mindfulness and hypnotisability was 
inconclusive in this study, but a meta-analysis of studies 2 and 3 provides support for 
this relationship. Strong support is also provided for a relationship between 
hypnotisability and judgement of time of intention across the studies. We were unable to 
provide any evidence one way or the other for the relation between trait mindfulness 
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and W judgments. Thus, the question of whether meditation practice per se as a training 
in metacognitive awareness of intentions, rather than trait mindfulness, is crucial to 
early W judgments remains open.  
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General Discussion 
 
We used the Libet task to investigate group differences in the timing of the 
conscious awareness of an action intention (W) in hypnotisable groups and mindfulness 
meditators. A linear effect of hypnotisability was found on W (cf Kirsch 2011), with 
highly hypnotisable participants reporting a later W time than less hypnotisable 
participants. Conversely, mindfulness meditators reported an earlier W time than non-
meditators. These differences are supported by a positive correlation between 
hypnotisability and W timing in two further studies and a negative correlation between 
hypnotisability and trait mindfulness in a meta-analysis of the results of studies 2 and 3. 
The results are consistent with the prediction from cold control theory that 
hypnotisability is inversely related to the coupling of higher order thoughts to first order 
intentions; that is, most generally, with theories of hypnosis that argue that hypnotic 
responding involves changes in the monitoring of intentions, rather than changes in 
executive control. Furthermore, the earlier W timing reported by experienced meditators 
supports predictions from Buddhist scholars (Dreyfus, 2013) that mindfulness 
meditation enhances metacognition related to action intentions.  
Notably, we have recently found that there is no difference in M judgements 
between hypnotisable groups and no difference in M between meditators and non-
meditators.  A fixed-effects meta-analysis was conducted on M judgement differences in 
meditators reported in Lush, Parkinson & Dienes (submitted) and in Semmens-Wheeler 
(2012). Mean difference = 6.6 ms, p = .806 [-46.4, .59.7], BH(0, .80)  = .27. This B 
supports there being no difference between meditators and non-meditators in M 
judgements. However, we report here that W judgements do differ between these 
groups. As we found evidence for no differences in inter-quartile range, these results are 
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unlikely to be attributable to differences in attention to the task. Jo, Hinterberger, 
Wittmann & Schmidt (2015) reported no significant difference in W judgements 
between meditators and non-meditators, but with means showing large effects in the 
same direction as we found here.  A fixed-effect meta-analysis of the standard Libet 
instruction comparison reported in Jo et al and study 1 revealed strong evidence in 
favour of an earlier W time in meditators rather than non-meditators (M = 76 ms, SD = 
24.2),  BH(0, 115)  = 46.25.  
Historically, there has been little agreement as to what the Libet task is 
measuring (e.g., Dennett & Kinsbourne, 1992; Maoz et al, 2014), and these results may 
inform that debate. One possible interpretation is that the findings may reflect 
differences in a threshold or criterion level of the brain activity underlying voluntary 
movement at which people can become conscious of an intention to move (cf Schurger, 
Sitt, & Deheane, 2012). On this reading, highly hypnotisable people may have a higher 
threshold (perhaps resulting from coarser grained concepts of first-order intentional 
states) and thus take longer to become aware of intending. Conversely, mindfulness 
practice may lower this threshold (perhaps due to the development of finer grained 
concepts of mental state properties). Alternatively, it has been argued that consciousness 
is graded and that the timing of awareness of action intentions may instead reflect a 
threshold of reportability (Miller & Schwarz, 2014; though contrast Dehaene, Charles, 
& Marti, 2014, for the argument that consciousness is relatively all-or-none). These 
findings are consistent with either interpretation. From a higher order theory perspective 
(e.g. Rosenthal, 2005), whatever pressure brings about possession of concepts of mental 
states, would not need make such higher order states more fine grained in content than 
the gradations of first order states themselves. Thus, higher order states will likely make 
discrete distinctions between first order states (for evidence concerning the extent to 
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which confidence ratings, i.e. higher order thoughts, reflect discrete states see 
Swagman, Province, & Rouder, 2015).   Thus, awareness of first order states 
(specifically intentions) may be discrete to a degree that varies across individuals (e.g. 
between high and low hypnotisable individuals) and that can be made more fine grained 
by practice (e.g. mindfulness meditation). Notably, Schlegel et al (2015) report motor 
cortex activity associated with intentional action for highs performing actions 
experienced as involuntary following a post-hypnotic suggestion, consistent with there 
being no change in first order processes in hypnotic responding. 
The related question of how one becomes aware of an intention has been the 
focus of a large body of research in recent years (e.g., Haggard & Eitam, 2015), with 
competing accounts proposing retrospective (e.g., Wegner, 2002) or predictive (e.g., 
Blakemore, Wolpert & Frith, 2002) cues. Current theoretical models propose that the 
sense of agency is supported by both predictive and retrospective mechanisms 
(Synofzik, Vosgerau, and Newen 2008), with the relative weighting of each depending 
on their reliability (so that signals of low noise have a greater influence) (Moore and 
Fletcher, 2012; Synofzik, Vosgerau, and Voss, 2013). However, this question is largely 
orthogonal to the hypotheses addressed here. 
Recent findings suggest a second possible mechanism underlying the earlier W 
judgement timing reported by mindfulness meditators. Mindfulness involves not taking 
the content of mental states at face value, and thus potentially not being drawn to 
attractive or salient stimuli (e.g. Papies, Pronk, Keesman, & Barsalou, 2015). Possibly 
meditators in estimating the time of an intention are thus not unduly drawn to the time 
of the action, allowing an earlier estimate of the time of the intention. However, 
contradicting this explanation, we have found that meditators compared to non-
meditators show more intentional binding, i.e. a process by which the estimated time of 
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one event is drawn towards that of another in an illusory way (Lush, Parkinson & 
Dienes, submitted). 
Group differences in the timing of conscious awareness of intending a voluntary 
action may provide a route toward exploring related cognitive and neuronal processes. 
For example, Moore & Bravin (2015) report that increased variability of W judgement 
predicts high schizotypy scores (although there is evidence for a relationship between 
schizotypy and hypnotisability (e.g., Connors et al, 2014), we found no difference in W 
variability between hypnotisable groups). Delays in the timing of W have also been 
reported in groups with parietal lobe damage (Sirigu et al, 2003), and exploration of the 
neural processes and architecture supporting the differences reported here may provide 
further insight into disorders related to the awareness of intention, such as schizophrenia 
(for a review of disorders of volition, see Kranick & Hallett, 2013). Intriguingly, later W 
timing has also been found in conversion disorder patients (Edwards et al 2012), 
suggesting the possibility that cold control theory may provide a way of investigating 
the often hypothesised link between functional or psychogenic disorders and hypnosis 
(see Vuilleumier, 2014).  
 It has been argued that in order to become tractable to empirical investigation, 
consciousness may need to be theoretically divided into constituent structural properties 
(Seth, 2009). Phenomena that involve changes in subjective visual perception such as 
binocular rivalry have been employed to study neural correlates of visual consciousness 
(e.g., see Maier, Panagiotaropoulos, Tsuchiya & Keliris, 2012). Similarly, the 
identification of hypnotic responding as changes in the subjective experience of 
intending may provide a fruitful avenue to investigate the biological substrates of 
conscious experiences of volition. More generally, the sense of agency is a rapidly 
growing field of study within psychology (see Moore & Obhi, 2012; Chambon, Sidarus 
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& Haggard, 2014; David, Obhi & Moore, 2015; Haggard & Eitam, 2015), and the 
investigation of changes in the sense of agency resulting from hypnosis has the potential 
to illuminate and inform findings in this area. 
In summary, this study reveals individual differences in the timing of a 
metacognition of action initiation related to mindfulness meditation and hypnotisability. 
These findings are consistent with the cold control theory of hypnosis and with the 
proposal that hypnotisability and mindfulness meditation lie at opposite ends of a scale 
of metacognition related to the conscious awareness of intention (Semmens-Wheeler & 
Dienes, 2012).  
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Chapter III 
Illusory temporal binding in meditators  
 
Abstract 
 
We investigate conditions in which more accurate metacognition may lead to greater 
susceptibility to illusion; and thus conditions under which mindfulness meditation may 
lead to less accurate perceptions. Specifically, greater awareness of intentions may lead 
to an illusory compression of time between a voluntary action and its outcome 
(“intentional binding”). Here we report that experienced Buddhist mindfulness meditators 
rather than non-meditators display a greater illusory shift of the timing of an outcome 
towards an intentional action. Mindfulness meditation involves awareness of causal 
connections between different mental states, including intentions. We argue that this 
supports improvements in metacognition targeted at motor intentions. Changes in 
metacognitive ability may result in an earlier and less veridical experience of the timing 
of action outcomes either through increased access to sensorimotor pre-representations of 
an action outcome or by affording greater precision to action timing judgements. 
Furthermore, as intentional binding is an implicit measure of the sense of agency, these 
results also provide evidence that mindfulness meditators experience a stronger sense of 
agency. 
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Introduction 
Mindfulness is a concept central to Buddhist traditions and can be defined as the 
cultivation of a calm (hence “non-judgemental”) awareness of present states, especially 
mental states, and specifically including an awareness of the temporal properties of the 
ongoing states, such as their transience (Williams & Kabat-Zinn, 2011). While 
mindfulness practice often starts with awareness of the experiences of breathing, the 
central mindfulness practice of the Pali canon, Satipatthana, includes cultivating 
awareness of all mental states, including intentions and their consequences (Analayo, 
2004; Gunaratana, 2012).  Thus, Dreyfus (2011) argued that mindfulness meditation 
should lead to cognitive differences in the awareness of intentions, and urges 
psychologists to explore this possibility. Consistently, mindfulness meditators have 
been found to report earlier judgements of the timing of an intention to move than non-
meditators, suggesting they have more accurate metacognition related to intention 
(Dienes et al, 2016; Lush, Naish & Dienes, 2016).  
The sense of agency can be defined as the sense of being in control of one’s goal 
directed actions and their outcomes in the world (Gallagher and Zahavi, 2008; Haggard 
and Chambon, 2012).   The modern study of agency can be traced back to the work of 
Libet, Gleason, Wright and Pearl (1983), in which the timing of a conscious intention to 
move (W) was related to the ‘readiness potential’ in the motor cortex which precedes 
voluntary motor actions. Libet et al measured timing judgements by asking participants 
to watch a rotating ‘clock’ and to retrospectively report the position of the clock ‘hand’ 
had occupied when they experienced the urge to move. Intentional binding refers to the 
subjectively reported time compression that occurs between an intentional action and its 
outcome when compared to the timing of an action alone and of an event that does not 
depend upon an action (Haggard, Clark and Kalogeras, 2002). It can be measured using 
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Libet et al’s rotating clock method to record the judged time of an action or an auditory 
tone in two conditions: a contingent condition in which the action causes the tone; and a 
baseline condition in which the action does not result in a tone or the tone occurs 
without an action. The effect emerges from the perceived shift of the action toward the 
tone (action binding) and of the tone towards the action that caused it (outcome binding) 
in the contingent condition compared to the baseline condition (Moore and Obhi, 2012).  
Intentional binding has been employed to investigate disorders that involve 
changes in the sense of agency, e.g., in schizophrenia (Haggard, Martin, Taylor-Clarke, 
Jeannerod and Franck, 2003; Voss et al, 2010), alien limb syndrome (Wolpe et al 2013) 
and functional motor disorder (Kranick et al, 2013) and in pharmacologically induced 
changes in sense of agency, e.g., ketamine (Moore et al, 2011). There is, however, some 
evidence that weaker action-effect interval binding can occur in the absence of intention 
(Buehner, 2012; Wohlschlager, Haggard, Gesierich and Prinz, 2003). Therefore, 
intentional binding may be a special case of a more general causal binding of actions to 
their outcomes, with information specific to intentions supporting stronger binding. 
There is not yet consensus on the mechanism of intentional binding. The 
important point is that the proposed mechanisms can agree on intentional binding 
arising from meta-cognitive processes. Greater awareness of intentions should increase 
the binding effect.  According to one theory, outcome binding arises from accurate 
prediction of action outcomes (Waszak, Cardoso-Leite and Hughes, 2012). That is, the 
better one can predict the outcome from the intention, the sooner in time the outcome is 
perceived as happening.  On other theories, the assessed time of each component is 
affected by a type of anchoring produced by the other event happening. In this case, the 
greater precision with which an intention and hence an intentional action is timed, the 
more it will affect the perceived time of the outcome (Kawabe, Roseboom & Nishida, 
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2013; Moore & Fletcher, 2012). With regard to intentional binding being a measure of 
sense of agency, the more precisely one represents the outcomes of an intention as 
intentional outcomes, the more sense one has of acting on an intention; or the more 
precision with which one represents the intention, the more sense one has as acting on 
an intention. Thus, on each of these theories, greater awareness of intentions should lead 
to greater outcome binding, associated with a greater sense of agency. 
Because Buddhist mindfulness involves awareness of "dependent origination" 
i.e. the causal connections between different mental states, including intentions and their 
outcomes (for example in mindfulness of movements, Gunaratama, 2012), meditators 
should have greater metacognitive access to their intentions. Meditation is an exercise in 
metacognitive processes, both in monitoring and control (Jankowski & Holas, 2014) 
and sustained meditation practice seems likely to lead to changes in metacognition 
(Dienes et al, 2016). Consistently, meditators have been found to show more accurate 
metacognition related to the timing of an intention than non-meditators, (Lush, Naish & 
Dienes, 2016) and experienced meditators have been shown to have greater 
metacognitive access to negative deflections of slow cortical potentials (which, when 
averaged, produce the early readiness potential) (Jo, Hinterberger, Wittmann & 
Schmidt, 2015).  
Greater metacognitive accuracy of higher order mental states targeted at motor 
intentions should influence timing judgements that are dependent on prediction, such as 
outcome binding. These considerations can be used to make different predictions. On 
the one hand, meditators may be more accurate in their timing estimates due to 
improvements in metacognition, and attention resulting from mindfulness practice (Jo et 
al, 2014).  On the other hand, the ability to develop accurate prior expectations 
concerning the outcome of intentions, and to consistently and reliably use those 
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expectations, could lead to perception of the tone as occurring early. In terms of this 
mechanism, this could result either from more reliable sensorimotor pre-representations 
of the outcome tone (Waszak et al, 2012) or through greater precision (and therefore 
greater weight) being afforded to intentional action in an outcome timing judgement 
(Wolpe et al, 2013). As there is some agreement that action binding is a result of cue 
integration, action binding would be smaller in meditators if there is a relative increase 
in precision of action judgements, reducing the relative contribution of the tone to action 
timing judgements (Wolpe and Rowe, 2014).   
Jo et al. (2014), the one previous study that has addressed the question of 
intentional binding in meditators, found no significant difference between meditators 
and non-meditators in intentional binding. However, a non-significant result does not in 
itself mean there is no effect. To assess the sensitivity of the study to pick up an effect, 
an estimate is needed of the sort of difference in intentional binding that could be found 
between different groups. Kranick et al (2013) provided such an estimate using 
functional motor disorder patients; the difference between groups was on the order of 
magnitude of about half the effect found in control participants.  Based on this estimate, 
Jo et al’s data do not provide evidence for there being no difference in intentional 
binding between meditators and non-meditators (see online supplemental materials). 
We tested mindfulness meditators and age-matched controls on an intentional 
binding task. If mindfulness increases the relative precision afforded to action timing 
judgements, then the meditation group should show decreased action binding and 
increased outcome binding due to improved metacognitive access to motor intentions 
resulting from a history of sustained attention to intentions and actions. Alternatively, if 
meditators are more accurate in their timing estimates as a result of improved attentional 
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abilities generally, their reported judgements should be more veridical and they should 
show less binding of any sort (Jo, Hinterberger and Schmidt, 2014). 
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Method 
Participants 
Eight meditators were recruited from Brighton-based Buddhist organisations. 
Eight age and gender matched controls were recruited by advertisement (3 males and 5 
females, mean age = 49.3 years, SD = 10.5). The Buddhist meditators (3 males and 5 
females, mean age = 49.1 years, SD = 9.8) reported a mean of 14.6 years of continuous 
meditation experience (SD = 11.6) and a mean of 23.3 (SD = 12.0) hours per month 
meditation. Meditators were asked to provide details of their practice in simple terms 
and all reported using a form of mindfulness meditation. All members of the control 
group reported that they had no experience of mindfulness meditation.   
Ethical approval was received from the University of Sussex ethical committee. 
Informed consent was obtained from each participant before commencing with the study. 
Participants received cash payment of £5, and were additionally paid £5 in travel 
expenses. 
Participants were recruited for the duration of one term, until there were no more 
responses. Bayesian analyses were used to assess sensitivity. As stopping was not 
conditional on the p-value, orthodox statistics assuming fixed N could be used (Cox & 
Mayo, 2010, section 10.1). Crucially, we used Bayesian analyses to indicate the strength 
of evidence for H1 versus H0; the measure of evidence is valid no matter 
what the stopping rule. 
Procedure 
Visual stimuli were displayed at 100 Hz on a 21" CRT monitor and auditory 
stimuli were presented via Sennheiser headphones. For each trial, a clock face was 
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presented, marked at thirty degree intervals and subtended a visual angle of five 
degrees.  A static dot, subtending at 0.2 degrees, appeared at a pseudo-randomized 
position and began rotating around the clock 250 ms later (at 2560 ms per revolution). 
Participants were seated at a viewing distance of approximately 60 cm. A computer 
keyboard was used to record actions (button presses). 
There were four trial types, presented in separate blocks. In contingent trials, 
pressing a key triggered a 1000 Hz, 100 ms duration tone after a 250 ms delay. 
Participants were asked to look at a fixation cross in the centre of the clock and to wait 
for at least one revolution before pressing the button at a time of their choosing. The 
trial was restarted if the action occurred before one full revolution or after six 
revolutions. Participants were asked not to plan ahead or to aim for a particular point on 
the clock and to report either the action or the tone (to give contingent action or 
contingent tone judgements). Baseline action trials were the same as contingent action 
trials except the button did not trigger a tone. In baseline tone trials, the tone was 
triggered pseudo-randomly between 2.5 s and 7 s following one revolution of the clock.  
Following the tone (or action on baseline action trials), the dot continued moving 
for a pseudo-randomised period of time between 1200 ms and 2370 ms. The clock was 
then removed from the screen for a pseudorandomised time interval (500 ms to 1280 ms). 
When the clock reappeared, participants were able to control the position of the dot with 
a mouse. Moving the mouse forward (toward the screen) caused the dot to move in a 
clockwise direction around the clock face and the reverse mouse movement (away from 
the screen) caused the dot to move counter-clockwise around the clock face. Participants 
were asked to move the dot to the position it had occupied at the time of the judged event 
(action or tone) and to press the mouse button to record their judgement. 
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Each block consisted of 40 repetitions of one trial type and blocks were 
separated by 30 s rest periods. The four blocks were presented in counterbalanced order.  
Before the session began, all participants were trained with four practice trials in the 
baseline tone condition and four in the baseline action condition so that they could 
become familiarised with the reporting procedure. All Stimuli were generated with 
Matlab (MATLAB 2012b, The MathWorks, Inc., Natick, Massachusetts, United States) 
running Psychtoolbox v3 (Kleiner et al, 2007). 
Measures 
Mean judgement errors were calculated for each group on each trial type. 
Individual judgements more than 3.5 SD from the mean for each participant on each 
judgement type were excluded before mean judgement errors were calculated for each 
participant. Nine judgements were filtered by this method ((1.4% of all trials). The 
adjusted mean errors for action and tone conditions were then subtracted from their 
respective contingent conditions to calculate action and outcome binding. Finally, 
outcome binding was subtracted from action binding to produce a total binding measure. 
We ran independent t-tests to compare the two groups on these measures. 
Within-participant SD of timing judgements provides a measure of precision in 
estimating the time of an event. If binding reflects the combination of cues according to 
the precision afforded to actions or their outcomes, any differences in intentional binding 
should be accompanied by differences in this measure. In terms of cue integration theory, 
it is the interaction between meditators vs controls by tone vs action timing precision that 
determines changes in intentional binding between groups. If meditators relative to 
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controls have greater precision for actions rather than outcomes, then outcome binding 
should be greater and action binding less for meditators relative to controls. 
Data Analyses 
Bayes factors (B) were used to assess strength of evidence (Wagenmakers, 
Verhagen, Ly, Matzke, Steingroever, Rouder, & Morey, in press). Unlike null-hypothesis 
significance testing, Bayes factors have the advantage of distinguishing sensitive 
evidence for H0 from not much evidence at all. A B of above 3 indicates substantial 
evidence for the alternative hypothesis and below 1/3 substantial evidence for the null 
hypothesis. Bs between 3 and 1/3 indicate data insensitivity in distinguishing null and 
alternative hypotheses (Dienes, 2014; Jeffreys, 1939).  Here, BH(0, x) refers to a Bayes 
factor in which the predictions of H1 were modeled as half-normal distribution with an 
SD of x (Dienes, 2014); the half-normal can be used when a theory makes a directional 
prediction where x scales the size of effect that could be expected (so x can be chosen 
from e.g., relevant past studies). Kranick et al (2013) provide an estimate of the sort of 
difference in intentional binding that could be found between different groups using 
conversion disorder patients; the difference between groups in tone binding was on the 
order of magnitude of about half the effect found in control participants. Bayes factors 
for group differences in each measure were therefore calculated using a half-normal 
distribution with SD based on half the total shift in the control group. The direction we 
used is that predicted by cue combination and sensorimotor pre-representation theories of 
intentional binding, given the assumptions discussed in the introduction (Wolpe & Rowe, 
2014). That is, the prediction was a greater outcome binding for meditators rather than 
controls, but a reduced action binding.  
Bayes factors for solo action judgement group contrasts were calculated using a 
full-normal with SD = 80 ms based on the difference between meditators and non-
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meditators in the timing of an intention to move (Lush, Naish & Dienes, 2016). H1 for 
analysing differences between meditators and controls in standard deviations (SD) was 
specified using a uniform from 0 to the control groups’ SD, specified as BU[0,m] where m 
is the maximum of the uniform distribution. A Bayes factor for the interaction of group 
and within participant SD in baseline action and outcome trials was calculated using a 
uniform from 0 to the largest simple effect difference between groups (Dienes, 2014). 
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Results 
Figure 1 shows the overall intentional binding measures for each group. 
Meditators’ total binding (M = 168.8, SD = 98.9) was greater than that of age-matched 
non meditators (M = 71.7 ms, SD = 62.6), t(14) = 2.34, p = .034, d = 1.17, BH(0, 40)= 3.95. 
 
 
 Figure 1. Total binding for meditators and age-matched controls. Error bars 
show standard errors 
 
Figure 2 shows the action and outcome binding measures for each group. 
Meditators’ outcome binding (M = -138.02 ms, SD = 64.8) was greater than that of non-
meditators (M = -60.5 ms, SD = 50.0), t(14) = 2.68, p = .018, d = 1.34,  BH(0, 32)= 6.57. 
There was no sensitive evidence for whether or not meditators’ action binding (M = 30.7 
ms, SD = 45.9) was less than that of non-meditators (M = 13.9 ms, SD = 31.0), t(13) 
= .857, p = .406, d = 0.43, BH(0, 9)= 0.80.  For the prediction of action binding being greater 
for meditators rather than non-meditators, BH(0, 9)= 1.20. 
0
50
100
150
200
250
Meditators Controls
M
e
a
n
 t
im
e
 s
h
if
t/
m
s
Group
75 
 
 
Figure 2. Action and outcome binding for meditators and age-matched controls. Error 
bars show standard errors 
 
The raw simple effect of meditators’ within-participant SDs for baseline action 
judgements (M = 67.6 ms, SD = 33.9) was 30.3 ms lower than that of controls (M = 98.0 
ms, SD = 95.5).  The raw simple effect of meditators’ within-participant SDs for 
baseline tone judgements (M = 79.0 ms, SD = 42.9) was 11.2 ms lower than that of 
controls (M = 90.2, SD = 47.6), so the raw interaction effect for within participant SD 
on each measure between groups was 19.1 ms. There was no evidence one way or the 
other for whether or not there was an interaction, F(1, 14) = .427, p = .524, BU[0, 30] 
= .68.  
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Discussion 
We found that meditators showed greater subjective compression of the interval 
between an intentional action and its outcome than non-meditators (intentional binding). 
Specifically, meditators showed a greater shift in the perceived timing of an event 
toward the action that caused it; there was no sensitive evidence for a difference 
between meditators and non-meditators in the shift of action judgements towards its 
tone (Bayesian analysis showed these data to be insensitive in discriminating H1 from 
H0, so no firm conclusions can be drawn with regard to accepting the null hypothesis 
for action binding difference and this non-significant result will not discussed further). 
Meditators therefore reported a less veridical experience of timing of action outcomes 
than non-meditators. Furthermore, as intentional binding is considered an implicit 
measure of sense of agency, this result can be taken to show that meditators have a 
stronger sense of agency than non-meditators.  
There may be different mechanisms underlying the two binding components, 
action binding and outcome binding (Wolpe, Haggard, Siebner and Rowe, 2013). 
According to a predictive, sensorimotor model of outcome binding, the effect is due to a 
decreased latency in the perception of an outcome that results from the pre-
representation of the predicted outcome of an action (Waszak et al, 2012). Therefore, an 
increase in outcome binding may be driven by stronger or more reliable predictive 
sensorimotor representations of the tone (Synofzik, Vosgerau & Voss, 2013).  
Alternatively, when an outcome event is contingent upon an action event, the judgement 
of the time at which a particular event occurs may be a weighted average of each cue 
(Kawabe et al, 2013; Moore & Fletcher, 2012). In this case, group differences in the 
timing shift of an outcome toward an action or of an action toward an outcome would 
reflect group differences in the relative weighting of each cue (on cue integration 
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theory, we should expect lower variance of within participant SD of action judgements 
than tone judgements; however, the evidence here was insensitive, so we can draw no 
conclusion as to how our results relate to this theory). 
The increased outcome binding in meditators we report here could be 
attributable to differences in metacognition of motor intentions under both these 
accounts. Meditators may have more reliable or well specified sensorimotor 
representations of the predicted outcomes of an action, consistent with the claim that 
mindfulness involves close attention to concrete experience (Watkins, 2015). 
Alternatively, on a cue combination approach, meditators would show stronger outcome 
binding if improved metacognitive access to motor intentions or actions relative to 
external stimuli (like tones) affords higher precision of action timing relative to outcome 
timing. In this case, an increase in the weighting of the action cue in outcome 
judgements would lead to the timing judgement being drawn closer to the time of the 
action and therefore more outcome binding. In either case, greater accuracy of higher 
order mental states directed at intentions and their associated actions would, somewhat 
paradoxically, lead to a less veridical subjective experience of the timing of an 
intentional action’s outcome. The direct test of differences in precisions between groups 
for actions relative tones was insensitive, so this explanation is neither directly 
supported nor ruled out by the data. 
 Consistent with the suggestion that outcome binding is increased by improved 
metacognition of motor intentions, there is growing evidence that outcome binding is 
reduced when the contribution of intentions is reduced. A reduction in outcome binding 
has been shown to occur when participants incorrectly believed their action did not 
cause an outcome, a finding which may be attributable to the discounting motor 
intention related cues in judging the time of an outcome (Desantis, Roussel & Waszak, 
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2011). A post-hypnotically suggested experience of involuntariness has also been 
shown to reduce outcome binding (Lush et al, submitted). This finding may also be a 
result of the reduced contribution of motor intentions to the outcome judgement, as 
hypnotically induced experiences of involuntariness may be supported by the avoidance 
of motor intentions in forming metacognitive judgements of agency (Dienes, 2012). 
Finally, activity in the pre-supplementary motor area (preSMA) reflects motor 
intentions (Lau, Rogers, Haggard & Passingham, 2004). The disruption of activity in the 
preSMA by repetitive trans-cranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS) has been found to lead 
to a reduction in outcome binding (Moore et al, 2010) and the amplitude of the early 
readiness potential in the preSMA (associated with motor preparation) has been found 
to positively correlate with outcome binding (Jo et al, 2014). 
Jo et al (2014) reported a non-significant difference in intentional binding 
between mindfulness meditators and age-matched controls. However, Bayes factors can 
be employed to test evidence for the null hypothesis (Dienes, 2014, Wagenmakers et al, 
in press, Dienes, 2016), and in fact a meta-analysis of the results of the two studies 
provides sensitive evidence for an increase in overall binding and outcome binding (see 
online supplementary materials).   
Mindfulness meditators report a slower subjective passing of time and are 
thought to experience an “extended now” (Wittmann and Schmidt, 2014). However, 
here we report a shorter estimate of the time interval between an action and its outcome 
in meditators. These results can be taken to suggest that meditators have a stronger 
implicit, experiential sense of agency than non-meditators (Ryan & Rigby, 2015). The 
study of group differences in action-outcome binding may therefore inform our 
understanding of the sense of agency and consequently disorders which involve 
distortions in the sense of agency, (e.g., functional motor disorders or schizophrenia). 
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To this end, mindfulness meditators offer clear advantages over the use of the 
pharmacological interventions or clinical populations in which previous group 
differences in action-outcome binding have been observed. For example, the role of 
predictive cues in intentional binding has previously been studied by varying the 
probability of an outcome tone occurring (Moore & Haggard, 2008). This method has 
been used to investigate intentional binding in schizophrenia and could be 
straightforwardly applied to investigate predictive contributions to outcome binding in 
meditators (Voss et al, 2010). 
We report increased intentional binding, an objective measure of the sense of 
agency, in meditators over age-matched controls. Specifically, meditators showed a 
larger shift in the timing of an outcome toward the intentional action that caused it. 
While meditators here reported a less veridical experience of the timing of an event, we 
argue that this reflects that compared to non-meditators, mindfulness meditators have 
improved metacognition of motor intentions. 
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Chapter IV 
Post-hypnotically induced changes in the temporal binding of intentional action 
outcomes  
 
Abstract 
The sense of agency is the experience of initiating and controlling one’s voluntary actions 
and their outcomes. Intentional binding (the compressed time interval between voluntary 
actions and their outcomes) is increased in intentional action but requires no explicit 
reflection on agency. The reported experience of involuntariness is central to hypnotic 
responding, where strategic action is experienced as involuntary. We report reduced 
intentional binding in a hypnotically induced experience of involuntariness, providing an 
objective correlate of reports of involuntariness. We argue that reduced binding results 
from the diminished influence of motor intentions in the generation of the sense of agency 
when beliefs about whether an action is intended are altered. Thus, intentional binding 
depends upon awareness of intentions, showing that changes in metacognition of 
intentions affect perception.  
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Introduction 
The sense of agency is the experience we have of initiating and controlling our 
voluntary actions and their outcomes (see Haggard & Eitam, 2015). Intentional binding 
refers to the subjective compression of the time between an intentional action and its 
outcome, consisting of a forward shift of the judged time of an action toward its 
outcome (action binding) and the backward shift of an outcome toward the action that 
caused it (outcome binding). (Haggard, Clark & Kalogeras, 2002). The effect is 
sensitive to intentional action but requires no explicit reflection upon agency and may 
reflect the additional contribution of intentions to causal binding (Buehner, 2012; 2015). 
Intentional binding has been shown to be affected in a number of disorders of agency, 
for example schizophrenia (e.g., Voss et al, 2010) and alien limb (Wolpe et al 2014) and 
to be reduced in coerced action (Caspar, Christensen, Cleeremans & Haggard, 2016).   
The ‘classical suggestion effect’ of hypnosis is the experience of involuntariness 
of an action (Weitzenhoffer, 1980) and changes in the sense of agency are central to 
hypnotic responding (Polito, Woody & Barnier, 2013). Sense of agency may arise from 
the integration of internal, and external, predictive and retrospective cues (Moore & 
Fletcher, 2012; Synofzik, Vosgerau & Voss, 2013), and also general beliefs about 
agency. Indeed, retrospectively manipulating beliefs about agency can alter attributions 
of agency (Wegner, 2002). Hypnotic involuntariness may therefore reflect a relatively 
strong weighting of beliefs about hypnosis, and a relatively weak weighting of the 
internal signals provided by motor intentions.   
However, highly hypnotisable participants might merely report that a 
hypnotically suggested movement feels involuntary– even though they may experience 
the action as similar to any other voluntary action.  If so, phenomena sensitive to 
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conscious intentions, such as intentional binding, should be normal following hypnosis. 
Alternatively, if movement under hypnosis represents a shift from relying on internal 
action signals to relying on experimenter-delivered beliefs about action, then implicit 
measures sensitive to the experience of intentional action might be altered in hypnosis 
for highly hypnotisable subjects. It has been shown that beliefs about whether or not one 
is the cause of an outcome influence intentional binding (Desantis et al, 2011). Here, we 
address for the first time whether binding is influenced by beliefs about whether or not 
an action was intended. 
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Method 
Participants 
Eighteen participants (4 males, mean age = 20.2, SD = 2.35) were selected for 
high score on the SWASH, a modified version of a standard test of hypnotisability, the 
Waterloo-Stanford Group Scale of Hypnotic Suggestibility, Form C (WSGC; Bowers, 
1993). As requested by the reviewers, later a second group of 14 participants were 
selected for a medium score on the SWASH (4 males, mean age = 23.4, SD = 5.2). The 
SWASH (Sussex Waterloo susceptibility to hypnosis scale) is a modified, ten item 
version of the WSGC:C, with age regression and dream suggestions removed to avoid 
participants becoming absorbed in negative experiences (Cardeña & Terhune, 2009). In 
addition to the objective ratings of the WSGC:C, the SWASH also includes a subjective 
experience rating for each suggestion. For example, the following is the subjective 
rating for item 2, “Moving hands together”: 
You were next told to hold your hands out in front of you about a foot apart and 
then told to imagine a force pulling your hands together. On a scale from 0 to 5, how 
strongly did you feel a force between your hands, where 0 means you felt no force at all 
and 5 means you felt a force so strong it was as if your hands were real magnets?  
 
 Participants were selected on the basis of their combined hypnotisability score 
(the simple mean of the objective and subjective scores, each scaled out of a maximum 
of 10), with a minimum cut-off of 5 (which was the top 11% of 266 screened) for the 
highly hypnotisable group. The medium hypnotisable group scored below 5 and above 2 
on the SWASH. (15% of SWASH scores lie below 2).  
84 
 To assess whether participants were able to maintain an experience of 
involuntariness for the duration of the task, verbal ratings of involuntariness on a scale 
between 0 (completely voluntary) and 5 (completely involuntary) were recorded after 
each block of trials. Seven participants from the highly hypnotisable group who 
reported full voluntariness (an involuntariness score of 0) after any block in the post-
hypnotic involuntariness condition were excluded. Two of these participants did not 
complete all conditions, and therefore provided insufficient data for comparisons. As 
the aim was to determine an objective correlate (intentional binding) of reported 
feelings of involuntariness, only cases where there were feelings of involuntariness are 
relevant for the high hypnotisable group. Analyses of the results for all highly 
hypnotisable participants together (whether or not they were able to sustain the 
experience of involuntariness) are shown in Table S4 in the Supplemental Material 
available online. The combined hypnotisability score of those unable to sustain the 
suggestion was lower 5.98 (SD = 1.11) than those who maintained involuntariness, 7.48 
(SD = 1.24), t(16) = 2.61, p = .019, BH[0,2] = 7.37 (B calculated using a half-normal 
distribution with SD based on half the difference between the combined hypnotisability 
score of the first group and ten, the maximum hypnotisability score possible). The 
medium hypnotisable group had a mean combined hypnotisability score of 3.19 (SD = 
0.88). None of the participants in the medium hypnotisable group were able to sustain 
an experience of involuntariness throughout the experiment. One participant from the 
highly hypnotisable group was excluded because the standard deviation of their baseline 
action judgements was more than 3 times the group interquartile range in the passive 
(614.9 ms) and post-hypnotic (470.2 ms) conditions. Therefore, data from ten highly 
hypnotisable participants (1 male, mean age = 20, SD = 1.9) are reported.  
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Highly hypnotisable participants were recruited for the duration of two terms, 
until the participant pool was exhausted. Medium hypnotisable participants were 
recruited during the summer break, until there were no more responses. Bayesian 
analyses were used to assess sensitivity. Crucially, we used Bayesian analyses to 
indicate the strength of evidence for H1 versus H0; the measure of evidence is valid no 
matter what the stopping rule (Rouder, 2014; Schoenbrodt, Wagenmakers, Zehetleitner, 
& Perugini, in press). 
No power analysis was conducted. We included Bayes factors so that there 
would be an assessment of the sensitivity of the data to distinguish H0 and H1. Once the 
data are in, power has no relevance to how sensitive the data are, because power is a 
property of decision rule in the long run; conversely Bayes factors indicate the 
sensitivity of the very data collected to distinguish H1 and H0. 
Ethical approval was received from the University of Sussex ethics committee 
and informed consent was obtained. Participants received cash payment of £18 or 
course credits. 
Materials and methods 
Visual stimuli were displayed at 100 Hz on a 21" CRT monitor and auditory 
stimuli were presented via Sennheiser headphones. For each trial, a clock face was 
presented, marked at thirty degree intervals and subtended a visual angle of five 
degrees.  A static dot, subtending at 0.2 degrees, appeared at a pseudo-randomized 
position and began rotating around the clock 250 ms later (at 2560 ms per revolution). 
Participants were seated at a viewing distance of approximately 60 cm. A computer 
keyboard was used to record actions (button presses). 
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Each session began with a hypnotic induction adapted from the WSGC:C 
(included in the Supplemental Material available online). Following the hypnotic 
induction, participants were given the suggestion that their finger would move 
involuntarily onto the key for blocks of trials which followed a handclap from the 
experimenter. Participants were then ‘counted out’ of hypnosis before performing the 
experimental task. There were three counterbalanced conditions. In the voluntary 
condition, participants pressed the key when they wished. In the involuntary condition, 
the participant’s index finger was pulled onto the key by the experimenter by a fabric 
loop, with the experimenter’s action out of the participant’s view. A single handclap 
was made in the post-hypnotic suggestion condition approximately 20 seconds before 
the start of each 35 trial block (except the baseline tone condition). Participants were 
asked to rate the involuntariness of the action in each condition on a scale from 0 to 5 
after each block in each condition and, additionally, after three trials of the first block of 
the post-hypnotic condition. No handclaps were delivered in the voluntary or 
involuntary conditions. Participants were informed during the hypnotic induction that 
the post-hypnotic suggestion would be removed when they left the room at the end of 
the session. 
There were four trial types, presented in separate blocks. In contingent trials, 
pressing a key triggered a 1000 Hz, 100 ms duration tone after a 250 ms delay. 
Participants were asked to look at a fixation cross in the centre of the clock and to wait 
for at least one revolution before pressing the button at a time of their choosing. The 
trial was restarted if the action occurred before one full revolution or after six 
revolutions. Participants were asked not to plan ahead or to aim for a particular point on 
the clock and to report either the action or the tone (to give contingent action or 
contingent tone judgements). Baseline action trials were the same as contingent action 
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trials except the button did not trigger a tone. In baseline tone trials, the tone was 
triggered pseudo-randomly between 2.5 s and 7 s following one revolution of the clock.  
Following the tone (or action on baseline action trials), the dot continued 
moving for a pseudo-randomised period of time between 1200 ms and 2370 ms. The 
clock was then removed from the screen for a pseudorandomised time interval (500 ms 
to 1280 ms). When the clock reappeared, participants were able to control the position 
of the dot using a mouse and were asked to position the dot at the position at which it 
had been at the time of the judged event (action or tone) and to press the mouse button 
to record their judgement. 
Each block consisted of 35 repetitions of one trial type except for baseline tone 
trials, for which 13 repetitions were taken in each condition and subsequently combined 
into a single block of 39 trials. The baseline tone trials were spread across the conditions 
in this way in order to minimise the experimental duration and reduce the possibility of 
participants becoming fatigued. As the baseline tone trials required no action to take 
place, the different experimental conditions should not influence these timing 
judgements. Blocks were separated by 30 s rest periods and presented in 
counterbalanced order.  Before the session began, all participants were trained with four 
practice trials in the baseline tone condition and four in the baseline action condition. In 
order to reduce the effects of fatigue, the experimental task was split across two 
experimental sessions, with two conditions performed in the first session and one in the 
second. Participants were led through the hypnotic induction and count-out procedure at 
the start of each session. Sessions took place on separate days or following a gap of at 
least 2 hours. In total, the sessions took approximately 2 hours and 30 minutes, 
including training and debriefing. All Stimuli were generated with Matlab running 
Psychtoolbox v3. 
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Analysis 
Mean judgement errors were calculated for each group on each trial type. 
Individual judgements more than 3.5 SD from the mean for each participant on each 
judgement type were then excluded before mean judgement errors were calculated for 
each participant, as also specified in Lush, Parkinson & Dienes (2016). Twenty 
judgements were excluded across all participants and trials (0.52% of judgements). 
Baseline action and tone judgement errors were subtracted from their respective 
contingent conditions to calculate action and outcome binding. Outcome binding was 
subtracted from action binding to produce a total binding measure.  
Repeated measures ANOVAs were performed for action, outcome and total 
binding measures. Baseline action (M) judgements and within-participant SD of 
baseline action judgements were also compared. Where there was evidence for violation 
of sphericity, Greenhouse-Geisser corrected degrees of freedom were used. Significant 
Fs were followed up with Fisher’s LSD post-hoc comparisons. 
Bayes factors (B) were used to assess strength of evidence for one degree of 
freedom effects. A B of above 3 indicates substantial evidence for the alternative 
hypothesis and below 1/3 substantial evidence for the null. Thus, all Bayes factors, B, 
reported here represent the evidence for H1 relative to H0; to find the evidence for H0 
relative to H1, take 1/B. Bs between 3 and 1/3 indicate data insensitivity (see Dienes, 
2014; cf Jeffreys, 1939).  Here, BH(0, x) refers to a Bayes factor in which the predictions 
of H1 were modeled as a half-normal distribution with an SD of x (see Dienes, 2014); 
the half-normal can be used when a theory makes a directional prediction where x scales 
the size of effect that could be expected (so x can be chosen from e.g. relevant past 
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studies). BN(0, x) indicates H1 was specified as a normal distribution with mean 0 and SD 
x (for non-directional predictions).  Proposals that a shared mechanism underlies 
functional motor disorders (motor disorders with no known neurological cause) and 
hypnotic involuntariness have been made since the 19th century (for a recent review see 
Bell, Oakley, Halligan & Deeley (2010). Kranick et al (2013) provide an estimate of 
intentional binding effect size for the difference between functional motor disorder 
patients and healthy volunteers; the difference between groups in outcome binding was 
approximately half the effect found in control participants. Bayes factors for differences 
in each measure were therefore calculated using a half-normal distribution with SD 
based on half the mean in the voluntary condition. BU[0,max] refers to a Bayes factor in 
which the predictions of H1 were modeled as a Uniform distribution from 0 to max. We 
used this model for the rating of involuntariness which is on a scale from 0 to 5; thus the 
maximum that the population mean difference between conditions could be was 5. A 
Bayes factor for the regression of the difference in outcome binding between voluntary 
and post-hypnotic conditions on reported involuntariness in the post-hypnotic 
suggestion condition was calculated using a half-normal distribution with SD based on 
the quotient of the mean outcome binding in the medium group (as an independent 
estimate of the rough amount of binding that could exist in highs) and the range of the 
involuntariness rating scale (i.e. 120/6).  Bayes factors for simple interactions between 
two conditions and group were calculated modeling H1 using half the mean binding in 
both groups for the relevant binding component. 
 
Predictions 
We tested highly hypnotisable and medium hypnotisable groups on an 
intentional binding task in voluntary action and in two involuntary conditions, in which 
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the action was passive or was reported to be experienced as involuntary following a 
post-hypnotic suggestion (in which response occurs following hypnosis, Barnier & 
McConkey, 1998) of action involuntariness. As binding is sensitive to agency, binding 
should be strongest in the voluntary condition and weaker in passive action. If the 
experience of involuntariness reported in hypnotic responding by highly hypnotisable 
subjects reflects real changes in the experience of agency, intentional binding should 
also be weakened in post-hypnotically suggested involuntariness in highly hypnotisable 
subjects.  In terms of the comparison of highly with medium hypnotisable subjects, 
highs compared to mediums should have a greater difference in binding between 
voluntary and post-hypnotic conditions, and between passive and post-hypnotic 
conditions; no prediction is made for highs being different from mediums in the 
difference between voluntary and passive conditions. 
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Results 
Involuntariness ratings. 
 Table 1 shows mean involuntariness ratings for each group in each condition. 
The effects of hypnotisability on reported involuntariness were analysed using 
hypnotisability (high vs medium) as a between-subjects factor and condition (voluntary 
action vs post-hypnotically suggested involuntariness vs passive action) as a within-
subject factor. Importantly, there was a significant interaction between condition and 
group on reported involuntariness, F (1, 22) = 50.85, p < .001, η2p = .698. The 
interaction was decomposed into the simple effect of condition for each hypnotisability 
group.  For the highly hypnotisable group, there was a significant effect of agency 
condition on involuntariness, F(2, 18) = 135.2, p <.001, η2p = .94. Compared to 
voluntary action, participants reported more involuntariness in the passive action, p 
<.001, BU[0,5] = 3.84 x 10
28, 95% CI [-4.98, -3.62], dz = 5.53, and post-hypnotic 
conditions, p <.001, BU[0,5] = 3.53 x 10
11, 95% CI [-3.62, -2.23], dz = 3.01. However, 
passive actions were reported to be more involuntary than actions performed following 
a post-hypnotic suggestion of involuntariness, p <.001, BU[0,5] = 2.15 x 10
8, 95% CI  [.99, 
1.76], dz = 2.53.  For the medium hypnotisable group, there was a significant effect of 
agency condition on involuntariness, F(2, 26) = 413.08, p <.001, η2p = .97. Compared 
to passive action, participants reported less involuntariness in the voluntary action 
condition, p <.001, BU[0,5] = 6.95 x 10
125,  95% CI [-5.00-, -4.28], dz = 7.33. There was 
evidence for no difference between voluntariness ratings in the voluntary and post-
hypnotic conditions, p  >.250, BU[0,5] = .10, 95% CI [-.53, .24], dz = .22. Passive actions 
were rated as more involuntary than actions performed following a post-hypnotic 
suggestion of involuntariness, p <.001, BU[0,5] =  2.43 x 10
84, 95% CI  [4.06, 4.94], dz = 
5.92. 
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Total binding. 
 Analyses of the total binding measure are reported in the online supplemental 
material 
Outcome binding. 
 Table 2 shows the binding measures in each condition for both groups and 
Table 3 shows p values, Bayes factors, 95% confidence intervals and effect size for 
post-hoc comparisons for each main effect. The effects of hypnotisability on outcome 
binding were analysed using hypnotisability (high or medium) as a between-subjects 
factor and condition (voluntary action, post-hypnotically suggested involuntariness or 
passive action) as a within-subject factor. There was a significant main effect of 
condition on outcome binding, Fcorrected(1.42, 31.30) = 10.30, p = .001, η2p = .319, but 
no significant main effect of hypnotisability on this measure, F(1, 22) = .929, p  > .250, 
η2p = .041.  There was a marginally significant interaction between condition and group 
on outcome binding, Fcorrected(1.42, 31.30) = 2.81, p = .091, η2p = .11. The theory that 
hypnotic response is experienced as passive predicts two key partial interactions. 
Specifically, there was, as predicted, an interaction between group and voluntary vs 
post-hypnotic conditions on outcome binding, F(1,22) = 9.18, p = .006, BH(0, 62.5) =  
39.01, η2p = .29. There was no evidence one way or the other for an interaction between 
passive and post-hypnotic conditions, F(1,22) = .222, p  >.250, BH(0, 62.5) = .67, η2p 
= .01. Finally there was no sensitive evidence for an interaction between group and 
voluntary vs passive conditions on outcome binding, F(1,22) = 3.52, p = .074, BN(0, 62.5) 
= 1.63, η2p = .14. The planned simple effect of condition for the highly hypnotisability 
group revealed a significant effect of agency on outcome binding, Fcorrected(1.15, 10.37) 
= 5.50, p = .037, η2p = .38. Compared to voluntary action, outcome binding was lower 
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for both the passive action and post-hypnotic conditions. For the medium hypnotisable 
group, there was also a significant effect of agency on outcome binding, F(2, 24) = 5.52, 
p = .010, η2p = .30. Compared to passive action, outcome binding was higher for 
voluntary and post-hypnotic action. There was sensitive evidence for no difference in 
outcome binding between the voluntary and post-hypnotic conditions. 
Action binding. 
 The effects of hypnotisability on action binding were analysed using 
hypnotisability (high or medium) as a between-subjects factor and condition (voluntary 
action, post-hypnotically suggested involuntariness or passive action) as a within-
subject factor. There was no significant main effect of condition on action binding, F(2, 
44) = .579, p > .250, η2p = .026, nor was there a significant effect of group, F(1, 22) = 
1.165, p > .250, η2p = .050. The interaction between condition and group on action 
binding was also not significant, F (2, 44) = .579, p > .250, η2p = .03. The more precise 
partial interactions were all non-evidential; no conclusions follow. Specifically,  there 
was only insensitive evidence for the interaction between group and voluntary vs post-
hypnotic conditions on action binding,  F(1,22) = .859, p > .250, BH(0, 19) = 1.19, η2p 
= .038;   the same for the interaction between group and voluntary and passive 
conditions on action binding, F(1,22) = .013, p >.250, , BN(0, 19) = .68, η2p = .001; and 
for the interaction between group and passive vs post-hypnotic conditions, F(1,22) 
= .623, p >.250, BH(0, 19) = 1.22, η2p = .03. The planned simple effect of condition for the 
highly hypnotisability group was not significant, F(1.30, 11.72) = .032, p > .250, η2p 
= .004. While the action binding shifts in the voluntary condition for highly 
hypnotisable participants are comparable to other reported results (e.g., 20 ms reported 
in Haggard, Clark & Kalogeras, 2002), we found no sensitive evidence for a difference 
in action binding between conditions to parallel the shift in outcome binding. However, 
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as can be seen in Table 2, neither is there is substantial evidence for no difference 
between any two conditions; the data are simply insensitive and provide support for 
neither the experimental or null hypothesis. We can therefore draw no conclusions 
about action binding based on the results of this study. The insensitivity is not 
surprising; as we found, outcome binding is typically a bigger effect than action binding 
(e.g. Desantis, Roussel & Waszak, 2011; Kranick et al, 2013; Lush, Parkinson & 
Dienes, 2016). Given that action binding is characterised by a smaller shift than 
outcome binding, a larger sample might be required to reveal differences in this 
measure. 
Figure 1 shows the derived interval between the action and tone events in each 
condition. As outcome binding was reduced but not eliminated in passive actions, these 
results are broadly consistent with evidence that intentional binding is a special case of a 
general causal binding (Buehner, 2012). As passive actions were reported to be more 
involuntary than post-hypnotically induced involuntariness for highly hypnotisable 
subjects, we should expect a difference in magnitude of binding between these two 
conditions. Table 2 shows that the mean values follow this expected pattern. However, 
as the comparisons between these two conditions are insensitive, we can draw no firm 
conclusions about this pattern of results (table 3).  
To investigate the relationship between the experience of involuntariness and 
binding, regression analysis of the difference in outcome binding between voluntary and 
post-hypnotic suggestion conditions over reported involuntariness in the post-hypnotic 
condition was conducted. All medium and highly hypnotisable participants (including 
those excluded from other analyses because they were unable to maintain 
involuntariness) were included in this analysis.  
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Reported involuntariness predicted the difference in outcome binding between 
voluntary and post-hypnotic conditions, the raw slope being 19 ms/rating unit, t(27) = 
2.37, p = .025, BH(0, 20) = 6.48. Therefore, outcome binding was reduced in the post-
hypnotic condition compared to the voluntary condition as reported involuntariness 
increased, supporting the hypothesis that binding difference is related to subjective 
experience.  
 
 
Figure 1. Derived time intervals between action and tone events in the highly 
hypnotisable group: ** = 3 <B <10, *** = B >10 
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   Condition  
Group 
(hypnotisability) 
 Voluntary Post-hypnotic 
involuntariness 
Passive 
High     
 Involuntariness 
rating 
.7 (.30) 3.3 (.17) 5 (0) 
Medium     
 Involuntariness 
rating 
.3 (.16) .4 (.20) 4.9 (.07) 
 
Table 1. Mean (SE) involuntariness ratings in each group. 0 = completely voluntary, 5 = 
completely involuntary. 
  
   Condition  
Group 
(hypnotisability) 
 Voluntary Post-hypnotic 
involuntariness 
Passive 
High     
 Action binding 28.0 (25.0) 24.6 (56.7) 23.2 (53.7) 
 Outcome binding -130.7 (45.4) -69.4 (56.0) -50.51 (89.1) 
Medium     
 Action binding 9.9 (28.2) 25.6 (38.4) 3.1 (42.9) 
 Outcome binding -120.2 (66.3) -117.9 (67.9) -83.5 (79.7) 
Mean times are given in ms (SD). 
 
Table 2. Mean binding for the high and medium hypnotisable groups in the three 
experimental conditions 
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   Comparison  
Group)  Voluntary action vs 
passive action 
Voluntary action vs 
Post-hypnotic 
suggestion 
Passive action vs 
post-hypnotic 
suggestion 
High     
 Action 
binding 
  p > .250                 
BH(0, 14) = .91                
[-29.3, 38.8]                    
dz = 0.10 
p > .250                    
BH(0, 14) = .89              
[-32.9, 39.7]                    
dz = 0.07 
p > .250               
BH(0, 14) = .93             
[-59.4, 56.8]                 
dz = 0.02 
 Outcome 
binding 
  p = .003*               
BH(0, 65) = 79.51**    
[-124.4, -35.9]                    
dz =1.08 
  p = .009*               
BH(0, 65) = 14.70**     
[-103.4, -19.2]                    
dz = 0.93 
p > .250                  
BH 0, 65) = .76            
[-59.0, 96.8]                 
dz = 0.17 
Medium     
 Action 
binding 
p > .250                   
BH(0, 5) = 1.08           
[-16.8, 30.5]                         
dz = .17 
p > .250                   
BH(0, 5) = .77             
[-44.3, 12.8]                        
dz = .31 
   p = .121              
BH(0, 5) = 1.33      
[-52.0, -6.9]                        
dz = .43 
 Outcome 
binding 
p = .019*                 
BH(0, 60) = 7.07**         
[-66.4, -7.0]                      
dz = .67 
p > .250                   
BH(0, 60) = .22**          
[-23.5, 18.8]                      
dz = .063 
   p = .022*               
BH 0, 60) = 6.11**      
[-62.8, -5.9]                      
dz = .65 
* Significant at the .05 level. ** Sensitive B (> 3 or < 1/3). Brackets show 95% CIs 
Table 3. Post-hoc comparisons between each condition in the high and medium 
hypnotisable groups. 
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Discussion 
Replicating previous studies, causal binding in voluntary action was stronger 
than in passive action (Haggard, Clark & Kalogeras, 2002; Buehner, 2015). Crucially, 
binding was also reduced in high hypnotisables after a post-hypnotic suggestion of 
involuntariness, providing evidence for hypnotically induced changes in sense of 
agency.  
We only found evidence for changes in outcome binding. The prediction of the 
sensory outcome of an action may provide cues for sense of agency by comparing a 
predicted sensory outcome to the actual outcome and hypnotic suggestion may disrupt 
this mechanism by preventing motor intentions from activating sensorimotor predictions 
(Blakemore, Oakley & Frith, 2003). Therefore, reduced outcome binding may arise 
from disruption to a comparator preventing sensorimotor pre-representation of an action 
outcome.  
An alternative account proposes that, by analogy with cross-modal cue 
combination (Ernst & Banks, 2002; Körding et al, 2007), the timing judgements of 
intentional actions and their outcomes may be a weighted average of the action and 
outcome cues (Kawabe, Roseboom & Nishida, 2013), with the weighting dependent on 
the estimated precision with which each is individually timed. The decreased outcome 
judgement shift reported here may therefore arise from the increased weighting of the 
outcome cue over the action cue in estimating the time of the outcome event when 
motor intention information is discounted and the estimated precision of the action cue 
consequently decreases (consistently, in the online supplemental material we report 
lower within-participant SD in the voluntary than in the post-hypnotic condition for 
high hypnotisables and sensitive evidence of no difference in medium hypnotisables). 
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This would occur in passive action because motor intention information is absent, and in 
post-hypnotic involuntariness because hypnotist induced beliefs reduce the relative 
weighting of motor intentions in generating sense of agency. A cue combination 
mechanism is predictive of an increase in action binding when motor intention 
information is reduced, as lower precision of action should result in a relatively higher 
weighting of the outcome cue in outcome timing judgements and consequently a greater 
shift of the weighted average of the two events toward the action cue. This might run 
contrary to our prediction of reduction in overall binding, as the two opposing shifts 
would, to at least some degree, cancel each other out. However, as we report no 
sensitive evidence for differences in action binding, the results of the current study do 
not bear on this prediction either way.   
While the current study is the first to show the relevance of beliefs about 
intentions to binding, outcome binding is also reduced when participants incorrectly 
believe that an outcome is triggered by another’s action (Desantis, Roussel & Waszak, 
2011). This may reflect a reduced contribution of motor intentions to outcome timing 
judgements when, according to beliefs, such information is not relevant to event timing. 
Binding has also been shown to be reduced when participants are instructed to press a 
particular key at a particular time (Caspar et al 2016). By contrast, in the current study, 
participants were free to press the button when they wished and were merely instructed 
that they would not feel that they had intended the action.  
It might be argued that hypnotic responding occurs in the absence of intentions 
(e.g. Woody & Bowers, 1994). However, given hypnotic actions are performed in 
appropriate and flexible ways, intentions appear undisrupted in hypnotic responding, 
and it is the metacognition of intentions that is disrupted (e.g. see Woody & Sadler, 
2008). Thus, the difference between hypnotic and non-hypnotic action may lie in the 
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awareness of intentions (Dienes, 2012; Lush, Naish & Dienes, 2016). If so, an intention 
being conscious may increase its availability to other processes (Cleeremans & Jiménez, 
2002), and thus to the process of timing its associated action. Consistently, mindfulness 
meditators, who may have more accurate metacognition of motor intentions (Dreyfus, 
2011), show stronger outcome binding (Lush, Parkinson & Dienes, 2016). It should be 
noted that highly hypnotisable people are a highly selected group, and these results may 
not generalise to the general population. 
We report that hypnotically suggested actions behave more like genuinely 
involuntary than voluntary actions in an implicit measure sensitive to agency, providing 
objective evidence for hypnotically suggested changes in agentic experience and 
demonstrating that beliefs about whether an action is intended influence binding. 
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Chapter V 
Intentional binding in trait hypnotisability 
Abstract 
An experience of involuntariness is central to hypnotic responding, and may 
arise from an ability to sustain inaccurate metacognition of first-order intentions. Trait 
differences in the ability to respond to hypnotic suggestion may reflect differing levels 
of access to motor intentions, with highly hypnotisable people having relatively low 
access and low hypnotisable people greater access. Intentional binding refers to the 
subjective compression of the time between an action and its outcome, typically 
indicated by a forward shift in the judged time of an action toward its outcome (action 
binding) and the backward shift of an outcome toward the action that caused it (outcome 
binding). The effect is considered an implicit measure of the sense of agency as it is 
sensitive to intentional action without explicit reflection upon agency. Intentional 
binding may represent a simple case of multisensory cue combination. Following such 
an interpretation, increasing the variance of an action or its outcome should decrease the 
bias of the perceived timing of one cue toward another. Here we present results 
consistent with such a mechanism. The results support the theory that trait 
hypnotisability is related to access to information related to motor intentions. In a 
contingent presentation of action and outcome events, lows reported less variable timing 
judgements of actions than highs and less variable timing judgements of action events 
than of outcome events within-group. Lows also showed weaker action binding than 
highs, and weaker action than outcome binding within-group. Intentional binding may 
reflect the combination of cross-modal cues based on an ontogenetically acquired casual 
prior.  
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Introduction 
The sense of agency (SoA) is the experience we have of controlling our actions 
and their outcomes (Moore, 2016; Haggard, 2017). Research on SoA can measure 
explicit judgements of agency, such as asking whether or to what degree a particular 
action or outcome is associated with an experience of agency (e.g., Wegner & 
Wheatley, 1999). Alternatively, implicit measures which require no reflection upon 
agency can be used, of which the intentional binding effect is perhaps the most 
commonly employed. Intentional binding refers to the compression of the perceived 
interval between the reported times of actions and their outcomes (Haggard, Clark & 
Kalogeras, 2002). Intentional binding is considered to be an implicit measure of sense 
of agency because the effect is reduced or even extinguished in unintended actions (for 
reviews see Moore & Obhi, 2012; Wolpe & Rowe, 2014).  However, temporal binding 
of actions and outcomes also occurs in the timing of events which are merely observed 
when a causal relationship is inferred, so intentional binding is perhaps best described as 
the effect of motor intention-related information on the magnitude of temporal binding 
over and above causal binding (Buehner, 2012; 2015). 
Intentional binding can be measured by deriving intervals between the reported 
time of an action and outcome event from the difference in the reported time of the 
events when the outcome is contingent upon the action (contingent conditions) and 
when it is not (baseline conditions). Timing judgements can be made using a Libet 
clock method (e.g., Libet, 1985) in which participants report the position of a rapidly 
moving clock hand when an event is perceived. Measured in this way, intentional 
binding can be seen to consist of two opposing shifts in reported time from baseline to 
contingent conditions: action timing judgements towards the time of the outcome event 
(action binding) and outcome timing judgements toward the time of the action event 
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(outcome binding). This temporal binding between an action and its outcome may arise 
from a cue combination mechanism, in which the timing estimate reported for either 
action or outcome events is a precision weighted average of the two events (Kawabe, 
Roseboom & Nishida, 2013; Wolpe, Siebner & Rowe, 2013). Such a mechanism 
predicts that a relatively high precision of event timing should have opposing effects on 
binding components. For example, relatively high precision of action event timings will 
result in both action and outcome event timing judgements which are relatively close to 
the action, so that the magnitude of action binding will be relatively small and that of 
outcome binding relatively large. Conversely, if precision of action event timing 
judgements is relatively low, there will be reduced outcome binding and greater action 
binding. Therefore, individual differences in the availability of motor intention-related 
information which affects the relative precision of action timing judgements should be 
reflected in intentional binding.  
Hypnosis is fundamentally related to changes in the experience of agency, and 
the experience of involuntariness has been described as the classical suggestion effect of 
hypnosis (Weitzenhoffer, 1980). According to dissociated experience theories of 
hypnotic responding, the experience of involuntariness in hypnotic responding occurs 
when monitoring systems become dissociated from cognitive control systems (for a 
review, see Woody & Sadler, 2008).  According to higher order thought (HOT) theories 
of consciousness, conscious experiences are essentially metacognitive; a particular 
mental state only becomes conscious when there is a higher order mental state directed 
at it (Rosenthal, 2000). The cold control theory of hypnosis recasts dissociated 
experience within the framework of HOT theory, arguing that the experience of 
hypnotic involuntariness arises from the production and maintenance of inaccurate 
HOTs directed at unconscious first order intentions (Dienes, 2007; 2010). Therefore, a 
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successful response to a hypnotic suggestion involves performing an intentional act but, 
through an inaccurate HOT of intending, experiencing the act as unintentional. The 
sense of agency may be generated by the integration of multiple sources of information, 
with the influence of each source weighted by precision (Moore, Wegner & Haggard, 
2009; Synofzik, Vosgerau & Lindner, 2009). Therefore, hypnotic responding may arise 
from the relatively high weighting of hypnosis-related beliefs and the relatively low 
weighting of motor information. 
Hypnotisability can be measured by response to suggestion on standardised 
scales following hypnotic induction (for reviews see Laurence, Beaulieu-Prévost & Du 
Chéné, 2008; Terhune & Cardeña, 2016). Measured in this way, hypnotisability can be 
considered a relatively stable trait, with strong test-retest reliability over a 25-year 
period (Piccione, Hilgard & Zimbardo, 1989). According to cold control theory, 
individual differences in trait hypnotisability should reflect individual differences in the 
ability to generate and maintain inaccurate metacognition of 1st order intentions. There 
is some recent evidence which supports the theory that an ability to generate and sustain 
an experience of involuntariness reflects a trait for relatively low access to 1st order 
intentions. High hypnotisables report later awareness of motor intention than medium or 
low hypnotisables (Lush, Naish & Dienes, 2016) and are less sensitive to disruptions of 
control when forming judgements of agency in a task designed to measure 
metacognition of SoA (Terhune & Hedman, 2017). There is also evidence that the 
classical suggestion effect is related to a reduction of action intention related 
information in timing judgements; a post-hypnotically induced experience of 
involuntariness is accompanied by less anticipatory judgements of action timing 
(Haggard & Oakley, 2004), and, in intentional binding, by an increase in the variability 
of action timing judgements and a reduction in outcome binding (Lush et al, 2017).   
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Here we investigate the relationship between trait hypnotisability and intentional 
binding. We draw on evidence for a relationship between hypnotisability and 
metacognition of intentions and assume a cue combination model as the mechanism of 
binding to form predictions. We predict that lower metacognitive access to 1st order 
intentions in high hypnotisables will be reflected in increased within-participant 
variance of action timing judgements and consequently reduced outcome binding and 
increased action binding. We make the opposite predictions for low hypnotisables; 
increased metacognitive access to 1st order representations of intending will be reflected 
in more precise within-participant action timing judgements and, consequently, 
decreased action binding and increased outcome binding. 
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Method (adapted from Lush, Parkinson & Dienes, 2016) 
Participants 
Forty participants were recruited following screening on the Sussex Waterloo 
Scale of Hypnotisability (SWASH; in prep). Of these, 18 participants were highly 
hypnotisable (3 males and 15 females, mean age = 19.3 years, SD = 2.3) and 22 low 
hypnotisable (2 males and 20 females, mean age = 20.9 years, SD = 2.3)  
Combined subjective and objective hypnotisability scores (the simple mean of 
the objective and subjective scores, each scaled out of a maximum of 10) were used to 
identify high and low hypnotisables participants, with a minimum cut-off of 5.5 (which 
was the top 10% of 418 screened) for the highly hypnotisable group (M = 6.5, SD = .8) 
The low hypnotisable group (M = 1.3, SD = .6) scored below 2 (15% of SWASH scores 
lie below 2). 
Ethical approval was received from the University of Sussex ethical committee 
and informed consent was obtained. Participants received cash payment of £7 or course 
credits.  
As in Lush et al (2017), participants were recruited for the duration of six terms, 
until there were no more responses.  
Procedure (adapted from Lush, Parkinson & Dienes, 2016)  
Visual stimuli were displayed at 100 Hz on a 21-in. CRT monitor and auditory 
stimuli were presented via Sennheiser headphones. For each trial, a clock face was 
presented, marked at thirty degree intervals and subtended a visual angle of five 
degrees. A static dot, subtending at 0.2°, appeared at a pseudo-randomised position and 
began rotating around the clock 250 ms later (at 2560 ms per revolution). Participants 
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were seated at a viewing distance of approximately 60 cm. A computer keyboard was 
used to record actions (button presses). 
There were four trial types, presented in separate blocks. In contingent trials, 
pressing a key triggered a 1000 Hz, 100 ms duration tone after a 250 ms delay. 
Participants were asked to look at a fixation cross in the centre of the clock and to wait 
for at least one revolution before pressing the button at a time of their choosing. The 
trial was restarted if the action occurred before one full revolution or after six 
revolutions. Participants were asked not to plan ahead or to aim for a particular point on 
the clock and to report either the action or the tone (to give contingent action or 
contingent tone judgements). Baseline action trials were the same as contingent action 
trials except the button did not trigger a tone. In baseline tone trials, the tone was 
triggered pseudo-randomly between 2.5 s and 7 s following one revolution of the clock. 
Following the tone (or action on baseline action trials), the dot continued 
moving for a pseudo-randomised period of time between 1200 ms and 2370 ms. The 
clock was then removed from the screen for a pseudorandomised time interval (500 ms 
to 1280 ms). When the clock reappeared, participants were able to control the position 
of the dot with a mouse. Moving the mouse forward (toward the screen) caused the dot 
to move in a clockwise direction around the clock face and the reverse mouse 
movement (away from the screen) caused the dot to move counter-clockwise around the 
clock face. Participants were asked to move the dot to the position it had occupied at the 
time of the judged event (action or tone) and to press the mouse button to record their 
judgement. 
Each block consisted of 40 repetitions of one trial type and blocks were 
separated by 30 s rest periods. The four blocks were presented in counterbalanced order. 
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Before the session began, all participants were trained with four practice trials in the 
baseline tone condition and four in the baseline action condition so that they could 
become familiarised with the reporting procedure. All Stimuli were generated with 
Matlab running Psychtoolbox v3 (Kleiner et al., 2007) 
Measures  
Within-participant SD of timing judgements provides a measure of precision in 
estimating the time of an event. If binding reflects the combination of cues according to 
the precision afforded to actions or their outcomes, any differences in intentional 
binding should be accompanied by differences in this measure. In terms of cue 
combination theory, it is the interaction between high vs low hypnotisables by outcome 
vs action timing precision that determines changes in intentional binding between 
groups.  
Mean judgement errors were calculated for each group on each trial type. 
Individual judgements more than 3.5 SD from the mean for each participant on each 
judgement type were excluded before mean judgement errors were calculated for each 
participant. Thirty-four judgements were filtered by this method (2.1 % of all trials). 
The adjusted mean errors for action and tone conditions were then subtracted from their 
respective contingent conditions to calculate action and outcome binding. If binding 
reflects cue combination, an interaction between high vs low hypnotisables by action 
and outcome timing precision should be reflected in an interaction between high and 
low hypnotisables and action vs outcome binding. 
Data analyses  
Bayes factors (B) were used to assess strength of evidence (Wagenmakers 
Verhagen Ly Matzke Steingroever Rouder & Morey, 2017). Unlike null-hypothesis 
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significance testing, Bayes factors have the advantage of distinguishing sensitive 
evidence for H0 from not much evidence at all. A B of above 3 indicates substantial 
evidence for the alternative over the null hypothesis and below 1/3 substantial evidence 
for the null over the alternative hypothesis. Bs between 3 and 1/3 indicate data 
insensitivity in distinguishing null and alternative hypotheses (Dienes, 2014; Jeffreys, 
1939). Here, BH[0, x]  refers to a Bayes factor in which the predictions of H1 were 
modelled as half-normal distribution with a mean of 0 and an SD of x (Dienes 2014); 
the half-normal can be used when a theory makes a directional prediction where x scales 
the size of effect that could be expected (so x can be chosen from e.g. relevant past 
studies). 
 Kranick et al. (2013) provide an estimate of the sort of difference in intentional 
binding that could be found between different groups using conversion disorder 
patients; the difference between groups in tone binding was on the order of magnitude 
of about half the effect found in control participants. Bayes factors for group differences 
in each measure were therefore calculated using a half-normal distribution with SD 
based on half the average of action and outcome binding in all participants.  
Bayes factors for within-participant SD of timing judgement group contrasts 
were calculated using a half-normal based on the expected change in variance 
accompanying a 50% change in binding. On the theory that binding arises from the 
Bayesian combination of outcome and action time estimates, the percentage change in 
binding would equal the percentage change in the relative precision, i.e. of the variance; 
the change in SD should be proportionate to the square root of the change in variance. 
Thus, a 50% change in variance amounts to the standard deviation changing to 0.7 of its 
value, i.e. a reduction of 30%. 
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Results 
Baseline within-participant SD of event judgements 
First, we tested the prediction that highly hypnotisable participants would have 
less precise reports of baseline action event timing judgements than lows, but that the 
two groups would not differ in precision of reports of baseline tone event timing 
judgements. There was no evidence either way for an interaction, F(1, 
38) = 1.44, p = 0.238, BH[0, 16] = 1.33, η2p = .036 (see figure 1). Planned simple effects 
comparisons showed that high hypnotisables had greater variability of baseline action 
timing judgements (M = 76.4ms, SD = 24.3) than low hypnotisables (M = 58.3 ms, SD = 
19.2), t(38) = 2.64, p = .012, d = .83,  BH[0, 16] = 14.29. There was no evidence either way 
for a difference between baseline tone judgement SD in highs (M = 89.2 ms, SD = 22.8) 
and lows (M = 80.2 ms, SD = 16.9 ms), t(1,38) = 1.42, p = .163, d = .45, BH[0, 16] =  1.59. 
High hypnotisables had lower SD when timing actions than outcomes, t(17) = 1.85, p 
= .082, dz = .44, BH[0, 16] = 3.23, and low hypnotisables also had less variable judgements 
of action than of outcome in baseline conditions, t(21) = 5.41, p < .001, dz = 1.16, 
BH[0, 16] = 323302.46. 
Contingent within-participant SD of event judgements 
Next, we tested the same prediction for SD of reports of timing judgements 
when the outcome tone was contingent upon the action event. There was evidence for 
an interaction, F(1, 38) = 3.38, p = .074, BH[0, 16] = 3.37, η2p = .082 (see figure 2). 
Planned simple effects analyses revealed that high hypnotisables showed greater 
variability in contingent action judgements (M = 88.4ms, SD = 34.6), than low 
hypnotisables (M = 61.9 ms, SD = 19.26), t(25.40) = 2.91, p = .007, Glass's Δ = .77, 
BH[0, 16] =  35.79. There was no evidence either for or against the prediction that there 
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would be no difference in within-participant SD of contingent tone judgements between 
highs (M = 91.9 ms, SD = 22.5) and lows (M = 83.9 ms, SD = 27.35), t(1, 38) = .984, p 
= .331, d = .32, BH[0, 16] = .1.07. There was no sensitive evidence for whether or not 
highs varied in SD between contingent action and outcome judgements, t(17) = .486, p 
= .633, dz = .12, BH[0, 16] = .60. Low hypnotisables however, did have less variable 
judgements of action than of outcome in contingent conditions, t(21) = 3.09, p = .005, 
dz = .95, BH[0, 16] = 46.34. 
Action and outcome binding 
Finally, we tested the prediction that as a result of having relatively lower access 
to motor intentions, high hypnotisables would have increased action binding and 
decreased outcome binding. There was marginal evidence for an interaction between 
group and type of event judged (action or outcome) on timing judgement shift from 
baseline, F(1,14) = 3.25, p = .080, BH[0, 24] = 2.82, η2p = .079. Figure 3 shows the action 
and outcome binding measures for each group. t-tests were used to test planned 
comparisons between groups and on each binding measure. There was evidence that 
highly hypnotisable participants showed a greater shift of action toward tone in 
contingent trials (M = 41.1 ms, SD = 36.4) than low hypnotisables (M = 22.6 ms, SD = 
27.2), t(38) = 1.84, p = .073, d = .58,  BH[0, 24] = 3.11. There was no evidence as to 
whether low hypnotisables showed a greater shift of tone toward action in contingent 
trials (M = -77.69 ms, SD = 70.7) than high hypnotisables (M = -51.27 ms, SD = 82.4), 
t(38) = 1.09, p = .282, d = .34,  BH[0, 24] = 1.49. While there was no evidence for whether 
or not action binding differed from outcome binding in highs (t(17) = .466, p = .647, dz 
= .12, BH[0, 16] = .91, low hypnotisables showed less action binding than outcome 
binding, t(21) = 3.09, p = .001, dz = 1.02, BH[0, 16] = 359.73. 
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Figure 1. Interaction between high and low hypnotisability and judged event on 
baseline condition within participant standard deviations of timing judgements. 
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Figure 2. Interaction between high and low hypnotisability and judged event on 
contingent condition within participant standard deviations of timing judgements. 
 
Figure 3. Interaction between high and low hypnotisability and judged event on 
contingent condition timing shift from baseline 
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Discussion 
We tested high and low hypnotisable participants in an intentional binding task. 
Low hypnotisables showed reduced action binding compared to outcome binding both 
within-group and when compared to high hypnotisables. Lows also reported less 
variable judgements of the time of an intentional action than highs, and less variable 
within-group timing of action than outcome events. These results are consistent with 
both a cue combination model of intentional binding and of a relationship between trait 
differences in hypnotisability and metacognition of intentions. There was no sensitive 
evidence either for or against the hypothesis that lows would show more outcome 
binding than highs, so no firm conclusions can be drawn regarding outcome binding in 
trait hypnotisability.  
According to a cue combination model, when precision of action timing 
judgements is high there should be a relatively small shift of action timing towards the 
outcome event and a relatively large shift of outcome event timing towards the action. 
Both high and low hypnotisables showed less variable action timing judgements than 
they did outcome judgements. However, we should expect that relatively precise 
information about the timing of an action event (compared to an outcome event) is 
available to the initiator of an action (Moore & Fletcher, 2012), and crucially, the 
magnitude of this difference was smaller than that of lows.  
There is direct experimental evidence for a cue combination mechanism 
supporting action binding. Wolpe, Siebner & Rowe (2013) manipulated the variability 
of outcome judgements by masking the outcome tone with varying levels of white noise 
and found that action binding decreased when outcome judgements were relatively 
imprecise. However, to date no direct evidence for or against cue combination in 
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outcome binding has been published. It has been proposed that outcome binding may 
occur when the threshold for perception of an action outcome is crossed more rapidly 
due to a sensorimotor prerepresentation of the outcome. However, there is evidence 
against action outcome identity playing a role in intentional binding (for a review see 
Hughes, Desantis & Waszak, 2013).  
There is evidence for differences in action binding in disorders of agency. In 
corticobasal syndrome (for which disorders of agency are diagnostic), patients show 
greater action binding than controls and the magnitude of action binding is positively 
related to variability of action time judgements (Wolpe et al, 2014b). Because the 
patient group showed abnormalities in a brain area considered important for motor 
intentions (the preSMA), these results may be attributable to differences in access to 
motor intentions. Additionally, Voss et al (2010) report greater action binding in 
schizophrenic patients than in controls (although no evidence for a difference in action 
timing variability was reported for this study).  
Increased within-participant variance of action timing judgements in high 
hypnotisables relative to low hypnotisables is consistent with the theory that trait 
hypnotisability reflects differences in metacognitive access to 1st order intentions 
(Dienes 2010; Dienes et al, 2016; Lush, Naish & Dienes, 2016). High hypnotisables 
may show greater variance in action timing judgements because they have less access to 
motor intention related information when forming HOTs of intending. Consistent with 
this, highs show more variable action judgement timing (and decreased outcome 
binding) following a post-hypnotic suggestion for the experience of involuntariness over 
actions (Lush et al, 2017). There is also evidence that TMS of dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex (dlPFC) increases hypnotisability (Dienes & Hutton, 2013). The dlPFC has been 
proposed to support HOTs (Lau & Rosenthal, 2011; Passingham & Wise, 2012) 
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(including HOTs of intending, Lau, Rogers, Haggard & Passingham, 2004), so the 
increase in hypnotic responding may be attributable to the disruption of HOTS of 
intending. If dlPFC supports HOTs relevant to precision of action timing judgements, 
disruption of dlPFC should lead to an increase in action timing variability, reduced 
action binding and increased outcome binding. 
It has been argued that the sense of agency arises from the integration of 
multiple sources of information, with the influence of each source weighted by 
precision (Moore, Wegner & Haggard, 2009, Synofzik, Vosgerau & Lindner, 2009). 
Therefore, hypnotic responding may arise from the relatively high weighting of 
hypnosis-related beliefs and the relatively low weighting of motor information. It should 
be noted that, according to cue integration models of SoA, the relationship between 
intentional binding and SoA is not straightforward. For example, having relatively low 
outcome binding does not mean that highs differ in their sense of agency because when 
information from one source is weak, other information will be weighted more highly 
(Moore & Fletcher, 2012). Consistent with this argument, when performing an 
intentional binding task in which the predictability of an outcome is manipulated 
(Moore & Haggard, 2008), schizophrenic patients have been shown to rely more on 
external, retrospective cues than on internal predictive signals (e.g., motor intentions) 
compared to controls (Voss et al 2010). If hypnotisability involves trait differences in 
access to information about motor intentions, we should expect to see a similar pattern 
in highs using this paradigm. 
As high and low hypnotisables are both special groups, it has been argued that 
medium hypnotisables should be included as a control group in hypnosis studies, to 
distinguish between the possibilities that the difference is attributable to highs or lows 
alone (Kirsch, 2011). This study was based on evidence for a linear relationship 
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between hypnotisability and metacognition of intentions (Dienes, 2015; Lush, Naish & 
Dienes, 2016), and the inclusion of low hypnotisables maximized the predicted potential 
differences. However, future studies are required to rule out the possibility that the 
relationships between trait hypnotisability and variance of action judgements or 
components of binding are non-linear. 
In summary, we report reduced precision of action timing judgements and 
increased action binding in high compared to low hypnotisables. These results are 
consistent with a cue combination model of intentional binding and with the theory that 
hypnotisability is related to differences in the availability of motor intention related 
information. 
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Chapter VI 
The Sussex-Waterloo Scale of Hypnotisability 
Abstract 
The ability to respond to hypnotic suggestibility (hypnotisability) is a stable trait which 
can be measured in a standardised procedure consisting of a hypnotic induction and a 
series of hypnotic suggestions. The SWASH is a 10-item adaptation of an established 
scale, the Waterloo-Stanford Group C Scale of Hypnotic Suggestibility (WSGC). 
Development of the SWASH was motivated by three distinct aims: to reduce required 
screening time, to provide an induction which more accurately reflects current theoretical 
understanding, and to supplement the objective scoring with experiential scoring. 
Screening time was reduced by shortening the induction, removing two suggestions 
which may cause distress (dream and age regression) and by modifications which allow 
administration in lecture theatres, so that more participants can be screened 
simultaneously. Theoretical issues were addressed by removing references to sleep, 
absorption and eye fixation and closure. Data from 418 participants at the University of 
Sussex and the University of Lancaster are presented, along with data from 66 participants 
who completed a re-test screening. The subjective and objective scales were highly 
correlated. The subjective scale showed good reliability, and objective scale reliability 
was comparable to the WSGC. The addition of subjective scale responses to the post-
hypnotic suggestion (PHS) item suggested a high probability that responses to PHS are 
inflated in WSGC screening. The SWASH is an effective measure of hypnotisability, 
which presents practical and theoretical advantages over existing scales.  
 
  
119 
Introduction 
Hypnosis involves reliable changes in experience which present a unique 
opportunity for experimentally investigating consciousness. In particular, the experience 
of involuntariness in central to hypnotic responding (Weitzenhoffer, 1980). Hypnosis is 
an effective tool for experimentally investigating alterations in the sense of agency or 
the experience of voluntary action (Haggard & Oakley 2004; Lush et al, 2017); thus, it 
creates illusions in agentic consciousness. Additionally, many highly hypnotisable 
people can experience vivid hallucinations or other altered sensory experiences; thus, 
hypnosis creates illusions in perceptual consciousness. That is, hypnosis can be used 
instrumentally for investigating a wide range of conscious experiences (Cardeña, 2014; 
Terhune, Cleeremans, Raz & Lynn, 2017).  However, hypnosis is under-used in 
comparison to established experimental methods of altering, for example, visual 
consciousness (e.g., continuous flash suppression; Tsuchiya & Koch, 2005) or bodily 
self-consciousness (Lenggenhager, Tadi, Metzinger & Blanke, 2007).  
 Hypnotisability can be considered a stable trait (Piccione, Hilgard, and 
Zimbardo, 1989), and empirical investigation of hypnosis commonly employs 
standardised scales in order to identify potential participants. While scale administration 
is a straightforward process which requires little training and requires no more than the 
ability to read a script (Kihlstrom, 2008), established inductions are unnecessarily long 
and fail to reflect contemporary theoretical understanding (Terhune & Cardeña, 2017; 
Woody & Barnier, 2008). Here we present a revised version of an established scale, 
with the aim of creating a practical and theoretically relevant screening procedure which 
we hope will make hypnosis research more widely accessible to the consciousness 
research community. 
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The development of the Sussex-Waterloo Scale of Hypnotisability (SWASH) 
has been guided by several distinct aims. First, we aimed to construct a time-efficient 
screening procedure. Second, we wanted to remove some allusions to theories which are 
no longer considered to be true. Third, we wanted to include an integrated experiential 
scale, as although hypnosis is characterised by changes in subjective experience, 
hypnotisability is often measured only according to objective criteria.  
The Waterloo-Stanford Group Scale of Hypnotic Susceptibility, Form C 
(WSGC; Bowers, 1993) is a 12-item scale adapted from the earlier SHSS:C 
(Weitzenhoffer & Hilgard, 1962), in which participants are screened individually. The 
WSGC was developed to have more difficult items than the group Harvard (Shor & 
Orne, 1963), which contains a relatively high proportion of easier ideomotor 
suggestions and therefore can fail to sufficiently identify high hypnotisables (Bowers, 
1993; Laurence, Beaulieu-Prévost, & Du Chéné, 2008). 
 Woody and Barnier (2008) proposed a four facet model for hypnotic 
suggestions in standardised scales, with items categorised as either direct or challenge 
suggestions which require either a motor or perceptual-cognitive response, and the 
WSGC contains a representative mix of these suggestion types. However, the WSGC 
can be time consuming to run, as sessions are administered to group sizes of a dozen or 
fewer and can take up to 90 minutes to complete. Commonly, the highest and lowest 
scoring 10 percent of participants are identified as highly and low hypnotisable. 
Therefore, a large number of participants must be screened in order to obtain an 
acceptable sample sizes for studies which require these groups. At Sussex, screening 
with the WSGC typically involves approximately 900 minutes of screening to identify 
just 10-12 highly hypnotisable participants. In constructing the SWASH, our primary 
aim was to reduce the time necessary to establish a participant pool while retaining the 
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difficult items used by the WSGC and the SHSS:C, so that people at the high end of 
hypnotisability can be still identified.  
We reduced screening time in two ways. First, session length was reduced by 
editing the WSGC induction and by reducing the number of suggestions. Second, the 
WSGC was modified for increased group size. We will first address the steps taken to 
decrease screening session time, and then the modification necessary for large group 
presentation. 
The common theme in hypnotic inductions is that they establish a hypnotic 
context for the period of time in which suggestions are delivered (Lynn, Maxwell & 
Green, 2017; Sheehan & Perry, 1976). There is evidence that the increase in response to 
suggestion attributable to hypnotic induction is small (Braffman & Kirsch, 1999; see 
Connors, Barnier, Coltheart et al, 2012, for an exception), and that any increase in 
responding over non-hypnotic suggestibility may be attributable to the use of the word 
“hypnosis” (Gandhi & Oakley, 2005). Thus, a minimal condition for an induction to 
enhance response may be simply defining the context as one appropriate for hypnotic 
response. It is unclear exactly what else, if anything, may be needed to constitute a 
minimal context, but as there is evidence for very brief inductions being less effective 
(Klinger, 1970), we aimed to cut the induction to only around half its original length.  
While evidence for effects on responding is mixed (for a review see Terhune & 
Cardeña, 2016) the prevalence of relaxation instructions in hypnotic inductions suggest 
that a requirement for relaxation might be expected by many and therefore be useful for 
establishing the hypnotic context (Lynn, Maxwell & Green, 2017). Therefore, and 
although relaxation is not a necessary component of hypnotic inductions (Banyai & 
Hilgard, 1976; Cardeña, 2004), we retained elements of the WSGC relating to 
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relaxation and counting down in order to ensure the induction was long enough to meet 
participants’ possible expectations. 
 All direct references to sleep were removed from the induction script, as 
hypnosis is distinct from sleep (Hull, 1933). However, some references to tiredness 
were retained as part of the relaxation procedure. An analogy between hypnosis and 
inattention to the environment whilst driving was also removed, as being distracted or 
absorbed is not the same as hypnotic responding (the correlation of hypnotisability with 
absorption is about 0.3 and usually is not found if tested out of the hypnotic context; 
Laurence, Beaulieu-Prévost, & Du Chéné, 2008). Finally, eye fixation and closure (the 
Braid effect; Weitzenhoffer, Gough & Landes, 1959) is a feature of most hypnotic 
inductions, but there is evidence that it does not increase suggestibility (Weitzenhofer & 
Sakata, 1970). As a substantial proportion of the WSGC induction is related to eye 
closure, the removal of this material considerably shortened the induction. In total, the 
pre-suggestion induction script (including preliminary instructions) was cut from 1636 
words to 873 words.  
Screening time was further reduced by the removal of two perceptual-cognitive 
WSGC suggestions: dream and age regression. There have been reports of negative 
responses to the age regression suggestion (Cardeña & Terhune, 2009), and the dream 
suggestion also involves highly personalised experiences that may be negative (Hilgard, 
1974). The WSGC contains a disproportionately high number of perceptual-cognitive 
suggestions (Woody & Barnier, 2008), so these items could be dropped without leaving 
this facet underrepresented. Further, the average score on these two items matches that 
of the WSGC overall (age regression 6.1, Dream 4.4 = 5.3, mean WSGC = 5.8; Bowers, 
1993), so the removal of these items does not change the level of difficulty of the scale 
as a whole. The SWASH therefore contains ten suggestions: two motor (hand lowering; 
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moving hands together), two motor challenge (arm rigidity; arm immobilisation), three 
perceptual-cognitive (mosquito hallucination; music hallucination; taste hallucination), 
two perceptual-cognitive challenge (amnesia; negative visual hallucination) and a post-
hypnotic suggestion to draw a tree but to forget the instruction, which combines a direct 
motor suggestion with a perceptual cognitive challenge (Woody & Sadler, 2008). 
With these adjustments, the total time to administer the SWASH is around 40 
minutes rather than approximately 90. Because it can be administered to more people 
simultaneously (it has been tested with up to 50) establishing a participant pool with the 
WSGC should take almost 10% of the time required by the WSGC. 
The negative visual hallucination suggestion was modified for large group 
presentation. The WSGC negative hallucination suggestion involves placing three 
coloured balls in the centre of the room. In the SWASH, a picture of three coloured 
balls are presented on a slide. Some minor modifications to other suggestions were 
made to improve universality (in particular for non-native English speakers). Baseball 
and billiard ball were replaced by bowling ball for the arm heaviness suggestion and 
Jingle Bells was replaced by Happy Birthday for the music hallucination, as it is 
perhaps the most widely recognised song worldwide (Brauneis, 2010).  
The WSGC relies on behavioural scoring to generate a pass or fail score for each 
item. However, it is not the visible physical responses to suggestion but the experience 
which accompanies the suggested behaviour which is of particular interest in hypnotic 
responding. A subjective scale has been developed for the WSGC (Kirsch, Milling & 
Burgess, 1998), but unfortunately has received little attention from researchers. The 
SWASH subjective scale is similar to this existing scale, with responses to questions 
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regarding the veridicality of the suggested experience recorded on a scale between 0 and 
5.  
The SWASH differs from the earlier scale in requiring two subjective responses 
to the post-hypnotic suggestion (PHS) item. The PHS in the Harvard Group Scale of 
Hypnotic Susceptibility, Form A (HGSHS:A; Shor & Orne, 1962) requires participants 
to touch their ankles following a signal but not to remember doing so. Sadler & Woody 
(2004) have criticised objective scoring of this item on the basis that it cannot exclude 
‘spurious passes’ that include actions experienced as voluntary and with full memory of 
the suggestion. Similarly, the WSGC PHS suggestion is passed if participants draw a 
tree in their booklet. However, the suggestion states that participants will draw a tree but 
forget that they were told to do so. For the SWASH, therefore, a PHS response only 
receives a subjective score if participants report both an urge to draw a tree and some 
amnesia about hearing the suggestion. We anticipate that this approach is likely to 
identify a substantial number of spurious passes for this item. 
Participants often report spontaneous experiences which occur following a 
hypnotic induction, and such effects have previously been measured by subjective 
ratings of hypnotic ‘depth’ (e.g., Tart, 1970). As such depth ratings can correlate with 
response to suggestion, it has been suggested that induction depth could act as a proxy 
measure of hypnotisability (Wagstaff, Cole & Brunas-Wagstaff, 2008). We included 
such a rating of depth in order to investigate this possibility and as a check that the 
edited induction produced hypnotic depth experiences. 
The purpose of this study was to produce a more efficient version of the WSGC, 
measuring hypnotisability across the range of ability, potentially opening hypnosis 
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research up to a greater number of researchers who might otherwise be put off by the 
impracticalities of screening. 
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Method 
Participants 
Four-hundred and twenty-nine participants were recruited to undergo a hypnotic 
screening procedure at the University of Sussex or at Lancaster University. Eleven 
participants were excluded for incomplete data, so data from 418 participants (331 
female, 87 male) were analysed, of which 331 participated at the University of Sussex. 
The mean age of participants was 19.9 years (SD = 4.0). Participants at the University of 
Sussex were invited to return for a retest screening approximately two months after their 
initial screening and retest data was recorded for 66 participants. Psychology student 
participants received course credits, and no other compensation was offered.  
Materials 
An induction and suggestion script was adapted from the WSGC (Bowers, 
1998). Participants recorded their responses in a booklet adapted from the WSGC. This 
contained subjective responses on a scale from 0 to 5. There were two versions of the 
booklet used. The second booklet differed from the first only in the addition of 
anchoring labels at each end of the scale used to record each subjective response. 
Approximately half of the participants completed each booklet, with 206 participants 
completing booklet 1 and 212 completing booklet 2. For the repeat screening, 59 
participants completed booklet 2 on both occasions and 6 completed booklet 1. 
A slide containing a picture of three coloured balls (green, blue and red) 
presented in a triangular formation on a black background was projected onto a screen 
at the front of the lecture theatre during the screening. 
Procedure 
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Participants were screened in a lecture theatre in groups of up to 50 and were 
instructed to leave a seat free between them and the next participant in order to allow 
freedom for arms to move (e.g. during the magnetic hands suggestion). A slide 
instructing participants to turn off their mobile phones was displayed, along with 
information about the length of the procedure. Before the session began, participants 
were instructed to fill in the front of the booklet with their personal information and 
then to sit back in their chair. The experimenter then thanked participants for their 
attendance and introduced his or her self and informed participants how long the 
procedure would take before reading from the script. The script contained a brief 
introductory passage and an induction.  
Analyses 
Mean objective and subjective scores were calculated. The scores for each 
version of the booklet were compared for objective and subjective scales. Data from the 
two booklets were then combined for subsequent analyses. 
Objective scores were scored according to the WSGC booklet (Bowers, 1998). 
Subjective scores were taken on a 0-5 scale for each item. For example, for item 2, 
moving hands together the following instruction was given for subjective response: “On 
a scale from 0 to 5, how strongly did you feel a force between your hands, where 0 
means you felt no force at all and 5 means you felt a force so strong it was as if your 
hands were real magnets?” 
For two suggestions, there were two subjective responses requested. For ‘taste’ 
these were about the experience of ‘sweet’ and ‘sour’ suggestions and for the post-
hypnotic suggestion item there were questions relating to experienced urge and to 
amnesia. 
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Objective scale scores between 0 and 10 for each participant were calculated by 
summing the successful objective responses for that participant. Subjective scale scores 
between 0 and 5 were calculated from the average of subjective scale responses. The 
final subjective response score for taste is the mean of the sweet and sour responses. For 
the post-hypnotic suggestion, the geometric mean of the urge and amnesia responses for 
the item was calculated, so that a subjective response for this item would be zero if 
either of the components of the suggestion did not generate a subjective response.  
An additional measure of induction depth was taken: “On a scale from 0 to 5, to 
what degree did you enter a hypnotic state, where 0 means your general state of 
consciousness was just the same as normal, 1 means you were slightly hypnotized and 5 
means you entered very deep hypnosis?” 
Scale validity was investigated by correlation analysis of subjective and 
objective scales, point biserial correlations between objective and subjective responses 
for each item and by comparison with data for the SWASH item responses from a 2014 
WSGC screening of 202 participants. 
Reliability of objective and subjective scales was checked with coefficient 
omega, an alternative to Cronbach’s alpha which overcomes some of alpha’s known 
deficiencies (Dunn, Baguley & Brunsden, 2014). Reliability was further examined by 
calculating the omega coefficient when each SWASH suggestion was dropped on each 
scale, the corrected same scale item-total correlations and test-retest correlations. 
To investigate how well the induction depth rating reflects the subjective and 
objective scales, correlations between strength of induction and each scale/item were 
run. 
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95% Confidence Intervals are reported throughout, which can be interpreted as 
95% Credibility Intervals with uniform priors. 
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Results 
Scores 
Objective scores on booklet 1 were very similar to scores on booklet 2, with a 
mean difference in score of 3.70 vs 3.61 = .09 (SE = .18), 95% CI [-26, .44]. Subjective 
scores across the two booklets were also similar, with a mean difference in score of 3.44 
vs 3.28 =.17 (SE = .16), 95% CI [-15, .48]. There was a difference in correlations 
between objective and subjective scores across the two booklets of just .71 vs .68 = .03, 
95% CI [-.07 0.13]. Therefore, results from the two booklets were combined. Mean 
score out of ten on the objective scale was 3.7 (SD = 1.8) and mean subjective score out 
of five was 1.7 (SD = .8). 
 Validity 
 There was a correlation between objective and subjective scales, r(418) = .70, 
95% CI [.65, .75], providing support for the validity of the subjective scale. Table 1 
shows mean subjective score and point biserial correlations between objective and 
subjective responses for each item.  Objective and subjective responses were all at least 
moderately correlated, (with a mean coefficient of .46) except for the post-hypnotic 
suggestion to draw a tree. The subjective response for this item was calculated as the 
geometric mean of a participant’s responses to two questions: the first about their urge 
to draw a tree and the second about amnesia for the suggestion. While urge to draw 
correlated with objective response, r(418) = .54, 95% CI [.47, .60], there was no 
evidence for a correlation between objective response and  amnesia for the suggestion, 
r(418) = -.09, 95% CI [-.18, .01]. The urge and amnesia questions also did not correlate 
with each other, r(418) = .01, 95% CI [-.09, .11] 
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All correlations significant at p< .001 except ** for which p = .04. 
Table 1. Mean subjective score and point biserial correlations between behavioural and 
experiential scoring of suggestions 
 
 
Table 2 shows percentage of objective suggestions passed on the 2013 WSGC 
run at Sussex and the SWASH from 2014-2016. Scores are comparable between 
SWASH and Sussex except for negative hallucination, PHS and amnesia. 
 
Suggestion M SD rpb 
1. Hand lowering 3.4 1.3 .46 [.38, .53] 
2. Moving hands together 2.9 1.4 .33 [.24, .41] 
3. Mosquito hallucination 1.0 1.4 .65 [.59, .70] 
4. Taste hallucination* 1.4 1.3 .65 [.59, .70] 
5. Arm rigidity 2.7 1.5 .57 [.50, .63] 
6. Arm immobilisation 2.3 1.5 .44 [.36, .51] 
7. Music hallucination .23 .7 .56 [.49, .62] 
8. Negative visual hallucination .43 1.1 .49 [.41, .56] 
9. Amnesia 1.4 1.3 .34 [.25, .42] 
10.  Posthypnotic suggestion** .93 1.4 .14 [.04, .23] 
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Table 2. Comparison of Sussex 2013 WSGC and SWASH percentage of participants 
passing each suggestion on the objective criterion  
 
Reliability 
Omega for the objective scale was 0.53, 95% CI [.44, .60], suggesting that 
internal consistency was not high for this scale. For the subjective scale, omega was 
considerably higher, .83 (SE = .013) 95% CI [.80, .85], indicating good internal 
consistency for this scale (for comparison, Cronbach’s alpha point estimates were .52 
for objective and .82 for subjective scales). 2014 WSGC data at Sussex also had low 
reliability, with omega .56, 95% CI [.46, .66] for all 12 WSGC suggestions and omega 
= .47, 95% CI [.31, .57] for the WSGC with just the ten items shared with the SWASH 
included.  
Suggestion SWASH   WSGC    
1. Hand lowering 71.8 77.2 
2. Moving hands together 76.8 76.7 
3. Mosquito hallucination 26.1 27.7 
4. Taste hallucination* 30.9 29.7 
5. Arm rigidity 54.9 68.3 
6. Arm immobilisation 36.4 46.5 
7. Music hallucination 5.0 5.9 
8. Negative visual hallucination 9.3 21.8 
9. Amnesia 14.6 5.9 
10.  Posthypnotic suggestion** 39.5 24.3 
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  Table 3 shows omega coefficient if the item is dropped for each SWASH 
suggestion on each scale. Point estimates of the coefficient were lower in all cases on 
the subjective scale. However, omega was slightly higher for post-hypnotic suggestion. 
 
 
 Objective omega  Subjective omega  
1. Hand lowering .52 [.44, .60] .81 [.78, .84] 
2. Moving hands together .52 [.44, .53] .82 [.79, .85] 
3. Mosquito hallucination .49 [.41, .57] .82 [.79, .84] 
4. Taste hallucination .46 [.37, .54] .81 [.77, .83] 
5. Arm rigidity .44 [.33, .53] .80 [.77, .83] 
6. Arm immobilisation .50 [.41, .57] .80 [.77, .83] 
7. Music hallucination .52 [.44, .59] .82 [.80, .85] 
8. Negative visual hallucination .50 [.42, .57] .83 [.80, .85] 
9. Amnesia .51 [.48, .61] .81 [.78, .84] 
10.  Posthypnotic suggestion .55 [.48, .61] .82 [.79, .84] 
 
Table 3. OMEGA (if item dropped) (95% CI in brackets) 
 
Table 4 shows item-total correlations. Each item was correlated with the 
corrected total scale score. However, while item-total correlations for the subjective 
scale were substantial (mean r = .51), the objective scale item-total correlations were on 
average small (mean r = .22).  
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 Objective r  Subjective r  
1. Hand lowering .19 [.10, .28] .53 [.46, .60] 
2. Moving hands together .20 [.11, .29] .48 [.40, .55] 
3. Mosquito hallucination .24 [.15, .33] .50 [.42, .57] 
4. Taste hallucination .32 [.23, .40] .59 [.52, .65] 
5. Arm rigidity .36 [.27, .44] .61 [.55, .67] 
6. Arm immobilisation .23 [.14, .32] .62 [.56, .68] 
7. Music hallucination .12 [.02, .21] .34 [.25, .42] 
8. Negative visual hallucination .25 [.16, .34] .35 [.26, .43] 
9. Amnesia .18 [.09, .27] .55 [.48, .61] 
10.  Posthypnotic suggestion .11 [.01, .20] .57 [.50, .63] 
 
Table 4. Corrected same scale item-total correlations for objective and subjective scores 
(95% CI in brackets). 
 
Test/re-test reliability 
Objective score on retest, (M = 4.0, SD = 2.0), was not strongly correlated with 
the original objective score of those taking part in the retest (M = 3.7, SD = 2.0), r(66) = 
.56, 95% CI [.37, .71]. However, there was a strong correlation between mean re-test 
subjective score, M = 3.1 (SD = 1.9) and the original subjective score of those taking 
part in the retest M = 3.4, (SD = 1.6), r(66) = .77, 95% CI = [.65, .85].  
Objective return score correlated highly with subjective return score, r(66) =.81, 
[.71, .88].  
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Induction correlations 
Mean induction rating was 2.3 (SD = 1.1). The induction rating correlated with 
the objective score, r(418) = .44,  95% CI [.36, .51] and with the subjective score r(418) 
= .62,  95% CI [.56, .68]. 
 Table 5 shows correlations between induction depth score and individual items 
on each scale. All subjective items significantly correlated with the induction depth. For 
the objective scale, all items except music and post-hypnotic suggestion correlated with 
induction. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Correlations between induction depth score and individual items on 
each 
 Objective Subjective  
1. Hand lowering .24 [.15, .32] .47 [.39, .54] 
2. Moving hands together .12 [.02, .21] .43 [.35, .51] 
3. Mosquito hallucination .16 [.07, .25] .34 [.25, .42] 
4. Taste hallucination .34 [.25, .42] .43 [.35, .51] 
5. Arm rigidity .29 [.20, .38] .47 [.39, .54] 
6. Arm immobilisation .17 [.08, .26] .42 [.34, .50] 
7. Music hallucination .06 [-.04, .16] .21 [.12, .30] 
8. Negative visual hallucination .19 [.10, .28] .25 [.16, .34] 
9. Amnesia .22 [.13, .31] .45 [.37, .52] 
10.  Posthypnotic suggestion .07 [-.03, .16] .32 [.23, .40] 
136 
Discussion 
We tested participants on the Sussex-Waterloo Scale of Hypnotisability 
(SWASH), a modified version of the Waterloo-Stanford Group Scale of Hypnotic 
Susceptibility. The subjective scale of the SWASH showed good reliability and 
objective scale reliability was comparable to that of the WSGC. Although the study 
design does not allow us to disentangle any particular element of the induction, we 
report no evidence for a substantial decline in scores over the WSGC. We suggest, 
therefore that, a simple relaxation procedure with counting down and repeated use of the 
word hypnosis is sufficient to generate response to hypnotic suggestions comparable to 
the WSGC. 
We found good reliability for the subjective scale, but not for the objective scale. 
It is not surprising that a scale based on ratings outperforms one based on dichotomous 
items. We therefore suggest recruiting for experiments using either the subjective score 
or a combined objective and subjective score. For example, one could take the simple 
mean of the two scores (with the subjective score multiplied by two to be on a 0-10 
scale), as we report in Lush, Naish & Dienes, 2016. 
The strength of the correlation between objective and subjective SWASH scales 
indicates that the subjective scale is a valid measure of hypnotisability. However, the 
post-hypnotic suggestion item showed only a weak correlation between objective and 
subjective responses. This issue arose as a result of breaking the subjective response to 
this item down into the two components of the suggestion: urge to perform the action 
and amnesia for the suggestion. While there was a relationship between successfully 
responding to the suggestion on the objective criterion (by drawing a tree) and reporting 
an urge to respond, relatively few participants who drew a tree reported amnesia for the 
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suggestion. This suggests that post-hypnotic suggestions scored solely on objective 
criteria produce an unacceptably high level of false positives. In our sample, more than 
half of the objective passes to the PHS suggestion did not pass the subjective criteria. If 
only those reporting a high level of amnesia (4-5 on the subjective scale) are included, 
the pass rate is less than 5%, or (2.1% for full amnesia). It is therefore likely that the 
rate of successful post-hypnotic responding has been over-estimated in previous WSGC 
samples (and indeed screens from other scales). As researchers routinely recruit for 
hypnosis experiments based on overall scores on a scale, this systematic confound is 
likely to have resulted in a substantial number of falsely inflated hypnotisability scores. 
As Sadler & Woody (2004, p.151) have argued, the continued use of unmodified PHS 
suggestions "represents a triumph of tradition over science". 
Objective scale SWASH pass rates were numerically low compared to the 
WSGC for negative visual hallucination and for challenge suggestions, and numerically 
high for post hypnotic suggestion and amnesia; overall similar means were reported for 
both scales, the population difference likely being no larger than 0.46.  
According to Weitzenfoffer (1980), the experience of involuntariness is what 
distinguishes a hypnotic response from a voluntary action. Here, we employed a 
subjective scale of veridicality as this may be an indirect index of the experience of 
involuntariness (people experience e.g., hallucinations as real because they don’t 
experience their intention in generating the experience; Dienes, 2007). However, given 
the centrality of the experience of involuntariness to hypnotic responding, future scales 
might benefit from the inclusion of a scale which directly taps this experience. Using 
scales developed for the SHSS: C, Bowers (1981) reported that 20% of responses 
considered successful by behavioural criteria were not accompanied by the classical 
suggestion effect and P. Bowers (1988) that 20% of failed responses were accompanied 
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by reports of the experience if involuntariness. However, directly asking questions 
about involuntariness may not be straightforward as for certain suggestions they can be 
confusing for participants (Kirsch & Braffman 2001) and reported changes in sense of 
agency may reflect different underlying factors (Polito, Barnier & Woody, 2013). 
In summary, the Sussex Waterloo Scale of hypnotisability is an effective 
instrument for measuring hypnotisability. The scale offers considerable practical and 
theoretical advantages over existing scales which tap a similarly wide range of hypnotic 
experience. The procedure can be administered to large groups of participants in a 
lecture hall setting and completed well within the time period of a typical lecture. It 
therefore can be employed to rapidly establish a participant pool for hypnosis-related 
research. We hope that it makes hypnosis studies practical for researchers interested in 
investigating the reliable experimental manipulation of conscious experience. 
 
 
 
  
139 
 Chapter VII 
Discussion 
Summary 
The studies presented here investigated the theory that hypnosis and mindfulness 
meditation are related in opposing ways to metacognition of intentions; metacognition 
of intentions is disturbed in hypnotic responding and mindfulness meditation involves 
the development of metacognition, including of intentions (Dienes et al, 2015). 
Evidence relating to hypnosis was presented in Chapter II, Chapter IV and Chapter V 
and evidence relating to Mindfulness meditation was presented in Chapter II and 
Chapter III. Chapter VI presented norms for a new hypnotisability scale: the Sussex-
Waterloo scale of hypnotisability (SWASH).  
Metacognition of intentions 
First I will discuss the evidence presented here as it relates to metacognition of 
intentions. Chapter II, Chapter IV and Chapter V describe data consistent with the 
theory that hypnosis is related to metacognition of intentions and Chapter II and Chapter 
III the theory that mindfulness meditation improves metacognition. In Chapter II, it is 
shown that trait hypnotisability is related to a later time of an intention to move. This is 
consistent with the cold control theory of hypnosis; to respond to a hypnotic suggestion 
is to act voluntarily whilst forming and maintaining an inaccurate higher order thought 
about that intention (Dienes, 2008; 2010). Such inaccurate metacognition requires that 
information related to the intention is given low weighting in the generation of a HOT 
of intending. Therefore, reports of delayed experience of motor intentions in high 
hypnotisables may reflect the relative inaccessibility of motor intention-related 
information to higher cognitive processes. Conversely, mindfulness meditators reported 
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earlier awareness of motor intentions. This may reflect relatively high accessibility of 
metacognitive ability arising from sustained mindfulness practice (Repetti, 2010; 
Dreyfus, 2013). 
Chapters III, IV & V relate metacognition of intentions in hypnosis to 
intentional binding: the perceived compression of the time interval between an 
intentional action and its outcome (which is generally considered to be an implicit 
measure of the sense of agency; Haggard, Clark & Kalogeras, 2002). In Chapter III, we 
report that a post-hypnotic suggestion (PHS) of involuntariness over actions leads to 
changes in sense of agency as measured by both explicit verbal judgements of agency 
and by an implicit measure of the sense of agency (intentional binding).  Compared to 
voluntary action, the backward shift of outcome timing judgements towards the time of 
the action (outcome binding) was reduced in highly hypnotisable participants who 
reported a PHS-induced experience of involuntariness over their action whilst 
performing the task. Outcome binding was not reduced in medium hypnotisable 
participants, who did not report a PHS-induced experience of involuntariness over their 
actions. As intentional binding is sensitive to agency (for a review see Moore & Obhi, 
2012), this reduction in binding suggests intention-related information is reduced in 
judgements of action timing during an experience of hypnotic involuntariness.  The 
reduction of outcome binding in highs was accompanied by an increase in the 
variability of action judgements and an increase in variability of action judgements is 
suggestive of a decrease in the availability of motor-intention related information for 
timing judgements and an intention being conscious may increase its availability to 
other cognitive processes (e.g., Cleeremans & Jiménez, 2002). So, the results presented 
in Chapter IV are consistent with the predictions of cold control theory. 
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Trait differences in hypnotisability are reflected in outcome binding and 
variability of baseline action judgements in a manner consistent with cold control theory 
(Chapter V), providing support for the argument from cold control that trait 
hypnotisability reflects trait differences in accessibility of intentions. Conversely, 
mindfulness meditators show greater outcome binding and less variable baseline action 
judgements than non-meditators (Chapter III), and therefore may have improved 
metacognitive access to intentions.  
There is other recent evidence consistent with the theory that hypnotisability and 
mindfulness meditation are related to metacognition of motor intentions in opposing 
ways. In a metacognition of agency task (Metcalfe & Greene, 2007), high hypnotisables 
are less vulnerable than low hypnotisables to distortions in their sense of agency 
brought about by disruption of control (Terhune & Hedman, 2017). This finding is 
consistent with highs relying less on motor information than on other external cues in 
generating a sense of agency. Future work could test mindfulness meditators with this 
paradigm, with the prediction that they should be more sensitive to disruptions of 
control due to improved metacognition of motor intentions. It has also recently been 
shown that mindfulness meditation and hypnotisability are related to differences in the 
experience of the rubber hand illusion in a manner consistent with this theory (RHI; 
Botvinick & Cohen, 1998); hypnotic suggestibility correlates positively with 
proprioceptive drift in the RHI (Walsh et al, 2015), and mindfulness meditators are less 
susceptible to RHI induced distortions of the sense of agency as measured by explicit 
judgements of agency (Cebolla et al, 2016). Future studies could investigate other 
established methods for manipulating sense of agency in these groups. For example, 
Wegner, Sparrow & Vinermans (2004) vicarious agency task, in which the 
experimenter’s hands are positioned where the participant’s hands would normally be. 
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Older people are less susceptible to this illusion, and this may be attributable to the 
relatively high weighting of internal signals (Cioffi, Cocchini, Banissy & Moore, 2017; 
though contrast Metcalfe, Eich & Castel, 2010, in which older people, like highs, are 
less vulnerable to disruptions of control in a metacognition of agency task, arguably due 
to less precise internal information about actions). The predictions from the theory 
presented here are straightforward: highs should be more susceptible to this illusion, and 
mindfulness meditators less susceptible. 
I will now briefly discuss how these results relate to hypnosis and mindfulness 
meditation more generally. The evidence presented in Chapter II is consistent with 
theoretical approaches to hypnosis in which changes in the monitoring of intact intentions 
drive the experience of involuntariness in hypnotic responding (e.g., cold control theories; 
Dienes, 2007; 2008; 2012).  The evidence presented in Chapter IV is consistent with both 
dissociated experience and dissociated control theories (e.g. Woody & Bowers, 1994), as 
precision of action event timing would also be expected to decrease if an intention was 
disrupted at the first order level. While this might also apply to the data in Chapter V it is 
more likely that relatively low precision of action timing in high trait hypnotisability is 
attributable to trait differences in metacognition of intentions than in first order intentions 
(as would be the case for dissociated control theories), as a relative deficit in the ability 
to produce voluntary action would be likely to have wide ranging effects on high 
hypnotisables which would be unlikely to go unnoticed. So, taken together the evidence 
across studies is consistent with cold control theory.  
While the evidence here is consistent with the argument that mindfulness 
meditation improves metacognition of intentions, Buddhist practice is multi-faceted 
(e.g., Rosch, 2007) and it cannot be ruled out that results could be attributable to other 
aspects of Buddhist practise. Furthermore, while metacognition of intentions is, 
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arguably, a central aspect of mindfulness (Grossenbacher & Quaglia, 2017), Buddhist 
practice involves mindfulness of a wide variety of perceptions (e.g., Dreyfus, 2011; 
Kuan, 2012) and there is no reason to expect mindfulness-related differences in the 
formation and maintenance of HOTs to be limited to those directed at intentions. We 
might therefore expect meditators to also have improved metacognition other than of 
intentions (e.g., see Fleming & Lau, 2014). Applying other metacognitive measures to 
hypnotisable groups could also inform theories of hypnosis. Cold control theory does 
not predict domain-general changes in metacognition and evidence for a relationship 
between domain-general metacognition and hypnotisability would require a 
reassessment of the theory. 
A general point that should be addressed is that the studies presented in Chapter 
II, Chapter III and Chapter IV are correlational, and therefore do not provide direct 
evidence that differences in metacognition of intentions are causally related to 
hypnotisability or to mindfulness meditation. For example, the work presented here 
relating to mindfulness meditation was motivated by the hypothesis that mindfulness 
practice is a form of metacognitive training. However, the reported results are merely 
consistent with the proposed theory that mindfulness meditation improves 
metacognition of intentions, rather than direct evidence for it. There is evidence for 
changes in various measures following brief mindfulness interventions (e.g., Zeidan et 
al, 2010), so such interventions may reveal mindfulness induced changes in 
metacognition of intentions. A longitudinal design in which meditation-naïve 
participants are tested on both hypnotisability and the cognitive tasks employed for this 
thesis before and after mindfulness training could provide direct experimental support 
for the theory that mindfulness meditation improves metacognition of intentions. The 
evidence as to whether hypnotisability can be increased by training is mixed (for 
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reviews see Barnier & McConkey, 2004; Laurence, Beaulieu-Prévost & du Chéne, 
2008). However, if the ability to respond hypnotically is related to metacognitive 
accessibility of first order intentions it may be relatively straightforward to reduce 
hypnotisability by metacognitive training. Therefore, training of metacognition of 
intentions through mindfulness meditation might also provide direct evidence for a 
causal relationship between hypnotisability and metacognition of intentions. 
I will now consider the possible role of context effects in the studies presented in 
this thesis. A potential confound for studies investigating hypnotisability as a trait is a 
tendency for study participants to interpret instructions according to a hypnotic context. 
This is known to be problematic for questionnaire designs, as correlations between trait 
hypnotisability and questionnaire measures often fail to replicate once the questionnaire 
is administered outside of the hypnotic context (Heap, Brown, & Oakley 2004; 
Laurence, Beaulieu-Prévost, & Du Chéné, 2008). This may be a problem for the 
questionnaire measure of trait mindfulness (FFMQ-SF) used here to investigate 
mindfulness in trait hypnotisability, for which we report a negative correlation (Chapter 
II). The hypnotic context may also influence cognitive measures (Martin, Sackur & 
Dienes, 2017). In reporting the time of the experience of an intention to move, a 
participant who, for example, knows they have been recruited for a hypnosis related 
experiment due to their particularly high or low hypnotisability might be influenced by 
that knowledge. Therefore, it cannot be ruled out that some or all of the group 
differences in W judgements reported in Chapter II are attributable to context effects. 
This is perhaps less of an issue for the intentional binding experiments reported in 
Chapters IV and V. Intentional binding requires no introspection about agency and the 
predicted pattern of results would not be easy to guess. However, it cannot be ruled out 
that the hypnotic context drives the differences in action timing judgement variability 
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reported here (Chapter IV, Chapter V). If binding is driven by cue combination, the 
differences reported here in outcome or action shift would naturally follow. Future 
studies of trait hypnotisability in cognitive tasks should control for this possibility by 
ensuring that participants are naïve to the hypnosis-related context wherever possible. 
Similar issues arise when interpreting the results from mindfulness meditators in 
terms of metacognition of intentions. It is reasonable to assume that experienced 
Buddhist meditators would have certain expectations about their abilities in performing 
a cognitive task which might differ from those of non-meditators. It is plausible that the 
timing of an intention to move could be influenced by such expectations. It is also 
plausible that the variability of action timing judgements could be similarly influenced. 
However, we should also expect meditators to show reduced outcome timing variability 
in this circumstance. Indeed, meditators showed less variable judgements of timing for 
both events than non-meditators. Crucially, however, this difference was more 
pronounced when judging actions than outcomes (p.148). 
The Sussex-Waterloo Scale of Hypnotisability 
The data in Chapter VI are consistent with evidence that the effect of hypnotic 
inductions on response to suggestion are minimal and may be largely, if not entirely, 
attributable to the establishment of a hypnotic context. However, while several 
components historically considered important for successful hypnotic induction were 
removed for the SWASH induction, it might be possible to reduce the length of 
induction further. Future studies could directly test content and duration of inductions in 
order to identify the minimum induction necessary to provide a hypnotic context 
(Terhune & Cardeña, 2016) Besides being of empirical value, such research could 
further improve the practicality of hypnosis research by further reducing required 
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screening time. Additionally, the modifications made to the SWASH for large group 
screening mean that only minor further adjustments would be necessary to administer 
the procedure by computer and potentially make large scale internet based hypnosis 
research viable.  
Mechanisms of intentional binding 
If sense of agency arises from cross-modal cue integration, then differences in 
intentional binding may reflect differences in the relative weighting of the action and 
outcome cues in sense of agency (Moore, Wegner & Haggard, 2009). Therefore, 
binding may result from the influence of each cue on the timing of the other, weighted 
by their relative precision (Kawabe, Roseboom & Nishida, 2013). While there is 
existing evidence that action binding arises from a cue combination mechanism (Wolpe, 
Haggard, Siebner & Rowe, 2013), it has been argued that outcome binding may arise 
when sensorimotor pre-representation of action outcomes lowers the perceptual 
threshold of an action outcome (Waszak, Cardoso-Leite & Hughes, 2012; Wolpe & 
Rowe, 2014). However, outcome binding is likely to depend on temporal control rather 
than sensorimotor predictions of action outcomes, as binding occurs when the identity 
of the action outcome is unpredictable (Desantis, Hughes & Waszak, 2012, Gethin, 
Desantis & Waszak, 2013, Haering and Kiesel, 2011). Furthermore, the arguments 
made for a dual process model are based on failures to reject the null hypothesis for 
differences in one of the components (e.g., Wolpe, Haggard, Siebner & Rowe, 2013; 
Desantis, Roussel & Waszak, 2011)  and this, taken alone, does not provide evidence 
for the null hypothesis (Dienes, 2014). In studies where there is a reported difference in 
one component of binding but a failure to reject the null hypothesis for a difference in 
the other, it is likely that the data are merely insensitive and therefore uninformative. 
Therefore, there is little evidence to support a dual process model of intentional binding. 
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While there has been, to my knowledge, no direct test of cue combination in 
outcome binding, there is indirect evidence to support the theory that both action and 
outcome binding arise from cue combination. For example, the disruption of activity in 
the preSMA by transcranial magnetic stimulation reduces outcome binding (Moore, 
Ruge, Wenke, Rothwell & Haggard, 2010). The preSMA is thought to support motor 
intentions (for a review see Haggard, 2008) and therefore disruption of preSMA should 
decrease precision of action judgements. Outcome binding is also reduced when 
participants are led to incorrectly believe they did not cause an action (Desantis, Roussel 
& Waszak, 2011). In this case, an influence of motor intention information on the 
timing of an external event would be inappropriate, and this would be predicted to 
decrease the precision of action judgements. So, the existing empirical evidence is 
generally consistent with a cue combination model of both components of intentional 
binding. I will now consider the evidence for cue combination across the intentional 
binding studies presented in this thesis. 
In Chapter V, data from an intentional binding study were analysed according to 
interactions predicted by a cue combination model of binding. Here I will report the 
same analyses applied to data from the intentional binding studies reported in Chapters 
III and IV. Descriptive statistics are reported for measures not reported in each chapter. 
For comparisons not reported in each chapter additional Bayes factors have been 
calculated using a half normal distribution as reported in Chapter V. Interaction graphs 
from Chapter V are reproduced here to facilitate comparison of the results of all three 
studies. 
For these comparisons, variability was measured by the mean within-participant 
standard deviation of time judgements for the action and outcome events in the 
contingent condition. For between-group comparisons, in each case the prediction is 
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that action judgement variability will be relatively low for the group theorised to have 
greater metacognitive access to first order intentions. Figure 1 shows the mean 
variability of time judgements for each event in meditators and controls. There was a 
sensitive interaction between group and type of event judged on within-participant SD, 
F(1,14) = 12.78, p = .003, BH[0, 16] = .182.05. As reported in Chapter III, meditators 
showed less variable action judgements in the baseline condition than controls. 
However, there was no evidence for or against a difference in contingent action SD 
between meditators (M = 51.0 ms, SD = 15.5) and controls (M = 81.4 ms, SD = 42.3), 
t(14) = 1.91, p = .077, BH[0, 16] = 2.59. Within-group, meditators did report less variable 
contingent action than outcome time judgements (M = 77.7 ms, SD = 10.4), t(7) = 5.92, 
p = .001, BH[0, 16] = 1744.56 and there was no evidence for or against a difference in 
variability when measuring contingent action or outcome events (M = 85.8 ms, SD = 
45.1) in controls, t(7) = 1.00, p = .350  BH[0, 16] = .66.  
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Figure 1. Interaction between group (meditators and controls) and judged event on 
within participant standard deviations of timing judgements in the contingent condition. 
 
Figure 2 shows within-participant SD of judgements in high and medium 
hypnotisable participants following a post-hypnotic suggestion of involuntariness over 
motor action (Chapter IV) There was no sensitive evidence for or against an interaction, 
F(1,22) = .317, p = .579, BH[0, 16] = .48, and the pattern of means is not quite consistent 
with predictions. While medium hypnotisables showed less variability of action timing 
report (M = 62.5, SD = 6.8) than highs (M = 105.6 ms, SD = 34.4), t(9.5) = 3.90, p 
= .003, BH[0, 16] = 1145.55, their outcome timing judgement variability (M = 79.7, SD = 
31.2) was also less variable than that of highs (M = 130.6, SD = 48.1), t(22) = 3.15, p 
= .005, BH[0, 16] = .8.18. There was no sensitive evidence that medium hypnotisables 
were less variable when reporting action than outcome events, t(13) = 2.11, p = .054, 
BH[0, 16] = .2.78, and the data were not sensitive as to whether or not there was a within-
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group difference in variability depending on event type for highs, t(9) = 2.09, p = .067, 
BH[0, 16] = .2.56. 
 
 
Figure 2. Interaction between group (high and medium hypnotisables) and 
judged event on within participant standard deviations of timing judgements in the 
contingent condition following a PHS suggestion of involuntariness. 
 
Figure 3 shows the means for low and high hypnotisables and type of event for 
within-participant SD of timing judgements (reproduced from Chapter V). As reported 
in Chapter V, low hypnotisables reported less variable time judgements than controls 
and less variable judgements of action than of outcome timing. There was no evidence 
for or against a difference in variability depending on type of event in high 
hypnotisables. 
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Figure 3. Interaction between group (high and low hypnotisables) and judged 
event on within participant standard deviations of timing judgements in the contingent 
condition. 
 
  
152 
In summary, the analyses of within-participant SD of timing judgements were in 
each case either sensitive in the direction predicted or simply insensitive (and therefore 
provide no evidence against predictions). The combined evidence is therefore consistent 
with the theory that the groups differ in availability of motor intention related 
information to higher cognitive processes. Interaction analyses from each study were 
entered into a Bayesian meta-analysis1, which showed evidence for an interaction 
between group and within-participant SD of timing judgements in these studies, B = 
184.61.  
Assuming a cue combination mechanism, differences in the variability of timing 
judgements should be reflected in the components of binding; action binding should be 
of a relatively small magnitude and outcome binding of a relatively large magnitude 
when variability of action judgements is low and the opposite pattern should be seen 
when variability of action judgements is high. We can therefore predict a crossover 
 
 
1Interactions between group and judged event type on within-participant SD of judgements were 
compared between each study to test whether or not it was appropriate to combine these results in a meta-
analysis. Bs were modelled using the predictions from Chapter V, but with a full normal as no directions 
for the differences were predicted. There was no evidence for a difference between the interactions of 
meditators and controls and of low and high hypnotisables (3.6 ms, SE = 11.93), BH[0, 16] = .62. The Bayes 
factor for the difference between the interactions of meditators and controls and of high and medium 
hypnotisables in PHS involuntariness was insensitive (10.42 ms, SE = 15.42), BH[0, 16] = .78. The Bayes 
factor for the difference between interactions of low and high hypnotisables and high and medium 
hypnotisables in PHS involuntariness was also insensitive, 10.8 ms (SE = 17.38), BH[0, 16] = .80. So there 
was no evidence for or against a difference in raw effect of interactions of group and type of binding on 
within participant SD in each study.  
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effect for the interaction between group and binding component in each case. Analysis 
of data from the study presented in Chapter III revealed a sensitive interaction between 
group and binding component, F(1,14) = 4.90, p = .044, BH[0, 24] = 4.17. Figure 4 shows 
the mean shift from baseline for each event judged by meditators and controls. As 
reported in Chapter III, meditators outcome binding was greater than that of controls, 
but there was no evidence either way for a difference in action binding between groups. 
The magnitude of binding was, as predicted, smaller for action than outcome binding in 
meditators, t(7) = 5.92, p = .001, BH[0, 24] = 29832.86 and there was sensitive evidence 
for a within-group difference of binding components in controls, t(7) = 2.67, p = .032, 
BH[0, 24] = 3.02. 
 
Figure 4. Interaction between group (meditators and controls) and type of 
binding. 
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The data from medium and high hypnotisables in the post-hypnotic 
involuntariness condition of the study reported in Chapter IV are presented in figure 5. 
There was no sensitive evidence for or against an interaction between group and binding 
component, F(1,22) = 1.95, p = .18, (BH[0, 24] = 1.77). As reported in Chapter V, there 
was a difference in the predicted direction between groups in outcome binding, but no 
sensitive evidence for a difference in action binding. There was no evidence for or 
against a difference between action and outcome binding in high hypnotisables, t(9) = 
1.65, p = .134, (BH[0, 24] = 1.70), but there was evidence for a difference between action 
and outcome binding in the predicted direction for medium hypnotisables, t(13) = 4.33, 
p = .001, BH[0, 24] = 21.64. 
 
Figure 5. Interaction between group (high and medium hypnotisables) and judged event 
on type of binding following a PHS suggestion of involuntariness. 
 
 
155 
The predicted cross over interaction can be seen in the means of component 
binding across groups in the trait hypnotisability study (figure 6), but the evidence for 
an interaction was marginal. As described in Chapter V, the group with the least 
variable action judgements (low hypnotisables) showed a larger difference between 
action and outcome binding in the predicted direction, than the group with more 
variable action timing (high hypnotisables). There was evidence only for a difference in 
groups in action binding, as, while the pattern of means for outcome binding was in the 
predicted direction, there was no sensitive evidence for or against a group difference in 
this measure. Lows showed the predicted difference in action and outcome binding, but 
there was no evidence either way for a difference in magnitude of binding components 
in highs. 
 
Figure 6. Interaction between group (high and low hypnotisables) and judged event on 
type of binding. 
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Taken together, these results are again a mixture of sensitive evidence consistent with 
predictions, and insensitive data. While only one binding component showed a sensitive 
group difference in each study, across studies there is evidence for the predicted 
differences in each component. A Bayesian meta-analysis2 of these data revealed 
sensitive evidence for an interaction, B = 34.25. 
So, together these studies are consistent with a cue combination mechanism of 
intentional binding. However, this evidence is indirect. Direct evidence for or against 
cue combination can be provided by manipulating the precision of the action and 
outcome cues directly. While such a test has provided evidence for cue combination in 
action binding (by adding varying levels of white noise to the outcome event; Wolpe, 
Haggard, Siebner & Rowe, 2013), there is, to my knowledge no published work directly 
testing the predictions of cue combination for outcome binding. This could be achieved 
by manipulating the precision of action judgements directly in future experiments (e.g., 
by altering the available sensory feedback regarding the timing of action).  
 
 
 
 
2Interactions between group and type of binding on time shift from baseline were compared to 
test before combining these results in a meta-analysis. Bs were modelled using the predictions from 
Chapter V with a full normal. There was no evidence for a difference between the interactions of 
meditators and controls and of low and high hypnotisables (13.4 ms, SE = 36.3), BH[0, 24] = .85. The B for 
the difference between the interactions of meditators and controls and of high and medium hypnotisables 
in PHS involuntariness was insensitive (8.4 ms, SE =  44.3), BH[0, 24] = .88. The B for the difference 
between interactions of low and high hypnotisables and high and medium hypnotisables in PHS 
involuntariness was also insensitive, 5 ms (SE = 43.4), BH[0, 24] = .88. So there was no evidence for or 
against a difference in raw effect of interactions of group and type of binding on time shift from baseline. 
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Consideration should be given to an alternative interpretation of the intentional 
binding results reported in Chapter IV. Hypnotic responding may require attention and 
therefore consume cognitive resources Bryant & McConkey (1990). For example, 
maintaining an experience of hypnotic blindness reduces performance on a decision task 
(Wyzenbeek & Bryant, 2011). Higher action and outcome timing variability was seen in 
highs compared mediums in the PHS involuntariness condition, and this might be 
attributable to a decrease in attention to the task. However, we should expect reduced 
attention to the task to result in increased binding (Haggard & Cole, 2007), and here 
outcome binding decreased with increasing variability of action judgement.  
I will now consider some implications of a cue combination model of intentional 
binding for the interpretation of binding as an implicit measure of the sense of agency. 
Much of the intentional binding literature reports an overall binding measure rather than 
the individual action and binding components. Indeed, when binding is measured by 
direct interval estimation (Engbert, Wohlschläger & Haggard, 2008) or by delay 
estimation (e.g., Kawabe, Roseboom & Nishida, 2013; Wen, Yamashita & Asama, 
2017), identifying the relative movement of the individual shifts is not possible. 
However, the exclusive use of an overall binding measure is problematic as a particular 
magnitude of overall binding could be informed by many patterns of results, depending 
on the relative weighting of each cue; action binding might be high while outcome 
binding is low, or vice versa. In addition, while our focus here has been on the 
availability of information regarding the action event, differences in binding could also 
arise from varying availability of information regarding the outcome event (e.g., Wolpe, 
Haggard, Siebner & Rowe, 2013). Therefore, future studies should identify individual 
components of binding and the variability of timing of each event whenever possible. 
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A related issue is that, according to cue integration models of the sense of 
agency, the relationship between individual shifts in the components of intentional 
binding and sense of agency is not straightforward. For example, having relatively weak 
outcome binding does not necessarily mean that high hypnotisables have a stronger 
sense of agency in everyday life, because when information from one source is weak, 
other information will be weighted more highly in generating a sense of agency (Moore 
& Fletcher, 2012). Therefore, highs may have a strong sense of agency, but one which 
relies more on external cues and internal contextual cues than on motor intentions.  
I will now discuss some issues relating to the temporal binding of events related 
to inferred causality. Intentional binding is established as a measure of sense of agency 
to the degree that differences in overall intentional binding are often referred to directly 
as differences in sense of agency (e.g., Caspar, Christensen, Cleeremans & Haggard 
2016; Engbert; Kawabe, Roseboom & Nishida, 2013; Obhi, Swiderski & Brubacher, 
2012; Wohlschläger & Haggard 2008). However, binding occurs in the absence of 
intentions when a causal relationship between action and outcome is inferred (Buehner, 
2012; note that Cravo, Claessens & Baldo, 2009, who report no evidence for binding in 
the absence of intentions, do not report evidence for no binding in the absence of 
intentions). Hughes, Desantis & Waszak (2012) and Buehner (2015) argue that the 
influence of causality is rarely controlled for in intentional binding studies. For 
example, in the first report of intentional binding (Haggard, Clark & Kalogeras, 2002) 
voluntary action was contrasted with an involuntary condition in which movement was 
triggered by TMS stimulation of motor cortex. However, the TMS condition differed 
both in voluntariness of action and in causality; the action was a twitch rather than a 
button press and the outcome was time-locked to the moment of TMS activation. 
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Therefore, the difference in binding between conditions is likely to be at least partially 
attributable to a change in the inferred causal relationship between action and outcome.  
Consistent with Buehner (2015), in Chapter IV, outcome binding occurred in the 
passive movement condition, during which information related to motor intentions was 
unavailable for timing judgements. This binding in the passive condition may be due to 
an inferred causal relationship and, therefore the difference between binding in the 
passive and voluntary conditions might be taken to reflect the magnitude of binding that 
is due to intention, over and above that due to causal inferences. When comparing a 
voluntary and a passive movement, the differences between conditions may not be 
limited to the presence or absence of intentions (e.g., the speed of the button press or the 
nature of proprioceptive information may also differ between intended and passive 
action). However, potentially confounding differences between PHS involuntariness and 
voluntary action conditions in Chapter IV would be limited, so the comparison between 
passive binding and binding in post-hypnotic involuntariness may provide a relatively 
pure measure of intentional binding. 
So, intentional binding involves beliefs regarding a causal relationship between 
actions and outcomes (Buehner & Humphreys, 2009) and prior beliefs about the 
environment are used to disambiguate sensory information (Ernst & Bulthoff, 2004) 
Therefore, if binding is driven by a cue combination mechanism, prior beliefs about 
causality are likely to be influential. The classic intentional binding task involves 
pressing a button or switch and triggering an outcome. In the developed world we have 
extensive experience of a similar situation every time we press a light switch or change 
the channel on a TV, and in the majority of situations the outcome occurs so rapidly 
following the action that it is almost instantaneous. It is likely that strong prior beliefs 
that button pressing triggering an instantaneous event develop over repeated experience 
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of such events. The simplest model for intentional binding is therefore a cue 
combination model with a causal prior arising from the experience of contingency of 
button presses and outcomes during ontogeny. Applicable models exist for binding 
across other modalities (e.g. Roach, Heron & McGraw, 2006), and could be explored 
using data from an intentional binding study in which the variability of action or 
outcome judgements is manipulated. 
I will now briefly consider how these results presented in this thesis relate to 
arguments regarding the relationship between implicit and explicit measures of sense of 
agency. The evidence for whether or not explicit judgements of agency track implicit 
judgements is mixed (Barlas & Obhi, 2014; Borhani, Beck & Haggard, 2017; Dewey & 
Knoblich, 2014; Ebert & Wegner, 2010; Moore, Middleton, Haggard and Fletcher, 
2012). In Chapter IV, a reduction in outcome binding accompanied verbal reports of a 
considerable reduction in the experience of agency over an action-outcome following a 
post-hypnotic suggestion of involuntariness. This is consistent with accounts that argue 
for a relationship between implicit measures and explicit judgements of agency. 
However, these results do not provide evidence that implicit and explicit measures 
cannot dissociate; for example, in this case motor intentions may provide information 
relevant both to intentional binding and explicit sense of agency, but the processes 
supporting each may be entirely distinct. Future studies testing hypnotic involuntariness 
in other implicit measures (e.g., sensory attenuation) might further inform theories of 
the relationship between implicit and explicit measures of sense of agency. 
I will now address issues relating to the other measure employed in these 
studies, Libet al’s (2013) judgements of the timing of an intention to move. Dominik et 
al (2017) report that W judgements are shifted earlier in time if they follow M 
judgements. The data for the study reported in Chapter II also show later average W 
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time when M judgements were also recorded (M = -143.7 ms, SD = 159.0; Study 3) than 
when W judgements alone were recorded (M = -63.4, SD = 12.8), t(36.61) = 2.45, p 
= .019, BH[0, 115] = 8.82 (B modelled as in  Chapter II). Dominik et al (2017) argue that in 
the absence of experience of M judgements, participants may interpret W judgements to 
be the timing of action occurrence, and that when M judgements are present, W time is 
at least partly inferred from M judgement timing (see also Gomes, 1988; Banks & 
Isham; 2009). However, Dominik et al (2017) do not report evidence for there being no 
difference between W and M timings in M judgement naïve participants, and in Chapter 
II a Bayesian meta-analysis revealed that for groups who differed in W judgements 
there was evidence for no difference in M judgements. Additionally, in Chapter II a 
negative relationship between hypnotisability and the distance between W and M 
judgements was found.  So, how can the influence of M on W timing in Study 3 of 
Chapter II be explained? It is possible that only some M judgement-naïve participants 
confuse W judgements with the timing of action, leading to later group average 
judgement time. Alternatively, experience with M judgements might help participants 
distinguish between information related to action and that related to intention, so that on 
average W timings are later when M judgements are taken.  
I turn now to consideration of a potential confound for the results presented here 
relating to both intentional binding and W judgements. Although the results here have 
been interpreted as evidence for differences in metacognition of intentions, there is a 
more prosaic explanation which cannot be ruled out; no attempt was made to control for 
the speed of participants’ movement in any of the cognitive tasks. A relatively slow, 
deliberate action might be expected to result in less variability of action timing 
judgements and consequently any differences in binding predicted by a cue combination 
mechanism. A slower button pressing speed would also result in an earlier W time, as 
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the time of action is recorded at the point of contact of the button and its sensor and not 
at the time of the initiation of movement, leaving more of a gap between action 
initiation and action completion for slow actions. Indeed, Buddhist mindfulness practice 
encourages slow, deliberate movement (Hanh, 1976). Hypnotisability, on the other hand 
may be positively correlated with motor impulsivity (Ludwig et al, 2013), and a 
tendency toward motor impulsivity could plausibly result in quicker and less deliberate 
button pressing. Therefore, future studies should control for this possible confound by 
measuring the speed of action in button pressing tasks. 
 The same criticism could apply to the correlation between motor impulsivity 
and W judgements reported in Caspar & Cleeremans (2015). These results are attributed 
to individual differences in the time that decisions occur, but they could alternatively 
arise from individual differences in metacognition of intentions. If so, it is possible that 
the relationship between motor impulsivity and W timing at least partly reflects the 
varying hypnotisability of participants. Future studies could explore this possible link 
between hypnotisability and motor impulsivity by testing for correlations with 
hypnotisability and motor impulsivity measures away from the hypnotic context. 
Disorders of agency 
I will now consider possible parallels between the results presented here and reports of 
intentional binding and W judgements in neurological and psychiatric conditions which 
are related to disorders in the sense of agency. Clinical groups with disorders of agency 
show differences from controls in direct measures of components of binding in a 
manner consistent with a cue combination mechanism. Wolpe et al (2013) report a 
relationship between high action binding and grey matter volume changes in preSMA in 
corticobasal syndrome. As corticobasal syndrome involves disorders of the sense of 
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agency and the preSMA is considered to support motor intention-related information, 
relatively high action binding in corticobasal syndrome (as in high hypnotisables; 
Chapter IV) may arise from low precision of action event timing judgements.  
Schizophrenia commonly involves disruptions to the sense of agency (Frith, 
2012; Jeannerod, 2009), and when performing an intentional binding task in which the 
predictability of an outcome is manipulated (Moore & Haggard, 2008), schizophrenic 
patients have been shown to rely more on external, retrospective cues than on internal 
predictive signals (e.g., motor intentions) compared to controls (Voss et al 2010). In the 
same study, greater action binding (as reported in Chapter V in trait hypnotisability) was 
seen in schizophrenic patients than in controls.   If both schizophrenia and 
hypnotisability are related to relatively low access to first order information about motor 
intentions, we should expect to see a similar pattern in highs. This possibility could be 
tested by applying Moore & Haggard’s (2008) method for testing relative reliance on 
internal and external cues to hypnotisable groups. 
In functional motor disorders (FMDs), patients present with symptoms of 
neurological disease (e.g., Parkinsonian tremors or epileptic fits). However, in FMDs, 
neurobiological evidence is inconsistent with these conditions and motor actions show 
signs typically associated with voluntary movements (e.g. distractibility). Hallett (2012) 
has argued that, to explain this “there must be a brain mechanism that allows voluntary 
movement to occur but to be experienced subjectively as involuntary.” The cold control 
theory of hypnosis may provide such an explanatory mechanism, in that FMDs may be 
a case of malfunctioning cold control. The hypnotic responding is voluntary (e.g., 
Hilgard, 1963; Orne, 1972), whereas in FMDs the production of an experience of 
involuntariness over voluntary action is itself involuntary. The key difference would 
therefore be that while hypnosis involves the voluntarily inaccurate metacognition of 
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intentions, in FMD, this mechanism is activated involuntarily.  FMDs have been 
associated with hypnosis since the 19th century, but while there is evidence that FMD 
patients show higher response to hypnotic suggestion (Roelofs et al, 2010), there is little 
direct evidence to link the two phenomena. However, there are patterns of results in 
cognitive tasks in FMD patients which mirror those reported for hypnotisables here. 
 In an intentional binding task, outcome binding is reduced in FMD patients 
compared to controls (Kranick et al, 2013), and this is consistent with FMD patients, 
like the high hypnotisables reported in Chapter V, having less reliable information about 
their action. FMD patients also report relatively late awareness of an intention to move 
(Edwards et al, 2011), as reported for high hypnotisables in Chapter II. Future work 
could further investigate the relationship between FMD and metacognition of intentions. 
Cold control theory could be therefore useful in suggesting previously unexplored 
possible treatments. For example, specific training in metacognition of intentions 
through mindfulness practice might decrease FMD symptoms by reducing the ability to 
form and maintain inaccurate HOTs of intending.  
According to HOT theory there should be two distinct routes to reductions in 
motor intention related information. The first involves a change in HOTs directed at 
intact first order representations, such as may occur in hypnotisability (and perhaps in 
FMDs). Disruption of information relevant to motor intentions might therefore be 
induced by TMS of the dlPFC. Indeed, there is evidence (Dienes & Hutton, 2013). 
Alternatively, a reduction in the availability of motor intention-related information to 
timing judgements could be the result of disruptions to first order representations, which 
may be supported by more caudal areas which include the preSMA. This is most likely 
to be the case in corticobasal syndrome, which is associated with alterations in the 
preSMA. 
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Conclusion 
The results presented in this thesis are consistent with the theory that hypnosis 
and mindfulness meditation are related to metacognition of intentions in opposing ways; 
the practice of mindfulness meditation may develop metacognition of intentions, while 
trait differences in the ability to respond to hypnotic suggestions may reflect differences 
in the availability of first order intentions to higher order thoughts (HOTs). Mindfulness 
meditators report an earlier awareness of an intention to move and less variable 
judgements when timing motor actions than non-meditators. Low hypnotisables report 
an earlier awareness of an intention to move and less variable motor action timing 
judgements than high hypnotisables. These results may reflect differences in higher 
order access to motor-intention related information. Explicit reports of the experience of 
involuntariness in hypnotic responding are reflected in a reduction in outcome binding, 
which may reflect a reduction in the precision of motor action timing judgements when 
motor intention-related information is afforded relatively low weighting in HOTs of 
intending. Mindfulness meditators report relatively strong outcome binding compared to 
non-meditators. High hypnotisables report relatively strong action binding compared to 
low hypnotisables. These results are consistent with a cue combination mechanism 
underlying both action and outcome binding. The Sussex-Waterloo Scale of 
Hypnotisability (SWASH) is a valid time-efficient measure of hypnotisability which 
may increase the viability of hypnosis research for the wider research community. 
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Supplemental material for Chapter II 
 
Study 2: correlations with individual measures of hypnotisability. 
There was no sensitive evidence for whether or not there was a correlation 
between W judgements and FFMQ-SF score, r(34)= -.231, p = .189, BH(0, .30)  = 1.75.
[1]  
There was a positive correlation between subjective hypnosis rating and Mean W 
judgement (M = -75.0 ms, SD = 84.5 ms) , r(34)= .44, p = .009, BH(0, .30)  = 15.60. 
Although between subjective and objective hypnosis ratings correlated, r(34)= .69, p< 
.001, BH(0, .82)= 16439.52,  there was no sensitive evidence for whether or not objective 
hypnosis rating (M = 2.0, SD = 1.4) correlated with W, r(34)= .19, p > .250, BH(0, .30)  = 
1.30. 
There was a negative correlation between subjective hypnosis rating (M = 9.5, 
SD = 4.6) and FFMQ score (M = 78.7, SD = 10.1), r(34)= -.45, p = .008, BH(0, .30)  = 
21.33. The correlation between FFMQ-SF score and objective hypnosis rating was 
r(34)= -.32, p = .063. BH(0, .30)  = 3.64. 
Study 3: correlations with individual measures of hypnotisability 
The correlation between objective hypnosis rating (M = 1.6, SD = 1.2) and W (M = -
143.7, SD = 159.0) was Spearman's ρ (28) = .35, p = .071, BH(0, .30) = 3.64. The 
relationship between objective hypnosis rating and M/W distance (M = 117.2, SD = 
120.2) was Spearman's ρ (28)= -.36, p = .060, BH(0, .30) = 4.16.  
There was no sensitive evidence for whether or not there was a correlation between 
subjective hypnosis rating (M = 8.6, SD = 4.8) and W, Spearman's ρ (28)= .239, p = 
.220, BH(0, .30)  = 1.66 nor for a correlation between M/W distance and subjective 
hypnosis rating, Spearman's ρ (28)= .-.297, p = .125, BH(0, .30)  = 2.47.    
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The evidence was not sensitive for whether or not there were correlations between 
FFMQ-SF and subjective hypnosis rating, Spearman's ρ (26)= -.233, p = .253, BH(0, .30)  
= 1.51, or objective hypnosis rating, Spearman's ρ (26)= -.029, p = .890, BH(0, .30) = .61. 
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Supplemental material for Chapter III 
 
Jo et al (2014) reported a non-significant difference in intentional binding 
between mindfulness meditators and age-matched controls. Meditators had similar 
levels of experience in the two studies. Jo et al (2014) reported slightly lower mean 
continuous meditation experience of 10.1 years (SD = 6.4) than in the current study 
(14.6 years (SD = 11.6)). Jo et al (2014) did not report the range of meditation 
experience, but in the current study experience ranged from 3-40 years. Both studies 
employed a cut-off of three years of continuous meditation experience. We will now 
consider the statistical evidence. Although the first study had a larger n (19 age-matched 
pairs), we report smaller SDs for all conditions. For example, the overall binding 
measure reported in in Jo et al (2014) has a SD of 170.4 ms for meditators and 105.0 ms 
for controls (98.9 ms and 62.6 ms respectively in the current study). The large SDs (and 
consequently large standard errors) mean that Jo et al’s study would have required more 
participants to provide evidence for a difference (by null hypothesis significance 
testing) or for evidence of no difference (by Bayesian analysis). It should be emphasised 
that although Jo et al found no significant difference between meditators and non-
meditators in intentional binding, a failure to reject the null hypothesis at a given alpha 
level does not provide evidence for the null hypothesis. However, Bayes factors can be 
employed to test evidence for the null hypothesis (Dienes, 2014, Wagenmakers et al, 
2016, Dienes, 2016), and in fact a meta-analysis of the results of the two studies 
provides sensitive evidence for an increase in overall binding and outcome binding.   
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In Jo et al (2014) non-meditators had total binding of 79 ms. Thus a difference 
between groups of about half this, or 40 ms, could reasonably be expected (Kranick et 
al, 2013). A Bayes factor, B can be used to assess the strength of evidence for the 
alternative hypothesis, H1, over the null hypothesis, H0, (Dienes, 2014). A B of less 
than 1/3 can be taken as substantial evidence for H0 over H1; between 1/3 and 3 as non-
evidential or only weakly evidential; and of greater than 3 as substantial evidence for 
H1 over H0.  For overall binding, BH(0, 40)= 2.56, which is weak evidence in favour of a 
difference between meditators and non-meditators. For outcome binding alone, BH(0, 45) 
= .54;  and for action binding, BH(0, 5.5)= 1.05, in both cases indicating insensitive 
evidence and no conclusions follow about the difference between meditators and non-
meditators for the separate components. 
Welch’s unpaired t-tests were used to compare binding measures across studies. 
The mean difference on action binding (-28.7 ms, SE = 33.1) was insensitive t(24) 
= .195, p = .369, BH(0, 9)= .99, as was the mean difference on outcome binding (39.3, SE 
= 35.7), t(23) = 1.10, p = .282, BH(0, 32) = .98 and overall binding (-68 ms, SE = 52.5), 
t(22) = 1.30, p = .208, BH(0, 40) = 1.08. Therefore, there is no sensitive evidence for a 
difference in the findings of the two studies. 
A fixed-effects meta-analysis was conducted on binding measures in meditators 
and controls reported here and in Jo, Hinterberger and Schmidt (2014) For overall 
binding, the mean difference = 63.2 ms, [2.9, 123.4], BH(0, 40)  = 4.36, supporting the 
group difference in overall binding. For outcome binding, the mean difference = 50.4 
ms, [6.2, 94.7], BH(0,  32)  = 5.90, providing support for a difference in outcome binding. 
The result for action binding was inconclusive, mean difference = 15.6 ms, [-15.9, 
47.2], BH(0, 9)  = 1.34.  
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Supplemental material for Chapter IV 
Total binding 
Table S1 shows the total binding measure and standard deviation of baseline 
action judgements in each condition for the high and medium hypnotisable groups. 
Table S2 shows p values, Bayes factors, 95% confidence intervals and effect size for 
post-hoc comparisons for each main effect for these groups.  
There was a significant main effect of condition on total binding, F(2, 44) = 
10.31, p < .001, η2p = .319, but no significant main effect of hypnotisability, F(1, 22) 
= .190, p > .250, η2p = .009.  The interaction between condition and group on total 
binding was also significant, F(2, 44) = 3.77, p = .031, η2p = .15 The theory that 
hypnotic response is experienced as passive predicts two key partial interactions. As 
predicted, there was an interaction between group and voluntary vs post-hypnotic 
conditions on total binding, F(1, 22) = 6.82, p = .016, BH(0, 72) = 13.89, η2p = .237. There 
was no evidence one way or the other for a predicted interaction between passive and 
post-hypnotic conditions, F(1,22) = 1.16, p  >.250, BH(0, 72) = 1.12, η2p = .050. Finally 
there was no sensitive evidence for an interaction between group and voluntary vs 
passive conditions on total binding, F(1,22) = 4.04, p = .057, BN(0, 72) = 1.80, η2p = .16. 
Simple effects analyses showed that for the high hypnotisable group there was a 
significant main effect of agency condition on total binding Fcorrected(1.09, 9.79) = 7.33, 
p = .021, η2p = .45. Compared to the voluntary condition, total binding was lower in 
both the passive action and post-hypnotic conditions in this group. There was also a 
significant main effect of agency on total binding in the medium hypnotisable group, 
F(2, 24) = 5.68, p = .009, η2p = .31. Total binding was greater in the voluntary and post-
hypnotic conditions than in the passive condition and there was evidence in this 
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combined measure for no difference between voluntary and post-hypnotic action in 
medium hypnotisables. 
Standard deviation of baseline action judgements  
There was a significant main effect of condition on baseline action judgement 
SD, F(2, 44) = 3.77, p = .031, η2p = .15, and also a significant main effect of group, , 
F(1, 22) = 14.59, p = .001, η2p = .399. There was a significant interaction between 
group and condition on this measure, F(2, 44) = 7.80, p = .001, η2p = .262, indicating 
that highly hypnotisable participants showed more variability in in their baseline action 
judgements during the post-hypnotic condition than in the voluntary condition. There 
was an interaction between group and voluntary vs post-hypnotic conditions on baseline 
action SD, F(1, 22) = 9.64, p = .005, BH(0, 35) = 44.14, η2p = .305, and between group and 
passive and post-hypnotic conditions, F(1,22) = 4.74, p  =. 040, BH(0, 35) = 5.57, η2p 
= .18. Finally there no evidence either way for an interaction between group and 
voluntary vs passive conditions, F(1,22) = 1.76, p = .198, BN(0, 35) = 0.84, η2p = .07. 
Analysis of simple effects showed that, for the high hypnotisable group, there was a 
significant main effect of condition on judgement SD in the baseline action condition, 
F(2, 18) = .5.44, p = .014, η2p = .38. Baseline action judgement SD was higher in the 
post-hypnotic condition than in the voluntary condition. For the medium hypnotisable 
group there was no significant main effect of agency on SD in the baseline action 
condition, F(2, 24) = 3.76, p = .074, η2p = .18. However, Bayesian analysis showed that 
baseline action SD was higher in the passive condition than in the voluntary condition. 
There was sensitive evidence for no difference in solo action baseline SD between the 
voluntary and post-hypnotic conditions. 
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Table S1: Total binding and mean SD of baseline action judgements for the high and 
medium hypnotisable groups in the three experimental conditions  
   Condition  
Group 
(hypnotisability) 
 Voluntary Post-hypnotic 
involuntariness 
Passive 
High     
 Total binding 158.6 (52.1) 94.0 (72.6) 73.7 (64.2)  
 SD of baseline 
action judgements 
80.7 (38.0) 133.1 (60.1) 113.5 (46.6) 
Medium     
 Total binding 130.2 (70.3) 143.0 (76.1) 87.4 (96.0)  
 SD of baseline 
action judgements 
62.0 (14.1) 65.0 (13.8) 74.6 (19.5) 
Mean times are given in ms (SD).
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Table S2: Post-hoc comparisons of total binding and solo action judgment SD between 
each condition in the high and medium hypnotisable groups. 
   Comparison  
Group 
(hypnotisability) 
 Voluntary action 
vs passive action 
Voluntary action 
vs Post-hypnotic 
suggestion 
Passive action 
vs post-
hypnotic 
suggestion 
High     
 Total 
binding 
  p < .001*               
BH(0, 79) = 
1.24x1016**     
[67.5, 102.4]             
dz = 2.17 
  p = .034*              
BH(0, 79) = 4.04**       
[5.9, 123.5]              
dz = 0.66 
p > .250                
BH(0, 79) = .66           
[- 87.2, 46.8]          
dz = 0.21  
 SD of 
baseline 
action 
judgements 
  p = .079                 
BH(0, 40) = 2.34           
[-70.4, 4.72]              
dz = 0.59 
p = .017*                
BH(0, 40) = 7.63**        
[-92.9, -11.9]            
dz = 0.83 
p = .176              
BH(0, 40) = 1.19           
[-49.7, 10.5]           
dz = 0.45 
Medium     
 Total 
binding 
p = .024*               
BH(0, 71.5) = 
5.76**          
[6.6, 79.0]          
dz= .64 
p > .250                
BH(0, 71.5) = 0.17        
[-49.6, 23.8]                       
dz = .20 
p = .009*            
BH(0, 71.5) = 
17.90**         
[-94.8, -16.5]                     
dz = .75 
 SD of 
baseline 
action 
judgements 
p = .033*                
BH(0, 31) = 3.35**        
[-24.0, -1.2]                           
dz = .60 
p > .250                    
BH(0, 31) = .28**         
[-12.8, 6.9]                                
dz = .17 
p = .159              
BH(0, 30.5) = .96          
[-4.3, 23.6]                       
dz = 0.39 
* Significant at the .05 level. ** Sensitive B (> 3 or < 1/3). Brackets contain 95% CIs 
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Results of analyses with all highly hypnotisable participants included. 
The results for all highly hypnotisable participants for which we have complete 
data (regardless of whether they were able to sustain an experience of involuntariness) 
are shown in table S3 and S4.  
 
Table S3: Mean binding for all highly hypnotisable participants in the three 
experimental conditions  
  Condition  
 Voluntary Post-hypnotic 
involuntariness 
Passive 
Total binding 159.9 (66.3) 103.2 (94.0) 85.5 (90.7)  
Action binding 21.6 (23.9) 15.8 (51.5) 9.3 (52.4) 
Tone binding -138.3 (68.4) -87.4 (85.3) -76.2 (117.8) 
Mean times are given in ms (SD). 
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Table S4: Post-hoc comparisons between each condition in all highly hypnotisable 
participants. 
 
  Comparison  
 Voluntary action vs 
passive action 
Voluntary action vs 
Post-hypnotic 
suggestion 
Passive action vs 
post-hypnotic 
suggestion 
Total binding   p =.004*                 
BH(0, 75) = 48.02**   
[27.8, 121.0]                
dz = 3.42 
p = .070                
BH(0, 75) = 2.85       
[-5.18, 118.5]                      
dz = 0.51 
p >.250                
BH(0, 75) = .59           
[-62.8, 27.4]                 
dz = 0.22 
Tone binding   p = .041*               
BH(0, 65.5) = 4.49**        
[-121.3, -2.8]                    
dz = 0.58 
p = .057                
BH(0, 65.5) = 3.33**      
[-103.3, 1.7]                        
dz = 0.54 
p > .250                 
BH 0, 65.5) = .54          
[-44.3, 62.8]           
dz = 0.11 
Action 
binding 
p > .250                   
BH(0, 4.5) = 1.26                 
[-11.8, 36.5]                
dz = 0.28 
 
p >.250                   
BH(0, 4.5) = 1.07              
[-18.5, 30.2]                
dz = 0.13 
p > .250               
BH(0, 4.5) = 1.04         
[-32.3, 45.3]                
dz = 0.09 
* Significant at the .05 level. ** Sensitive B (> 3 or < 1/3). Brackets show 95% Cis 
 
 
